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 II 
Abstract 
 
The topic of my dissertation is satire. This seems to excite many people, and over 
the past four years I have heard many variations of a similar refrain: “Oh, wow. 
You’re studying satire? That’s very topical. You must have a lot of material to work 
with.” There is a way in which this is true, though I suspect in a way that diverges 
from the way that most of my interlocutors believed. I suspect that the material 
they imagined me to be working with was the output of Donald Trump, first a 
candidate for and now holder of the office of President of the United States. That 
is not the material I find interesting. More interesting to me is their statement. It 
evinces a number of beliefs that I find interesting, chief among them that Trump 
makes the current period particularly apt for satire, as if a doddery and 
incompetent ruling class is somehow a recent phenomenon. And I suspect that 
underneath this belief in the aptness of satire is a belief in the power of satire. 
Satire is somehow how people are going to strike back at the vice-governed fools 
who rule us. Those beliefs are the material I want to work with. 
 This is my interest in satire, then: not so much what it is about satire that 
makes it powerful, but what is it about satire that makes people think it is 
powerful? And what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful when 
there is pretty powerful evidence that it is not? Unfortunately, here is where I run 
into the problem that in a very important way I do not have a lot of material to 
work with. There is not an awful lot on satire within the analytic tradition: outside 
of a few references to satire, analytic discussions of satire are limited to two short 
articles. Accordingly, I have taken the task of my dissertation to be to create an 
account of satire that helps to bring forward why satire is a thing that people can 
imagine to be powerful, that they can imagine to be politically effective. 
 My dissertation will effectively have two halves, one where I build my 
account and one where I begin to apply it. The purpose of applying my account, 
which will comprise the final two chapters, will not be to show its implications so 
much as how it can be used. My goal will not so much be to give definitive answers 
about the nature of satire, but rather to give a demonstration of how my account 
facilitates engaging questions about the role of satire in social and political 
context. 
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Introduction 
 
The topic of my dissertation is satire. This seems to excite many people, and over 
the past four years I have heard many variations of a similar refrain: “Oh, wow. 
You’re studying satire? That’s very topical. You must have a lot of material to work 
with.” There is a way in which this is true, though I suspect in a way that diverges 
from the way that most of my interlocutors believed. I suspect that the material 
they imagined me to be working with was the output of Donald Trump, first a 
candidate for and now holder of the office of President of the United States. That 
is not the material I find interesting, however. More interesting to me is their 
statement. It evinces a number of beliefs that I find interesting, chief among them 
that Trump, or Brexit, or Boris Johnson makes the current period particularly apt 
for satire, as if a doddery, hypocritical, and incompetent ruling class is somehow a 
phenomenon that emerged in the last five years. And I suspect that underneath 
this belief in the aptness of satire is a belief in the power of satire. Satire is 
somehow how we, the people, are going to strike back at the vice-governed fools 
who rule us. Those beliefs I find interesting, and those beliefs are the material I 
want to work with. 
 
 If those beliefs are indeed the beliefs of my interlocutors, they are not 
alone. Or, at least, they were not alone. The American election saw a number of 
high profile celebrations of the power of satire. Both Jon Stewart of The Daily 
Show and John Oliver of Last Week Tonight celebrated Trump announcing his 
candidacy for President, their perfect victim. The press echoed their words, with 
Buzzfeed, Salon, and Vox running articles about the comedians “destroying” and 
“annihilating” Trump. To me, the most striking example of this faith in satire is a 
tweet by former speechwriter for Barack Obama, Jon Favreau: “If Trump is the 
nominee, I actually think we should fund a SuperPAC that hires professional 
comedians to take him down with funny ads.”1 Half a year later, Trump was 
elected to be the 45th President of the United States. 
 
1 Jon Favreau, Twitter Post, February 29, 2016, 2:49 AM GMT, 
https://twitter.com/jonfavs/status/704136287800807424. 
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 This is my interest in satire, then: not so much what it is about satire that 
makes it powerful, but what is it about satire that makes people think it is 
powerful? And what is it about satire that makes people think it is powerful when 
there is pretty powerful evidence that it is not? Unfortunately, here is where I run 
into the problem that in a very important way I do not have a lot of material to 
work with. There is not an awful lot on satire within the analytic tradition: outside 
of a few references to satire, analytic discussions of satire are limited to two short 
articles. Accordingly, I have taken the task of my dissertation to be to create an 
account of satire that helps to bring forward why satire is a thing that people can 
imagine to be powerful, that they can imagine to be politically effective. 
 
 My dissertation will effectively have two halves, one where I build my 
account and one where I begin to apply it. The purpose of applying my account, 
which will comprise the final two chapters, will not be to show its implications so 
much as how it can be used. My goal will not so much be to give definitive answers 
about the nature of satire, but rather to give a demonstration of how my account 
facilitates engaging questions about the role of satire in social and political 
context. By framing my argument in such a way, I hope to keep my account 
respectfully distant from, but still useful to, disciplines like literary and media 
studies which have engaged questions of the nature and function of satire in 
concrete ways that philosophy cannot (and should not). 
 
 The first chapter focuses on the meaning of a work of art and trust. Work 
meaning is standardly understood in terms of Gricean reflexive intentions, and I 
will show that this allows for the relation between the artist, art work, and 
audience to be thought of in terms of trust. Under a reflexive intentions approach, 
the meaning of a work of art is understood in some way incorporate the work’s 
making intentions. Since the intentions must be apparent to the audience, the 
work’s meaning is in some way delimited by what the audience believes the 
intentions could be. What the audience believes the intentions could be is 
determined by, in part, how much and in what way the audience trusts the 
capability and character of the artist: that the artist is capable enough for some 
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salient feature to be intentional, or that the artist has the sort of character that 
they might intend some critical point. Identifying trust as essential to 
understanding the meaning of a work of art allows the first chapter to form a base 
of everything that follows. Trust will be used to spell out how satiric 
misrepresentation works in chapter 2, how satiric humour works in chapter 3, how 
it is a virtue of satire to be clear in chapter 4, how humour is ethically evaluable in 
chapter 5, and how satire is understood in political context in chapter 6. The first 
chapter is also important in a framing way that does not show up directly in the 
subsequent arguments, which is that I think it also helps with thinking of works of 
art as existing in a social context, rather than as an object to be appreciated or 
consumed. 
 
 Chapter two provides an account of satiric misrepresentation. The chapter 
comprises two halves, the first of which is to argue for my account of 
misrepresentation and the second of which is to use that account to build my 
account of satire. I argue for misrepresentation in the context of depiction, 
because I believe the case of depiction to be the most intuitively difficult. 
(Accounts of depiction standardly require the picture to in some way “look like” 
that picture’s subject, so pictorial misrepresentation requires that a picture 
simultaneously look like its subject and pointedly not look like its subject.) I settle 
on an account of misrepresentation that foregrounds the attribution of properties 
to a referred-to subject that that subject does not possess. In the second part of 
the chapter, I give an account of the sort of misrepresentation that is particular to 
satire. Satiric misrepresentation requires that the misrepresentation be funny, and 
that the misrepresentative properties either constitute or convey a criticism of the 
subject.  
 
 Humour, the other key component of satire, is the subject of chapter three. 
As with the previous chapter, this one also has two sections. First I build my 
account of humour, and then I incorporate it into my account of satire. My account 
of humour is novel: in contrast to conventional accounts of humour — which I term 
“internalist,” for their identification of humour with phenomena inside the body 
— I offer an account of humour as a social practice. This is to say that humour is a 
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historically-developed activity centred around, but not necessarily limited to, 
trying to provoke laughter. I support this with historical and anthropological 
evidence showing that the practice of humour has historically been quite diverse, 
and diverse in such a way that existing internalist theories cannot readily account 
for. Importantly, that humour is a social practice allows there to be a heavy social 
element in understanding how humour works. I give a heavy importance to the 
ideas of laughing with and laughing at, and show how the social dynamics of a joke 
(who gets to laugh and who gets laughed at) can be integral to whether a practice 
is humorous at all. The second half of the chapter examines the essential and non-
essential uses of humour in satire. I show that not only is humour essential to 
satiric misrepresentation, but it can be used to distinguish between Horatian and 
Juvenalian approaches to satire. Humour is also frequently used in satire to 
generate a tone switch, which is used to signal to the audience that the work they 
are engaging with is indeed satirical. 
 
 The fourth chapter performs three tasks. First, I collate the first three 
chapters to offer my full account of satire: A work of art is satirical, in part or in 
whole, insofar as it criticizes a target by way of a funny misrepresentation. 
Second, I compare my account against the existing literature, especially in literary 
studies. The literary work is invoked not to criticize it, but to perform the 
important task of showing that how I have approached satire tracks what is 
commonly understood as satire. I have not accidentally applied the title of 
“satire” to some genre of my own invention. There are, broadly speaking, three 
main waves of satiric theory: One in the late-17th Century with John Dryden at its 
centre, one in the mid-20th Century with Northrop Frye at its centre, and one 
closer to the present that no longer considers satire to be a unified phenomenon. I 
show that my account of satire fits comfortably with all three generations of 
theory. I conclude the chapter by using my account of satire to draw out the value 
of clarity, which I consider to be particularly important to satire.  
 
 With the fifth chapter I begin the application of my account of satire. The 
focus is on satire that fails to be satire because its core humour is unethical. The 
core of the chapter focuses on the ethical evaluation of humour, and how that 
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works under the social account of humour. I show that understanding humour as a 
social phenomenon that can succeed or fail based on social factors allows humour 
to be analyzed as an exercise of power. If a humour act constitutes an unjust or 
otherwise immoral exercise of power, the humour may fail because it repels 
participation. Drawing from my arguments on trust and clarity, I show that one of 
the central tasks of the satirist is to make their moral position clear. If the moral 
position of the satirist is dubious, then the humour will suffer because the 
audience cannot participate wholeheartedly, and if the humour suffers then the 
satire as a whole suffers. A consequence of my argument is that no topics are ever 
“out of bounds” for satire, but the more morally complicated an issue is, the more 
important it is that the satirist is clear about where they morally stand.  
 
 In the sixth and final chapter, I put my account of satire in the context of 
mass media. Works produced in a mass media context, I show, have not only a 
number of makers but an even larger number of candidate makers. A lot of people 
can influence the content of a mass media work of satire. That so many people can 
influence the content of a mass media work of satire creates a significant drag on 
the value of mass media satire because it undercuts the audience’s trust. Even if 
only one name is presented as a work’s writer or director, the audience has to 
consider the possibility that the work was shaped and directed by producers, 
executives, and other people with intentions that are standardly thought of as 
orthogonal to artistic achievement. I examine two sorts of mass media satire, 
mock news and what I call “ensconced” satire. I argue that mock news should not 
be expected to be very effective at changing people’s beliefs because in most 
cases, most of the time, the people watching mock news shows are watching what 
they are because they already agree with what is being said. In the case of 
ensconced satire, I show that the mass media context invariably undercuts a 
satire’s clarity because the mass media context makes it difficult for the audience 
to trust a work’s makers.  
 
 I offer a short, mildly optimistic conclusion. I may not think that satire is 
very powerful, but understanding why people think it is powerful is useful. If 
contemporary politics is full of people trying to do politics with satire, then an 
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understanding of satire conveys, at least in part, an understanding of how to do 
politics.  
 7 
Chapter One: Trust 
 
 This chapter is about trust, specifically the trust of an artwork’s author by 
that work’s audience. To illustrate what I mean, here are two reviews of Adam 
Sandler’s movie Jack and Jill (2011), where Adam Sandler plays both Jack 
Sadelstein and his twin sister Jill (in drag). The film was generally panned and 
TimeOut’s Matt Singer offered a typical review: 
 
Adam Sandler’s new comedy may be totally mediocre, but that’s still a 
big step up from the intensely unwatchable comedies he produced last 
year (see – or rather, don’t – ‘Just Go with It’ and ‘Zookeeper’). Sandler 
plays both title characters: Jack, a struggling adman, and Jill, the 
vulgar, oafish twin sister who becomes his unwanted houseguest. 
Admittedly, the film is merely a series of random celebrity cameos and 
shameless product placements (in one case, both – thank you, the guy 
from the Subway advert!). But there are a few moments of inspired 
absurdity, mostly provided by a surprisingly energetic Al Pacino, playing 
himself and channeling the smitten millionaire Joe E Brown from ‘Some 
Like It Hot’, as he falls head over heels for Jill.2 
 
Against the consensus, Armond White of the New York Film Critics’ Circle (since 
expelled) wrote one of his most famous contrarian reviews: 
 
Adam Sandler’s comedies are not “dumb fun,” maybe that’s why 
they’re not in critics’ favor. Sandler’s hilarious new film Jack and Jill 
(in which he portrays both male and female fraternal twins), brings to 
mind the great line that Ernst Lubitsch’s classic 1946 female plumber 
comedy Cluny Brown “upset people who didn‘t like to admit they have 
plumbing.” 
In Jack and Jill, Sandler looks at sibling rivalry without that acrid love 
of dysfunction so popular on TV and Broadway. It’s obvious that Los 
 
2 Matt Singer, “Jack and Jill,” Time Out, January 14, 2011, 
http://www.timeout.com/london/film/jack-and-jill. 
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Angeles ad exec Jack and his hefty, homely, still unmarried sister Jill 
who visits from New York will mend their rift but the fun is in 
watching the healing process. The film’s comedy (as in coach potato 
behavior) shows the depths of kinship–similarities siblings can’t help 
sharing but learn to accept in themselves. And Sandler’s always 
protective–as when Jack insults Jill but warns “I can say that because 
I’m her twin.”3 
 
While critics disagreeing is neither new nor rare, these two reviews contrast 
specifically not just in what they take Sandler to be doing, but in whether or not 
they are willing to believe that Sandler is doing much of anything at all. According 
to White, Sandler is making a statement on the power of family and love. Singer, 
on the other hand, believes that the film provides nothing more than “a series of 
random celebrity cameos and product placements.” Of particular note is White 
asserting against the critical consensus that Sandler movies are not “dumb fun.” 
White states that the films are funny, so it’s the “dumb” part to which he objects. 
However a film’s intelligence is to be understood — that of the maker, perhaps? — 
White argues that there is much there while Singer sees none, and this in turn 
affects how White interprets the film, pulling out the lesson of familial love. 
 
 What I would like to do in this chapter is provide a philosophical account of 
how an audience’s judgement of an author should affect their interpretation of the 
work in turn. My argument will proceed in two stages. In the first section I will use 
Ted Cohen’s account of understanding metaphors to argue that when a listener 
interprets a speaker, that listener must make a judgement on the character of the 
speaker. This section will also make use of Donald Davidson’s work on 
malapropisms, and Paul Grice’s work on communication. In the second section I will 
show that this account of judgement fits with every sort of approach to artistic 
interpretation. To do this, I will section approaches to artistic interpretation into 
three broad groups — accounts that identify a work’s meaning with the real 
author’s intentions (actual intentionalism), accounts that identify a work’s meaning 
with either a fictional author’s intentions or the real author’s hypothetical 
 
3 http://www.nyfcc.com/2011/11/jack-and-jill-reviewed-by-armond-white-for-cityarts/ 
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intentions (hypothetical intentionalism), and anti-intentionalist accounts that hold 
that a work’s meaning is separate from author’s intentions, real or hypothetical. I 
will conclude the chapter by arguing that, as a result of the way that interpreting a 
work requires an audience to make a judgement about a works’ author, there is a 
way in which the audience is trusting that author. 
 
1.1 Meaning and Reflexive Intentions 
 
Paul Grice’s work on meaning and communication is the base from which what the 
rest of what I will write follows. When talking about meaning, I will be talking 
about what Grice identifies as “non-natural meaning,” in opposition to “natural 
meaning.”4 Instances of natural meaning are simply cases of one thing entailing 
another, as with the statement “these spots mean measles.”5 (If it turned out that 
the spots were a result of something other than measles, then it would not have 
been the case that they meant measles.) Non-natural meaning, on the other hand, 
is what is meant by some uttered signal, sign, or speech act. For example, the 
crossing guard holding up his hand means that you should stop and not cross the 
road, and the chimes on the subway train mean that the doors are about to close.  
 
 In his 1957 work “Meaning,” Grice sets out to elucidate what is necessary to 
communicate by way of non-natural meaning. He starts his account negatively, 
considering possible cases that fall short of communication. His first case is of 
someone putting on a tailcoat to go to a dance (apparently something people did in 
1957).6 If putting on tailcoats necessarily leads to going to dances, then someone 
putting on a tailcoat naturally means that they are going to a dance, and this is a 
case of natural meaning. However, there is nothing in this case to suggest that it is 
being used for communication. Grice notes that he could stipulate that he has 
arranged a system where putting on a tailcoat is used to communicate that he is 
going to a dance, but then this renders the example uninformative since “it is 
 
4 Paul Grice, “Meaning,” in Studies in the Way of Words, ed. Paul Grice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 215. 
5 Grice, 213. 
6 Ibid, 216. 
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communicative” is stipulated.7 What makes this stipulated case communicative is 
not illuminated. 
 
 Next Grice engages cases of deliberately and openly letting someone know. 
There is a difference, Grice writes, between letting someone know something and 
telling them that same thing. He gives the following contrasting cases: 
(1) I show Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to 
Mrs. X. 
(2) I draw a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this same manner and show it 
to Mr. X.8 
In the first case, the photograph only has meaning in the natural sense. The 
interaction between Mr. Y and Mrs. X suggests an affair, and the photograph in a 
sense shows that. The drawn picture shows the same state of affairs. However, 
Grice writes that in the case of the drawing, the act of drawing the picture may 
constitute an act of communication only under certain circumstances. If I am idly 
doodling something I happened to see, the pen and paper just recreate the 
function of the camera. On the other hand, if Mr. X understands me to be intending 
to show him that Mr. X and Mrs. Y are having an affair, then there is a case of 
communication.  
 
 From the above case, Grice draws out two elements that are crucial to 
communication. The first is that non-natural meaning comes from intentions.9 The 
communicative intention of me in drawing the picture creates and communicates 
meaning in a way that cannot be explained merely in terms of what is depicted in 
the picture that I draw for Mr. X. The second is that for communication to occur, it 
must be the case that the audience, in this case Mr. X, understands the non-natural 
meaning by way of recognizing my intentions to convey that meaning. If I am 
making the drawing for myself, to make sense of what I have seen, then I am not 
communicating with Mr. X even if he should look over my shoulder and understand 
what has happened.10 Grice draws out this second distinction with another 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Grice, 218. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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example, this one of two cases of someone frowning.11 I will add a third case, and 
add the context that this is happening during a game of poker. In the first case 
there is the case where player A has received bad cards and, unable to control 
herself, frowns in displeasure.  In the second case, player A has received good 
cards but, wanting to pretend otherwise, affects a frown to show displeasure. In 
the third case, player A has received bad cards and, wanting to indicate this much 
to her friend in the crowd, frowns. In the first case, the frown has merely natural 
meaning. A is displeased, and the frown shows that. In the third case, the frown is 
a way to communicate that A has received bad cards. She intends to show 
displeasure to indicate that she has bad cards to her friend, and her friend 
recognizes this. In the second case, there is non-natural meaning but not 
communication. Player A intends to pretend that she has bad cards. Furthermore, A 
intends the other players to understand that she has bad cards. Importantly, 
however, A does not intend for the other players to recognize that it is her 
intention for them to understand that she has bad cards. As such, despite intending 
to generate an understanding in the other players, A is not communicating with 
them.  
 
 The outcome of these investigations is the following formulation: 
Communication by means of x occurred iff A uttered x with the intention of 
inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention.12 In the context of 
the third poker case, the frown is the utterance, that she has bad cards is the 
belief, and, in contrast with the second example, her friend understands that she 
has bad cards by way of recognizing that A intends to convey this information.  
 
 This is not to say that what Grice put forward is necessarily correct, or 
universally accepted. There are different approaches, with more or less priority 
placed upon speaker’s meaning or the process of interpretation, as just two 
possibilities. For example, while Grice presents a model where the listener is 
merely trying to interpret the utterance, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson present a 
model called “relevance theory,” where the listener is simultaneously interpreting 
 
11 Ibid, 219. 
12 Ibid, 219. 
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the utterance and deducing what the utterance is.13 However, that is not an issue 
here since all that is needed is that this interplay of intentions happens. What I will 
focus on in the next section is the part of interpretation that focuses on the 
audience figuring out the speaker’s intentions. I believe that nothing that I will 
either report or put forward is dependent on specifically Grice’s account of 
reflexive intentions, so nothing will depend on the reader committing to Grice at 
the expense of some other account of interpretation. Furthermore, I believe that 
Grice’s approach is particularly apt for engaging the interpretation of works of art 
— when the question of interpreting a work is standardly engaged, it is approached 
by way of asking how the meaning of some work is to be accessed. The work, like 
the utterance in the Gricean model, is assumed from the start. Nevertheless, 
Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory will feature in section 2.1 on the question of 
how an audience knows when it is engaging with a work of art. 
 
1.2 Metaphor and Linguistic Competence 
 
In this section I want to engage with Ted Cohen’s analysis of understanding 
metaphor in his book Thinking of Others. In it, he argues that the ability to 
understand metaphors is rooted in the human capacity to imagine things from 
someone else’s perspective. I will then extend his argument in two ways. First, I 
will argue that essential to understanding metaphor is some judgement of the 
speaker by the listener — if the listener wants to know what the speaker really 
means, then the listener will be making assumptions or conclusions as to who and 
what the speaker is. Second, I will argue that this approach of judging the speaker 
generalizes from understanding metaphor to all language.  
 
 In Thinking of Others, Cohen does not seek to define metaphor, choosing 
instead to direct readers to the works of Joseph Stern and Roger White.14 Rather, 
he identifies a number of identifying characteristics of metaphor. Metaphor is, 
 
13 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, “Outline of Relevance Theory,” HERMES — Journal of Language 
and Communication in Business 3, no.5 (2015): 35-56. 
14 Ted Cohen, Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor, (Princeton: Princeton university 
Press, 2012): 1. 
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primarily, one of a number of ways of thinking of one thing in terms of another.15 
What makes metaphor distinct are two features. The first feature is that in the 
case of metaphor there is no literal equivalence between the two halves.16 
Consider the metaphor “Juliet is the Sun,” uttered by Romeo in Romeo and Juliet. 
Romeo does not mean to ascribe to Juliet all literal properties of the Sun — he is 
not calling her a flaming ball of gas millions of miles from the Earth. Moreover, 
while he may be ascribing some properties of the Sun to Juliet, for example that 
she is radiant and lifegiving, the import17 of the metaphor is such that the saying 
“Juliet is radiant, and lifegiving, and so on” is not equivalent. This leads to Cohen 
writing that the subject of a metaphor, in this case Juliet, is regarded as a 
compound entity: Juliet-as-the-Sun.18 The second feature of metaphors is that the 
metaphorical identity is not symmetrical.19 This is to say that while the import of 
the “Juliet is the Sun” metaphor may be to see Juliet as the Sun, it is not to see 
the Sun as Juliet. Juliet is to be regarded in the same way that we regard the Sun 
— grand, life-giving — but the Sun is not to be regarded in the same way that we 
regard Juliet — young, romantic, prone to rash decisions. It is these two features 
that guide Cohen’s subsequent investigation. 
 
 Cohen roots human capacity to understand metaphor in the capacity for a 
person to think of himself as someone else. This sort of “interpersonal imagining” is 
at the base of how we learn to relate to other people.20 He uses the example where 
Bart, having done something to Abner, is asked “how would you like that if you 
were Abner?” Bart is asked to imagine himself as Abner, and how he would react in 
such a situation. Bart imagines himself not just as Abner, since he can already tell 
that Abner did not like how he was treated, but specifically as Bart-as-Abner. This 
is part of empathy, Cohen writes, as the purpose of the Bart-as-Abner identification 
is for Bart to feel as Abner does.21  
 
15 Cohen, 2. 
16 Cohen, 2. 
17 Cohen uses the term “import” instead of “meaning” since he feels like the latter may question-
beg in favour certain definitions of metaphor in a way that is unnecessary.  
18 Ibid, 3. 
19 Ibid, 8. 
20 Ibid, 16. 
21 To be clear, Cohen does not hold that all interpersonal imagination is of this sort, just that these 
sorts of interpersonal imaginations do exist and are fundamental to the human experience. 
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  The way that Cohen frames understanding metaphor fits comfortably with 
approaches that adopt Grice’s strategy of reflexive intentions. Just as the Gricean 
model of communication requires a listener to understand the mindset of a 
speaker, so too is understanding metaphor — on Cohen’s model — a subspecies of 
understanding the minds of other people. To understand what Romeo means when 
he says that Juliet is the Sun requires understanding Romeo’s mind in two stages. 
First, it is necessary to recognize that Romeo intends to communicate 
metaphorically, and that he is not earnestly asserting that Juliet actually is the 
Sun. Second, when Romeo is identified as communicating by way of metaphor, to 
get the metaphorical import of what Romeo intends to communicate the listener 
must then take up Romeo’s perspective of Juliet. To frame this in Gricean terms, 
Romeo has uttered “Juliet is the Sun” with the intention of inducing in the listener 
the perspective of regarding Juliet as the Sun by means of the listener recognizing 
that that is what Romeo intends to communicate. 
 
 If the process of understanding metaphor centrally involves understanding 
the speaker’s perspective, then an important issue comes into focus. Given that 
metaphors require the listener to take up the perspective of the speaker, the 
listener must also endeavour to figure out what the speaker’s perspective is. 
Figuring out the speaker’s perspective, in turn, requires the listener making some 
judgement as to the character of the speaker. By the “character” of the speaker, 
what I mean is that the speaker is not just judging the intentions of the speaker, 
but the sort of person the speaker is. In the case of Romeo’s “Juliet is the Sun,” 
this task is not difficult since the sentence is uttered in the context of a well-
known stage play. Romeo is a young man in love with Juliet, so knowledge of that 
should be used by us in interpreting the metaphor to determine what his 
perspective is towards both Juliet and the Sun. Furthermore, the listener (and 
audience) may bring to bear contextual knowledge, such as how the Sun is usually 
invoked in metaphor. However, as Cohen notes, the character of speakers may be 
more or less opaque. For fictional characters, such as Romeo, this is less often a 
problem since they are placed in the context of the work, which contains not just 
the other content of the work to help frame the character but also general artistic 
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conventions such as genre that guide audience expectations. When Romeo calls 
Juliet the Sun, part of how Romeo’s character is interpreted is by way of him being 
the protagonist in a romance. In real life, however, many speakers will be near or 
total strangers to the listener. For example, were a stranger to pull me aside, 
gesture to someone across the street, and say “he’s a weasel in a cardboard shirt,” 
I would have little to no idea what he actually meant, even though I could 
speculate as to possible meanings.  
 
 Understanding how judgement of Romeo’s character influences how his 
metaphor is to be understood can be better drawn out by imagining the same 
metaphorical phrase, “Juliet is the Sun,” uttered by three different versions of 
Romeo. The first is the Romeo that exists within Romeo and Juliet, the young 
lover. The second is Romeo*, the father of Juliet*. While the metaphor as uttered 
by both Romeo and Romeo* express affection, the sort of the affection understood 
by the listener would be different in each case. The romantic affection expressed 
by Romeo is not the same as the paternal affection expressed by Romeo*, so the 
import of the metaphor as expressed by each one is different. This difference in 
import, in turn, is understood by the listener by way of what they believe the 
character of the Romeo to be. Another case can help draw this example out 
further. Consider Romeo**, a severely ill but recovering patient referring to his 
doctor Juliet**. In this case, the import of “Juliet is the Sun” would not concern 
affection as the first two cases did, but a specifically restorative role for Juliet, as 
the coming of the Sun signals a new day after the night. A listener could 
nevertheless understand “Juliet is the Sun” from Romeo** to be the same as uttered 
by the original Romeo, but then that would depend on a judgement of Romeo** 
made by the listener — in this case that Romeo** was romantically infatuated with 
Juliet**. 
 
 It is important to note that most speakers, real and fictional, will fall 
somewhere between the extremes of total transparency and total opacity. Casual 
acquaintances may have some knowledge of each other’s character within a 
particular environment — such as a workplace — and have some confidence in 
judging each other’s character through that. Some works of art are more heavily 
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embedded in a context than others, and so the characters may be more distant to 
audiences from foreign cultures. For example, Shim Sung-Bo’s film Haemoo (2014) 
features an archetypical Korean sea captain that North American audiences may 
have trouble judging and understanding without knowledge of Korean folklore and 
archetypes. 
 
 Another way of understanding what is going on, with noting the importance 
of a speaker’s character to the import of their metaphor, is that metaphor is 
extremely context sensitive. The metaphor’s import relies heavily on the 
circumstances in which it is uttered. Approached this way, the speaker is one 
prominent relevant feature of the utterance’s context, and judging the speaker’s 
character is part of understanding that context. 
 
 This analysis of judging character to understand metaphor can be applied 
back to language more fully. If communication is understood through a model that 
uses reflexive intentions — which is to say that in instances of communication the 
speaker has an intended meaning that she intends for the listener to understand 
through recognition of this intention, and that the listener understands the speaker 
by him understanding her intentions — then judging a person’s character is 
necessary to understanding their intentions. Most of the time this is trivial, since 
the only judgement necessary for most ordinary conversation is that the speaker is 
a competent speaker of the relevant language. However, there are still cases 
where such judgements are necessary. For example, a few years ago I stumbled 
into a clothing store after having been soaked by a bus, and asked for “clean 
pants.” In Britain, “pants” are often taken to mean underwear. Mercifully, the 
store clerk identified that I was North American and directed me towards what the 
British call “trousers,” but in North America are called “pants.” The store clerk 
made a judgement about me, and used that to determine my intentions. 
 
 Judgements of these sort give rise to a kind of trust. More specifically, the 
way that the listener interprets the speaker will depend on the degree to which the 
listener trusts the speaker. This trust can take several forms. In most cases, trust 
will simply take the form of trusting that the speaker is a sufficiently competent 
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speaker of some language. In the case of metaphor, this means that when Romeo 
says that “Juliet is the Sun,” the listener trusts Romeo that he has spoken what he 
means to say, and that he knows that Juliet is not literally the Sun, therefore he is 
speaking metaphorically. What I write will be brushing by the philosophical field of 
epistemology of testimony. However, everything I write should be neutral to any 
commitments within that discourse. 
 
 The strength of the language of trust is that it is particularly apt for 
explaining cases where what is at issue is not simply linguistic competency. A good 
example to consider here would be Donald Davidson’s use of Mrs. Malaprop in his 
paper “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.”22 The defining trait of Mrs. Malaprop is 
that she will frequently use the wrong words in conversation. So, following the title 
of the paper, instead of saying “a nice arrangement of epigraphs,” she will instead 
utter “a nice derangement of epitaphs.” In this case, her linguistic competence is 
not in question: Mrs. Malaprop is linguistically incompetent. However, Davidson 
notes, she is nevertheless reliably understood.23 It is my contention that the 
language of trust makes good sense of this in a way that goes beyond the concept 
of belief, reasonable or unreasonable belief, or knowledge. Even if she is not a 
competent speaker, the listener may still trust Mrs. Malaprop to be attempting to 
communicate sensibly — that she is keeping to the topic at hand, that there is a 
reason that she is addressing the listener, and that, even if she is not succeeding, 
she is at least trying to say what she means. In Gricean terms, the listener would 
be trusting that she is abiding by the cooperative principle.24  
 
 Foreign or classical films are also cases where the language of trust is very 
helpful. In the case of the Shim Sung-Bo film Haemoo, the audience may trust that 
since he, Shim, has been allowed to direct a major film, and has had a good 
apprenticeship, that his film will be crafted with care and that the sea captain 
character is not simply underwritten. However, since Shim is also a first-time 
 
22 Donald Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” in Truth and Interpretation, ed. Ernest 
Lepore, 433-446, (London: Blackwell, 1986). 
23 Davidson, 440. 
24 Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Studies in the Way of Words, ed. Paul Grice, 26 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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director, the audience may also have difficulty trusting him fully. As such, the 
audience may not be completely sure about how to understand the sea captain 
character. I believe that this is another strength of the language of trust: trust is 
not necessarily total or totally absent, and in cases where the listener or audience 
may only trust the speaker to a certain degree, there will be an uncertainty as to 
the nature of the speaker’s actions and utterances.   
 
1.3 Trust 
 
I have begun to talk about trust, so it would be helpful at this point to appeal to 
the existing literature on trust to clarify what I mean. There is a healthy and 
growing literature on trust, although not that much focuses on just what trust is. 
When trust is the focus, it is generally thought of in terms of “places.” This is to 
say that there is one-place trust (where person A is generally trusting), two-place 
trust (where person A trusts person B), and three-place trust (where person A 
trusts person B in some domain P). While Paul Faulkner argues that it is the first-
two places that are relevant for understanding trust — it is between the two 
people that trust occurs — most discussions focus on the three-place variant.25 For 
this section I will also focus on trust in two-places, although I will not be following 
Faulkner’s lead. Rather I will be focusing on two places because I will show in the 
section on trust and interpretation that, in cases of engaging, appreciating, and 
interpreting art, the audience may be trusting a work’s author or creator in several 
different domains. 
 
 Two-place trust generally comprises two distinct parts. First there is 
reliance, where A relies on B.26 “Reliance” is used in a technical sense here — as 
Katherine Hawley writes, “to rely on someone to x is to act on the supposition that 
she will x.”27 This is somewhat different form the colloquial use of “reliance,” 
which often has a connotation of some power dynamic, and to say that A relies on 
B is to say that A is at the mercy of B, and A requires B to perform some task for A 
that A cannot for herself. Importantly, Hawley notes, under this technical sense of 
 
25 Paul Faulkner, “The Attitude of Trust is Basic,” Analysis 75, no.3 (2015): 424 
26 Faulker, 426. 
27 Katherine Hawley, “Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,” Noûs 48, no.1 (2014): 3. 
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reliance, relying on someone to x does not mean believing that she will x.28 
Reliance is about acting, not believing; A could act on the supposition that B will 
do some x that A believes B is very unlikely to do, although that would be either 
foolish or desperate.  
 
 Different philosophers delineate the “reliance” part of trust in different 
ways. For example, Karen Jones writes that the way A relies on B in trust is that 
she has an “attitude of optimism” towards the “goodwill and competence” of B.29 
She explains this to mean that A anticipates that B will have and display 
competence and goodwill in their interactions.30 Hawley, instead of focusing on 
goodwill and optimism, writes that reliance resides in A’s belief that B has a 
commitment to doing something or acting in some way.31 Commitments, to 
Hawley, are normative expectations that most often (but not necessarily) arise 
from a combination of convention and mutual expectation.32 Zac Cogley provides a 
different approach to Jones’ understanding of reliance, and writes that in trust A 
believes that B will act with goodwill and competence.33 Where Jones stresses 
optimism, Cogley stresses belief. This means that to Jones, trust is an affective 
attitude, whereas to Cogley, trust is a sort of belief. This distinction, between 
affective attitude and belief, is the main point of contention in defining trust, but 
it is not relevant to what I will propose in this chapter. To the extent that I 
address it, it will be in section 3 where I argue that the relationship between 
audience and author is peculiar, since there is some way that the audience must 
place themselves at the mercy of a work’s author to fully appreciate a work of art. 
 
 The second part of trust is largely agreed upon, and it is of the form that 
however the first piece of trust is understood, that first piece will be a direct and 
compelling but not indefeasible reason for B acting in accordance with A’s attitude 
or belief. I will call this part the reflexivity condition. The exact form this part 
takes will depend on how the first part is formulated. So, to Jones, B is “directly 
 
28 Hawley, 10. 
29 Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics 107, no.1 (1996): 4. 
30 Jones, 6. 
31 Hawley, 10. 
32 Ibid, 13. 
33 Zac Cogley, “Trust and the Trickster Problem,” Analytic Philosophy 53, no.1 (2012): 35. 
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and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her,” whereas to 
Hawley, B will take having a relevant commitment to be a reason to fulfill that 
commitment.34 The main role of the reflexivity condition is to separate trust from 
mere reliance, and this is often justified with a comparison to relying on a 
machine. While one may rely on a machine for many things (for example, I am 
relying on one right now, to write this chapter), the machine does not respond to 
this reliance. It is neither motivated, nor affected.  The same analysis goes for 
other things or processes that are not agents — the ebb and flow of the tides, the 
Sun coming up in the morning, and so on. While we may talk about trusting in a 
computer, that is considered to be colloquial talk with no relevance to this 
discussion.   
 
 To this point I have provided the following: 
• An introduction to the importance of reflexive intentions, using Grice’s 
account of communication as a base. 
• A brief summary of Cohen’s account of how human’s understand metaphor. 
• An argument that Cohen’s account of understanding metaphor is consistent 
with a theory of communication that works via reflexive intentions.  
• Making sense of metaphors requires the listener to make some sort of 
judgement about the speaker, and that this approach is generalizable to 
language more broadly. 
• And, lastly, in light of these judgements, there are many cases where it 
makes sense to speak of the listener trusting the speaker. 
In the next section, I want to take the above and show that they may be applied to 
interpretation in art. This will take the form of a brief survey of approaches to 
interpretation in art where I show that each involves a judgement about the person 
of the author. I will conclude the section and chapter by arguing that interpreting a 
work of art will often involve the audience trusting a work’s author in the way that 
a listener may trust the speaker of a metaphor. 
 
 
 
34 Jones, 8; Hawley, 10. 
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2. Engaging Art 
 
I want to turn now to the philosophy of art, specifically the subsection of 
philosophy of art that is dedicated to the interpretation of works of art. I stated in 
the introduction that the analysis of interpretation could be applied to 
interpretation in art, and the Haemoo example in the previous section begins the 
project of showing how that is done. Since there are different approaches to 
interpretation in art, this section will be subdivided into four subsections. The first 
subsection will address how the audience’s judgement of a work’s author is 
relevant in figuring out to what extent and in what way an object in question could 
be a work of art. This is a question of the definition of art and will be resolved in a 
similar approach to how, in understanding metaphors, there is not just the 
interpretive project of understanding a metaphor’s import but also in identifying 
that a speaker is speaking metaphorically rather than literally. The second, third, 
and fourth subsections will each address a different approach to interpreting works 
of art. The second subsection will address actual intentionalist approaches, where 
the meaning of a work of art is primarily identified with the real intentions of the 
actual author of a piece. The third subsection will engage with hypothetical 
intentionalist approaches. There are a variety of different hypothetical 
intentionalist approaches, but what they have in common is that the meaning of a 
work of art is primarily determined by intentions hypothesized by the audience. 
The fourth subsection will address anti-intentionalist interpretive strategies, and I 
will show that even without an explicit appeal to intentions, the audience still 
makes use of judgements that work in fundamentally the same way as judging the 
character of the author. My goal is not to arbitrate between the three broad 
schools of interpretive approaches. Rather, I will show that each of the three 
approaches makes use of intentions, or at least something like them, in some way. I 
will then conclude this chapter by arguing that the trust analysis given at the end 
of section 1 applies just the same in cases of artistic interpretation.  
 
2.1 The Art Object 
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Just as a listener must identify that a speaker is speaking in metaphor, so too must 
an audience identify that the thing with which they are engaging is a work of art. 
There are two sorts of instances where the audience must identify whether or not 
they are engaging a work of art. One is where the audience is confronted with 
something, and must figure out whether or not this thing is an art work. The other 
is where the audience is engaging with something that they are certain is a work of 
art, but are not certain what are its limits and contours — whether some parts of 
the thing that they are seeking to appreciate are or are not part of the artwork. In 
this subsection I will show that both of these instances are navigated by audiences 
by, at least in part, making some sort of judgement on the (potential) work’s 
maker. To support this point, I will begin by briefly surveying definitions of art to 
show that whether or not something is a work of art in some way depends on the 
intentions behind its creation.  
 
 There are currently three main approaches to creating a definition of art, 
and all require a work to be intentionally made. That the work merely has to be 
intentionally made, without specifying exactly what art-making intentions are 
necessary or how they are to be pursued, means that questions of the ontology of 
art (that is, how something is a work of art) do not need to be engaged. It is 
sufficient for my purposes to just know that something is a work of art.  
 
 The three main approaches to defining what is a work of art are the 
institutional account, the historical account, and the cluster or disjunctive 
account. For the institutional account, something is a work of art if and only if it is 
produced within the context of an artistic institution. The theory finds its origins 
with George Dickie in 1969, and finds a recent articulation in Catherine Abell’s 
2012 article “Art: What it is and Why it matters:” “Something is an artwork iff it is 
the product of an [artistic] institution, and it directly affects how effectively that 
institution performs the perceived functions to which its existence is due.”35 The 
theory is famously strong in accounting for found art, such as Duchamp’s Fountain, 
where a urinal was taken, turned upside down, and presented as a work of art 
 
35 Catherine Abell, “Art: What It Is and Why It Matters,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
85, no. 2 (2012): 686. 
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within the context of an art gallery. Much of Abell’s article is focused on 
articulating what the functions of an artistic institution must be, and doing so in a 
way that does not leave art as being something only created by European 
civilizations in the last 400 or so years. What is critical to my project is that it is 
essential that for a work to be have been produced by an institution, it must have 
been intentionally created. The institution is a network of actors and norms, and 
something being produced by the institution means that it was created by the 
actors in keeping with the norms.36 This is most simply put by Dickie, who writes 
that it is a necessary condition that any work of art, to be a work of art, must have 
been put forward as a candidate for appreciation.37 
 
 Historical accounts of art are close relatives to institutional accounts. The 
big difference is that in place of artistic institutions, works of art are instead things 
that are produced within artistic traditions. Historical accounts are perhaps best 
thought of as anti-theoretical accounts: other theories of art do not succeed, but 
there is nevertheless this thing called art, and accordingly art is whatever is 
consistent with this historically emergent practice. The attraction of historical 
accounts are their strengths in dealing with the fact that there are diverse and 
independently developed traditions that are intuitively artistic. As Stephen Davies 
notes, while artistic traditions can develop in ways that are copacetic to an 
institutional account, they will not necessarily do so, and therefore the 
institutional account is insufficient.38 However, even if an institutional account is 
not available, Davies notes that it is still necessary that a work’s creators create 
that work in accordance with whatever practices and standards are necessary to be 
part of that tradition.39 Accordingly, the intentions of a product’s maker are still 
relevant to determining whether or not that product rests within an artistic 
tradition. 
 
 
36 Abell, 683. 
37 George Dickie, “The Institutional Theory of Art,” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll, 95 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000) 
38 Stephen Davies, “Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition,” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel 
Carroll, 199 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000) 
39 Davies, 206. 
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 The third approach to defining art is one where there are a set of possible 
candidate characteristics that a thing may have — such as being aesthetically 
pleasing, the product of a high degree of skill, or produced in accordance with an 
artistic tradition — and that some combinations of these candidate characteristics 
may identify that thing as art, but no individual candidate characteristic is either 
necessary or sufficient.40 This sort of approach may be called either a cluster 
account or a disjunctive account, depending on how many successful art-making 
combinations are theorized.41 However, as Berys Gaut notes in his defence of the 
cluster account, these are all characteristics that are applied to intentionally 
created artefacts.42 Accordingly, what is under consideration is always something 
that was intentionally created, which in turn means that it is only things that are 
intentionally created that can be art objects. From that, it is necessarily the case 
that in determining whether or not something is a work of art that part of what will 
be at issue, by way of the cluster account, is whether or not something was 
intentionally created. 
 
 While all three accounts diverge, what all have in common is that for 
something to be a work of art it must have been intentionally created. Accordingly, 
when identifying whether or not something is a work of art, one task the audience 
must perform is identify whether or not the thing under consideration was 
intentionally created. This, in turn, will require two different judgements about 
the character of a potential work’s creator — whether this is the sort of thing that 
a known artist would produce, or whether or not the potential work under 
consideration is the sort of thing that anyone may produce. 
 
 Most of the time, identifying whether or not something is a work of art is not 
particularly difficult. This is because works are often put in contexts that 
emphasize that those works are things that ought to be artistically appreciated. 
Even exceptions, such as professional wrestling or Joaquin Phoenix’s bizarre 
 
40 Berys Gaut, “Art as a Cluster Concept,” in Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll, 28 (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000) 
41 For elaboration on this distinction, see Francis Longworth and Andrea Scarantino, “The 
Disjunctive Theory of Art: The Cluster Account Reformulated,” British Journal of Aesthetics 50, 
no.2 (2010): 151-167. 
42 Gaut, 26. 
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decision to pretend to be schizophrenic for several years, are eventually presented 
to some appreciating audience. There are also times when some non-art object is 
incidentally put in a context that is usually meant to signal that something is a 
work of art. For example, in early 2015 someone dropped a glove in the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York City.43 Unsure as to whether or not the dropped glove was 
a work of art, museum patrons carefully stepped around it. Following from my 
argument in the first part of this subsection, part of determining whether or not 
the glove is to determine whether or not it was intentionally presented as a work of 
art. Cues the audience would look for might be whether something is in a position 
where a work of art would be positioned (such as on a pedestal in a lighted 
display), or whether it fits with the sort of thing that an artist might intend to be 
art. What makes the glove case possible is that a modern art museum is exactly the 
sort of place where an audience could come across a glove positioned as a work of 
art. Pictures suggest that the audience considered it was unlikely that the glove 
was a work of art, but they were unwilling to rule it out — despite few people 
apparently stopping to appreciate it, people did choose to walk around the glove 
and leave it alone, just in case it was a work. It is important to note that it is 
specifically art-making intention that the audience is trying to determine. The 
glove could have been intentionally positioned for other reasons — as a signal of 
some sort, maybe — which would have no relevance as to the glove being a work of 
art. While funny, a modern art museum is not the only instance where a person 
may encounter something that may or may not be a work of art. For example, 
someone wandering in the Canadian north may encounter a rock structure that 
could be entirely natural or it could be an Inukshuk. Similarly, archaeologists 
frequently have to determine between incidental rubble and pieces of sculpture. In 
each case, part of what the audience or examiner considers to determine whether 
or not something is a work of art is to try and determine what intentions (if any) 
were behind something’s creation.  
 
 Of all of the above cases, it is the case of the glove in the modern art 
museum that best shows how an audience’s judgement of the intentions behind an 
 
43 Tennessee Grimes, Twitter post, January 10, 2015, 12:03 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/10ehc/status/553703519229071360 
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object reflect their judgement of that object’s potential maker. They are unaware 
of the author of the glove — indeed, in actuality there is no “author” as such — but 
that does not mean that they cannot use judgements of an author’s character. In 
this case, there is the theoretical character of an archetypal modern artist. The 
museum’s patrons are not judging that some known person would create this 
artwork, but rather they are judging that it is possible that there could be a 
modern artist who would intend this object as a work. This is, again, why the 
audience is unsure as to the status of the glove. There is no definite person whose 
intentions they are judging, so they are instead left with the question of whether 
or not there is such a person who could have such intentions. 
 
 Audiences do not only have to determine whether or not something is a work 
of art, they are also sometimes confronted with a work of art but have to 
determine what is and is not part of it. In this case, much more than the other, 
judgements of the artist’s skills come in to play. Consider an extended improvised 
guitar solo. In judging the solo, the audience must determine whether the notes 
are intentionally and deliberately struck, or if the guitarist is just flailing without 
guidance and the resulting sound is incidental. Whether the audience considers the 
sounds produced to be intentional or random will depend on what they consider to 
be the level of skill possessed by the guitarist. Similar judgements may be made 
concerning random idiosyncrasies in film shots. Since filming and editing are parts 
of the art-making process in film, it is often but not necessarily the case that 
whatever is in the frame of a shot is there on the intentional decision of someone 
within the film-making process. However, if, for instance, a boom mic is visible 
within a shot, then that is considered simply a mistake and the boom mic is not 
considered to be part of the film as a work of art. In some cases, however, visible 
pieces of equipment might intentionally be part of the work. This is the case in 
some of the films produced under Lars von Trier’s Dogme95 project, where part of 
the point of the work is the low standard of production. Accordingly, when an 
audience judges whether or not visible equipment is properly part of a film and not 
just a mistake, then part of what they are doing is determining what they believe 
to be the character of the filmmaker, and whether that filmmaker would 
intentionally have the equipment visible in the film. 
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 What I have argued in this subsection does not map on to the Gricean 
formulation very easily. This is because the Gricean approach to communication 
takes the utterance as given, and then frames communication as merely the 
understanding of the content of that utterance and the intentions behind it. When 
determining whether or not something is a work of art, or what the limits are of a 
work of art, what is in question is not just an utterance’s meaning but what that 
utterance is. Furthermore, art is in general much more ambiguous than everyday 
language. The frequent use of language results in meanings being largely public and 
context invariant, and people are adept at navigating linguistic rules. Art, on the 
other hand, often does not deal in such clear and ready meanings and people do 
not have the same ready facility in understanding it. Although reflexive intentions 
are still in use, a more robust approach can be found in the relevance theory of 
Sperber and Wilson. Crucial to relevance theory is that humans pay attention to the 
features that are most relevant.44 This is true not just for communication but any 
situation. In the specific context of communication, this means that in 
understanding an utterance, the listener is working to identify the relevant 
features of that utterance.45 In other words, the listener does not simply accept 
the utterance then decode it, but that they are also simultaneously figuring out 
just what that utterance is. This interpretive process can end with the 
determination that what one is trying to understand is not an utterance at all, like 
someone realizing that what she thought was a call of her name was just the sound 
of the wind. With respect to works of art, relevance theory works as follows. In the 
case of determining whether or not something is a work of art, part of what 
audiences are attempting to identify are the features which are intended to be the 
most salient. They are looking to see how their attention is being directed. In the 
basic case of a painting hung in an art museum, the promoted features are those of 
the painting’s aesthetic content —its colours, its shapes, and so on. In the case of 
something ambiguous, such as the glove, the opacity of modern art makes it 
difficult for an audience to identify what the most relevant features of the glove 
are. It has apparently been left and either lost or forgotten, but that appearance is 
 
44 Sperber and Wilson, 41. 
45 Ibid, 44. 
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something that could be simulated by a modern artist. In the case of determining 
whether or not something is part of a greater work, as with the guitar solo or 
element within a film frame, the question is then whether that prospective content 
coherent with the rest of the definite content of the work. If the boom mic appears 
to be relevant, as it does in a Dogme95 film production, then the audience is more 
likely to identify it as being part of the work. 
 
 Following from all of the above, one of the skills that an artist needs to have 
in constructing a work is that all features of a work can be identified as part of that 
work, at least by the intended audience. I turn now to the content that is 
articulated by the work, and how its meaning is deduced. First is the actual 
intentionalist approach to identifying work meaning, which holds that the work 
meaning of a work of art depends upon the intentions of a work’s author. 
  
 
 
2.2 Actual Intentionalism 
 
The strongest form of actual intentionalism is the position often derisively called 
Humpty Dumptyism, which is the position that the work meaning of a work of art is 
entirely and no more than what the author intended it to be. This position is not 
defended within the discourse, but is frequently brought up as a position that 
provides the problems from which valuable solutions can be extracted.46 The more 
common current position is called moderate actual intentionalism (MAI), and 
defended by Noel Carroll and Robert Stecker. In this subsection I will begin by 
showing how judgements of the author are at play in Humpty Dumptyism — since it 
is a good starting point — before moving on to MAI. 
 
 Since, under Humpty Dumptyism, the work meaning of a work of art is 
entirely and exclusively that which is intended by that work’s author, then the role 
 
46 Invocations of Humpty Dumptyism can be found in Davidson, 439, and Noel Carroll, 
“Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism,” 
Metaphilosophy 31, no.1-2 (2000): 76. The name derives from a passage in Alive in Wonderland, 
where Humpty Dumpty insists that “glory” means whatever he wants it to mean. 
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for judgements of the author is immediate and obvious. Since all that matters is 
what the author intended, then determining an artwork’s work meaning is less a 
process of interpreting the work than it is an empirical investigation into the author 
himself. This is even more true if it is accepted that the author’s intentions do not 
have to be consciously-held intentions.47 In that case to determine an artwork’s 
work meaning the audience must psychoanalyze the author. To determine what the 
author would “really mean,” would, in turn, require substantive judgements about 
the sort of person the author is and what people like him would really intend. 
 
 Contrary to Humpty Dumptyism, MAI seeks to make sure that the work of art 
does not fade out of its own interpretation. The two main proponents of MAI are 
Robert Stecker and Noel Carroll, and both accept as their starting point Gregory 
Currie’s analysis that works of art are utterances.48 Stecker continues that not all 
works are necessarily utterances, but that they may still be understood as being 
analogous.49 They hold two points to distinguish MAI from its main rivals. First is 
that if the author’s art-making intentions are successful then it is these intentions 
that determine what is called the work’s “work meaning.”50 This is the “actual 
intentionalist” part of MAI. The moderacy of MAI is found in an acceptance that the 
author may fail to actualize their art-making intentions, and in these cases the 
resultant work (assuming the author was at least successful enough to create a 
work) has its work meaning fixed by convention and context.51  
 
 To justify how under MAI author’s intentions have primacy over the resultant 
work in regards to determining work meaning, Stecker invokes the Gricean position 
that utterer’s meaning and utterance meaning may come apart.52 He gives the 
example of the sentence “your cat ate my mat.” When Stecker utters such a 
sentence, by “your cat” he is referring to the vacuum cleaner. In this case, Stecker 
 
47 For more on unconcscious intentions, see Paisley Livingston, Art and Intention (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005), 3. 
48 Currie first defends a version of this claim in The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 31. 
49 Robert Stecker, “Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 64, no.4 (2006): 430 
50 Carroll, 77. 
51 Stecker, 429. 
52 Stecker, 430. 
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believes, utterer’s meaning — the vacuum cleaner — comes apart from utterance 
meaning — a cat. With respect to art this means that in a case where the author 
was successful in acting on her intentions, and her intended meaning — the 
utterer’s meaning — was different than the work’s utterance meaning, then the 
work meaning is determined by the utterer’s intentions. 
 
 Since MAI is interested in the author’s real intentions, as with Humpty 
Dumptyism, there is still a premium placed on determining the real author’s actual 
intentions and, consequently, MAI demands the same judgements of character 
about the author that was required by Humpty Dumptyism. MAI diverges from 
Humpty Dumptyism in that the audience must not only determine the author’s 
intentions, but also whether or not the author was successful in articulating those 
intentions in the work. In judging the success of the intentions, the audience is 
looking at the work and judging whether the output is the sort of thing that the 
author would have intended. This can happen at different points of the interpretive 
process. For example, the audience may first ask whether or not the work (or some 
part of the work) matches something that the author would have intended, and if 
answering in the affirmative can then move on to investigate the author’s 
intentions. Conversely, the audience may start by investigating the author’s 
intentions, and then ask whether the resultant work matches those intentions. In 
either case, when interrogating the work, the audience is confronted with the 
question of “is this the sort of thing that the author would have intended?” 
Answering that question requires a position on what sort of thing would the author 
intend, which in turn requires a judgement on the character of the author. 
 
2.3 The Mid-Point: Hypothetical and Fictional Authors 
 
Hypothetical intentionalism encompasses a wide array of positions that, on one 
end, fall short of real intentionalism and, on the other end, are not so extreme as 
full anti-intentionalism. These positions do not make use of the actual author’s 
actual intentions but they do nevertheless have intentions play some important role 
in determining work meaning. Paisley Livingston, in Art and Intention, identifies 
two main groups of hypothetical positions. The first group is a set of positions 
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where a work’s author is considered to be known, but her intentions are not. 
Accordingly, the meaning of a work is determined by the hypothesized intentions of 
the actual author. 53 For the second group the work’s real author is not considered 
to be known. In turn, a work’s meaning is determined by the intentions of a 
hypothetisized — or fictional — author.54 In this subsection I will engage both forms 
of hypothetical intentionalism and show that both approaches make use of 
judgements about the author, whether the author is real or hypothetical. 
  
 Jerrold Levinson offers the form of hypothetical intentionalism that is closest 
to MAI. In fact, he accepts most of the same points that defenders of MAI do.55 A 
work of art functions similarly to a Gricean utterance and, within the Gricean 
formulation, a work’s meaning is dependent upon the intentions of its author. 
Similarly, Levinson holds that if an author successfully realizes her art-making 
intentions when creating a work then her intentions will then determine the work’s 
meaning.56 Where he differs, however, is the role those art-making intentions play 
in the interpretive process. Central to Levinson adopting hypothetical 
intentionalism is that he believes that in pursuing the real intentions of the author 
the audience is no longer actually interpreting the work.57 Accordingly, what is 
appropriate to the interpretive process is only that which may be gleaned from 
considering the work itself. An important point is that it is a normative audience, 
not a real existing audience, that is being considered as the interpreter by 
Levinson.58 This is an important move to focus on the meaning of the work, rather 
than the epistemology of a particular audience. To Levinson, the normative 
audience is an “appropriate” audience, and an appropriate audience for a work is 
one that knows a work’s author and context. This audience is informed but not 
psychic, so while they know the facts surrounding the work they do not know what 
actually happened in the author’s mind as she was making the work.  This means 
 
53 Livingston, 143-4 
54 Ibid, 140 
55 Jerrold Levinson, “Defending Hypothetical Intentionalism,” British Journal of Aesthetics 50, no.2 
(2010): 139. 
56 Levinson (2010), 145. 
57 Jerrold Levinson, “Hypothetical Intentionalism: Statement, Objections, and Replies,” in 
Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold Levinson, 306 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 
58 Jerrold Levinson, “Who’s Afraid of a Paraphrase?” in Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics, ed. 
Jerrold Levinson, 295 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) 
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that what the normative audience is doing in interpreting a work is hypothesizing 
what the author’s intentions would have been, and a work’s meaning is that which 
is determined by the best supported hypothesis as to the author’s intentions. 
Accordingly, when Levinson accepts that successfully realized intentions determine 
a work’s meaning, it is only in so far as holding that an author successfully realizing 
her intentions will create a work which has as its best interpretation one that 
matches the meaning the author sought to create.59 So while the real author’s 
intentions determined the work’s meaning, they importantly do not serve as a 
criterion for that work’s meaning. 
  
 Since Levinson’s hypothetical intentionalism allows for the real author to be 
considered, judgements about the author are just as important to the process of 
interpretation as they are in real intentionalist approaches. Since what is being 
sought is what the author would have most likely intended then the audience must 
consider what the author would intend, and since what the author would intend 
depends on what sort of person the author is, determining the strongest hypothesis 
for what the author intended requires the audience to make some sort of 
judgement of the character of the author. However, in the case of hypothetical 
intentionalism, judgements of the character of the author work slightly differently 
than they do in the case of MAI. This is because the judgements are made on the 
behalf of the normative, appropriate audience. This means that any facets of the 
author’s character that a real audience member may know, but the normative 
audience would not know, do not factor in a work’s best interpretation. In 
practice, it is difficult to clearly set out what the normative audience does and 
does not know about an author. For example, while in most cases the private lives 
of movie makers are largely unknown, Woody Allen’s personal history as a sexual 
predator has achieved a level of public notoriety and seems to be the sort of thing 
that a normative audience should know about to be appropriately informed. For my 
purposes, however, it is simply enough to say that it is the case, under hypothetical 
intentionalism, that judgements of the character of the author are relevant to the 
interpretive process. 
 
 
59 Levinson (2010), 145. 
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 Another variant of hypothetical intentionalism is the one that holds that in 
the interpretive process the audience is attributing intentions to a fictional author. 
For the sake of clarity I will call this version fictional author intentionalism (FAI). 
FAI can be understood as a slightly stronger version of the hypothetical 
intentionalism that Levinson proposed. As with hypothetical intentionalism, FAI 
holds that the interpretive process, to properly be interpreting a work of art, must 
focus on the work itself. However, FAI goes one step further, holding that even 
knowledge of the real author is extraneous and takes the audience beyond merely 
interpreting the work.60 This means that under FAI the interpretative process 
requires the audience to construct a fictional author, and this fictional author is 
then attributed the intentions that created and gave meaning to a work of art. 
Currie advocates something close to this. For example, in Narratives and Narrators, 
he writes that audience members understand works of art through a process of 
what he calls “pragmatic inference” — that is, inferring the intentions of a 
narrative’s creator by combining the linguistic meaning of that narrative with its 
surroundings and context.61 Pragmatic inference is not a forensic investigation into 
the work’s creation but an interpretation of its achieved meaning so the real 
author does not feature in the interpretive process.62 Since the interpretive process 
is one of inferring intentions but does not consider a work’s real author, Currie 
writes that in the interpretive process the audience constructs a hypothetical 
author whose intended meaning coincides with the work’s achieved meaning.63 
 
 Since it does not consider a work’s real author, FAI breaks quite radically 
from MAI and hypothetical intentionalism in how it judges the character of a work’s 
author. In the case of the latter two the audience is making definite judgements of 
real people, but in FAI there is no real person to judge. Effectively, FAI runs in the 
opposite direction from both MAI and hypothetical intentionalism — where the 
latter two begin with knowledge of the author and then try to figure out what the 
author’s intentions would have to be to have created the work, FAI begins with the 
work and then from that work creates the author. Since the audience operating 
 
60 Livingston, 141-2. 
61 Gregory Currie, Narratives and Narrators, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 25. 
62 Currie, 25. 
63 Ibid. 
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under FAI has no real author to which they can appeal, yet they are also engaging 
in the project of determining which intentions best explain the work under 
interpretation, they must evaluate the plausibility of hypothesized intentions in 
some way other than appealing to a real person. Similar to how hypothetical 
intentionalism appeals to a normative audience, FAI appeals to a normative person 
in the role of the artist. Just as the normative audience is no real audience, the 
normative person in the role of the author is no real person or author. Contrary to 
hypothetical intentionalism, or MAI, the author is not examined or deciphered but 
rather created. The normative person is also, similar to the normative audience, 
considered to be appropriate to the work being examined, although there are 
different ways that can be parsed. 
 
 There are different ways that the audience may understand that normative 
person — the normative person may be thought of as any average person, 
specifically a trained artist, specifically an artist within a particular cultural 
context, and so on. However the audience understands the normative person will 
inform the sorts of judgements they make of the author. For example, if the 
audience considers the normative person as a trained artist within a particular 
cultural context — for example, a trained painter within the context of 
contemporary English society — then the hypothesized intentions behind the 
painting under evaluation will be those which would be most plausibly ascribed to a 
trained painter within the context of contemporary English society. Which 
intentions are most plausibly ascribed to such a person, in turn, depends on what 
the character of the trained painter within the context of contemporary English 
society is rightly thought to be.  
 
2.4 Anti-Intentionalism 
 
The next step beyond FAI is anti-intentionalism, the position that the way to 
interpret art makes no appeal to a work’s author, be that author real or fictional. 
In practice, anti-intentionalism may function almost identically to FAI, with the one 
difference being where a proponent of FAI would appeal to a fictional author whose 
intentions give the work meaning, the anti-intentionalist simply holds that the work 
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meaning is determined wholly by convention and context. Central to this position is 
what Paisley Livingston calls the dilemma argument: “either intentions are 
successfully realized in the artistic structure or they are not, and so intentions are 
either unnecessary or insufficient conditions of the work’s meaning.”64 As David 
Davies explains the dilemma, in support of his form of anti-intentionalism 
(Interpretive Intentionalism), the lesson of the dilemma is that no matter the 
utterer’s intentions, the meaning of the utterance, and thus the work of art, will 
always be determined by convention and context.65 Since all the interpreter is 
doing under interpretive intentionalism is parsing convention and context, Davies 
holds that it is then the case that the interpretive process is not one of ascribing 
semantic intentions.66 This allows Davies to sidestep the need to posit a fictional 
author whose intentions determine the work’s meaning. Rather, the meaning of a 
work is what a normatively informed interpreter would come to understand after 
applying the appropriate interpretive norms and conventions. 
 
 Since anti-intentionalism does not make use of a work’s author, either real 
or fictional, as a criterion for that work’s meaning, it does not make use of any 
judgements of a work’s author as the other interpretive approaches do. However, I 
believe that anti-intentionalism has a similar step that serves much the same 
purpose. The interpretive process of anti-intentionalism calls for the audience to 
engage with a work’s context, and to the extent that context can determine a 
work’s meaning, the audience must make judgements about the context from 
which the work derives. To clarify how judgements of context are relevant, 
consider the following two scenes. First, the scene from the James Bond film Dr. 
No in 1962, where Bond shoos a female dalliance offscreen so that he and Felix 
Leiter may talk business. Second, from the Melissa McCarthy film Spy in 2015, 
where Jason Statham’s character Rick Ford tries to shoo McCarthy’s Susan Cooper 
offscreen, again so the men may talk business. The anti-intentionalist may fairly 
come to the conclusion that the scene from Spy is mocking or condemning sexism, 
while the Bond scene merely reflects it. Part of the process of coming to this 
conclusion would be to make judgements of the contexts of 1962 and 2015. In 2015 
 
64 Livingston, 171 
65 David Davies, Art as Performance, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 89. 
66 Davies, 89. 
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the casual sexism displayed by Bond and Ford is no longer so ubiquitous or 
accepted, so Ford’s attempt to shoo Cooper offscreen is a sign of a sort of 
weakness, whereas Bond doing the same is a sign of strength. Of course, such 
judgements of context are merely part of the interpretive process — interpretation 
does not work on context alone — but so long as context informs interpretation, 
judgement of that context will play a role. In the following section, I will develop 
this argument into how judgements of a work’s context lead to trusting a work’s 
context in a way analogous to how an audience judges and trusts a speaker or 
author. 
 
3. Integrating Art and Trust 
 
In the previous section, I argued that the process of interpreting a work of art 
requires a judgement about the character of a work’s author, or some equivalent 
judgement about a work’s context. What I want to argue in this section is that, 
similar to how I argued in the first section that there is a way in which a listener 
trusts a speaker, a work’s audience similarly and equivalently trusts a work’s 
author. In this section I will expand that argument, and show the ways that that 
trust may work, and the effects it can have on interpretation.  
 
 The way in which trust works will work slightly differently depending on the 
interpretive approach that the audience takes. Taking the language of three-place 
trust, different interpretive approaches change what is in the place of the second 
place, the person or group trusted. Depending on what is being trusted — a real 
author or a hypothetical author, for example — how that trust works will be 
different. In the case of interpretive strategies that make use of a work’s real 
author, the audience is trusting those real people. In the case of anti-
intentionalism, what is in question is the degree to which society more broadly is 
trustworthy. Since FAI constructs its fictional author of the work, it is something of 
a synthesis of real and anti-intentionalist approaches — the character of the 
fictional author is someone who would be in the position of author, which means 
that the audience is considering both the general tendencies of social context more 
broadly as well as the more specific tendencies of the sort of person who would be 
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in position to be a work’s author. In the case of FAI and anti-intentionalism, the 
audience cannot trust the author to the same degree that the audience can under 
interpretive strategies that make use of the real author. This is because the 
audience is considering social tendencies — probabilities — rather than the 
definiteness of a particular person. In the case of a real author, their opinions, 
beliefs, and capabilities may be known. The anti-intentionalist, on the other hand, 
is left trusting society and that which may emerge from a social context, which is 
much less definite. By the same argument, under FAI and anti-intentionalism the 
audience cannot have as little trust for the author as they could under approaches 
that make use of the real author, since social tendencies cannot be so bad as the 
definite horribleness of particular individuals. For the purposes of this section, I 
will refer to the audience trusting the work itself, so as to remain neutral between 
interpretive approaches. 
 
 Anti-intentionalism faces a special problem with trust — it is not clear 
whether society in the second place of two- or three-place trust may meet the 
reflexivity condition. This is to say that it is not clear that society can be directly 
and positively moved by the audience’s reliance. How well anti-intentionalism can 
make use of the language of trust depends on how social context is understood. In 
one sense, society can be understood as people, individually and collectively, who 
are influenced and directed by various social forces. The Dr. No and Spy examples 
from section 2.4, for example, invoke the social force of sexism, which may in turn 
be placed in the context of broader social structures such as patriarchy. The 
audience is considering how these forces may have influenced the works’ creation. 
Thought of in this way, society seems very mechanistic, and machines cannot be 
trusted because they are not affected by the would-be trusters reliance in them. 
However, the people who make up society, individually and collectively, are still 
agents that can be and are influenced by the actions of others. While anti-
intentionalism does not consider intentions to be criteria of a work’s meaning, it 
still takes works to be intentionally made, and having meaning that derives from 
that intentional creation. Accordingly, by anti-intentionalism, the audience may 
still trust the people who contributed to the creation of a work. Importantly, this is 
not a full solution. The anti-intentionalist audience is only trusting these people as 
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creators of a work, not as authors. Their impact on a work’s meaning is only in as 
much as they create a work that happens to bear that meaning. Altogether, 
though, I do not believe that this is much of a problem. While the audience may 
not be able to trust social context, they may still approach it in a way that is 
fundamentally similar to trust. They make judgements as to the character of 
society — its forces and power structures, such as sexism and patriarchy, and the 
tendencies that those forces and power structures create — and in turn use that 
judgement to determine how they should engage with society and its outputs.  
 
 In art, the domain in which the audience is trusting a work’s author may 
vary. As with language, in most cases, the most common way that the audience will 
trust a work’s author is that they will trust that the author is artistically 
competent. They will trust that what is presented as a work of art has been 
intentionally constructed to be as it is, rather than being the product of (ill) 
fortune. As with language, this trust is not absolute, so audiences may trust an 
author more or less, without trusting or distrusting completely. Consider the Adam 
Sandler example, from the beginning of this chapter. White considers Jack and Jill 
to have a purposeful narrative, whereas Singer considers the film to be “merely a 
series of random celebrity cameos and shameless product placements.” One way to 
understand why White and Singer differ is that White trusts Sandler’s artistic 
competency but Singer does not, so White considers the film to be a purposeful 
narrative whereas Singer considers the direction of the film to be largely 
purposeless. Of course Singer is also reacting to the actual content of the film, but 
consider whether Singer thought highly of Sandler’s artistic ability. If Singer 
thought that Sandler was a virtuoso, would he would probably not come to the 
conclusion that Jack and Jill was meaningless. Even if he couldn’t make heads or 
tails of the film, he would be more likely to consider the film to be over his head, 
rather than empty.  
 
 The degree to which the audience trusts a work’s author will also affect how 
other aspects of a work are engaged. For example, in the case of improvised works, 
the audience is trusting that the improviser is creating something purposefully. The 
audience will be trusting that a jazz guitarist is playing a purposeful melody rather 
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than randomly playing notes that might happen to fall into something listenable, or 
that the person on stage is purposefully moving their body in dance rather than 
haplessly throwing themselves about. In one rather extreme case, Ian Curtis, the 
lead singer for the band Joy Division, was thought to be dancing on stage when he 
was actually suffering from an epileptic seizure. 
 
 As with language, discussing trust in interpretation is particularly apt for 
making sense of works that are ambiguous but the artistic competence is not in 
question. Consider again the examples of Dr. No and Spy. In the case of Spy, its 
context as a film starring Melissa McCarthy during the year 2015 leads to the 
sympathetic interpretation of something that would be taken as simple casual 
sexism in 1962. However, casual sexism is still prevalent and other films (ones that 
do not star Melissa McCarthy) may not be so easy to trust. Take the example of the 
James Bond film Skyfall (2012). In it, Bond seduces the character Sévérine. The 
film makes note that Sévérine is a former child sex slave who is now under the 
exploitative control of the villain Raul Silva. When Bond approaches Sévérine in the 
shower he makes note that she does not have her gun for protection, and Bond 
appears quite predatory. In one light, this sequence can be read as a condemnation 
of Bond. The film forms something of a retrospective of the Bond character, so 
showing Bond preying on Sévérine could be a way of condemning Bond’s masculinity 
as an artefact of a bygone era (as one supporting example, Bond is repeatedly 
compared to a porcelain John Bull bulldog from the 1960s). On the other hand, the 
film is a James Bond film that revels in all the usual trappings of the James Bond 
franchise — violence, sex, and luxury. Moreover, the film is produced and promoted 
by a major studio interested in continuing both the myth and the brand of James 
Bond. These facts cast doubt on whether the film would so unreservedly throw 
criticism at the iconic character, when he might just be seducing a damaged and 
defenceless woman like he has in so many previous stories. Altogether, it is 
difficult for the audience to trust the film, and this leaves the meaning of the 
scene in question somewhat ambiguous. Importantly, using the language of trust 
helps makes sense of why the meaning of the scene is ambiguous. The film contains 
all the necessary pieces to read the scene as critical of Bond, but because Skyfall is 
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a James Bond movie and is made, distributed, and promoted by a major studio that 
is invested in the James Bond brand, there is a level of distrust towards the film.  
 
Lastly, there is something that must be said about reliance. In analyses of 
trust, the reliance condition has to do with how the truster regards the future 
actions of the trustee. Reliance has to do with an attitude or belief towards what 
the trustee will do. In engaging works of art, however, the actions of the author 
are in the past. The work has been created, and there may be nothing more for the 
author to do. Accordingly, if the audience is to rely on the author, they must be 
relying for the author to have acted a certain way in the past, yet for those past 
actions to be what is under consideration at the time of interpretation. I believe, 
then, that the audience is relying on the author to have acted in accordance with 
artistic convention. The interpretive process involves attending to intentional 
actions that make up a work of art — brushstrokes of a painting, movements of a 
theatre performance, edits and cuts of a film — so the audience relies on the 
author to have made those actions in accordance with the institutional conventions 
of the artworld. These conventions can range from making a work that is 
intelligible to the audience, to just the act itself of participating in the artworld.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have made the argument that interpreting a work of art requires a 
judgement of a work’s author, and that this means that how the interpreter 
interprets a work will depend on how the interpreter trusts the author. The main 
virtue of the trust approach, I believe, is that it helps make sense of why the 
meaning of many works of art is never completely unambiguous. In turn, if works 
may be more or less ambiguous based on the degree to which the audience trusts 
the author, then a premium should be placed on the clarity with which a work’s 
creator is able to create that work. If a work, or some part of a work, has a 
meaning then that meaning should be clear to the audience. If that work, or some 
part of it, is purposefully ambiguous, then that ambiguity should be finely 
calibrated. This is not a novel or radical sentiment, but it does lay the foundation 
for the rest of this dissertation. In chapter 2, I will put forward an understanding of 
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misrepresentation. That understanding of misrepresentation will make use of a 
work’s creator’s intentions, so accordingly it will be important that the creator 
cultivate the trust of the audience. Chapter 4 will bring together a theory of satire 
and articulate the value of clarity. Clarity will depend, in part, how well a work’s 
makers are able to have the work clearly convey the meaning-defining intentions. 
The trustworthiness of a work or its makers may affect how straightforward a work 
may have to be for its meaning to be clear. For chapter 5, I will give an argument 
for the ethical evaluation of humour that places a premium on the audience 
trusting the joke-teller. This argument will turn on arguing that in joking it is 
important that the audience specifically trusts the ethical character of the joke-
teller. Lastly, in chapter 6, I engage satire in a mass media context. Part of that is 
giving a story about how mass media practices and institutions affect a work’s 
trustworthiness. So, while I may not have argued anything novel in chapter 1, I 
have at least laid the foundations for what follows. 
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Chapter Two: Misrepresentation 
 
The goal of this chapter is to give an account of satirical misrepresentation. To 
pursue this goal, this chapter will be split into two main sections. In the first 
section, I will seek to give an account of intentional misrepresentation in general. 
By intentional misrepresentation, I mean when it is someone’s intent specifically 
to misrepresent something. For this section, I will focus on depiction and visual 
representation, since I believe that of all possible cases of representation the 
visual case provides the most intuitively stringent challenge. At the end of the 
section I will show that the account of misrepresentation given in the visual case 
generalizes easily. In the second section I will give an account of specifically 
satirical misrepresentation, so as to distinguish it from non-satirical cases of 
misrepresentation such as allegory. 
 
1.1 Setting Up the Problem 
 
Intentional misrepresentation, on first pass, is a simple affair. It is a case of 
representation, but with differences so that the representation is different from 
the thing that is represented. Something is represented as it is not. Such that the 
misrepresentation is intentional, it is something that someone is doing, as a 
process. The person making the misrepresentation is meaning to represent 
something as it is not. However, on closer inspection, it is more complicated. In 
what follows I will just refer to “misrepresentation.” Since intentional 
misrepresentation is the subject of this chapter, all references to 
misrepresentation should be understood as being to intentional misrepresentation 
unless clearly stated otherwise. 
 
 Consider two pictures of Barack Obama, one a portrait painting, as will hang 
in the White House, and one a political cartoon. The political cartoon, implying 
that Obama is a liar, shows him with a long wooden nose in the style of Pinocchio. 
The portrait is just a representation, while the cartoon is a misrepresentation. The 
portrait is meant to look like him, while the cartoon, in certain respects, is meant 
to not look like him. However, in certain ways, the portrait does not quite look 
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like Obama either. For one, the portrait of Obama is flat, whereas the real Obama 
is not. There are also smaller, more subtle differences. The pictured Obama is 
somewhat larger than the real person and, despite the skill of the artist, the 
colour of his skin, eyes, and hair do not quite match. This is all to say that the 
portrait painting, despite the best efforts of the painting, still shows Obama as he 
is not.  
 
 This problem, of representations also not simply looking like their subjects, 
can be brought into further relief by considering pictures made in accordance with 
certain styles. For example, a cubist portrait of Obama would differ from the real 
person in colour, in shape, and present him as a collection of mismatched pieces 
like a jigsaw puzzle. But, within the style of cubism, it would be a 
representation — and not a misrepresentation — of Obama. If regular 
representation can allow for a picture to depict its subject while intentionally 
departing from what its subject looks like, then misrepresentation needs to be 
better articulated than just “representing something as it is not.” 
 
 The first task for a theory of misrepresentation, then, is to give it an 
articulation in such a way that it can be separated from normal representation; in 
the case of visual representation, depiction. Depiction itself is contested terrain, 
but I do not need a full theory, just enough to be able to give a clear account of 
misrepresentation. I will argue that once style is accounted for, it is possible to 
distinguish depiction as showing something as it is in accordance with a stylistic 
convention or strategy, whereas misrepresentation is understood as showing 
something as it is not in accordance with a stylistic convention or strategy. To 
make this argument I will focus on three areas of the debate surrounding 
depiction. First I will briefly discuss “seeing-in,” and the requirement that visual 
representation be properly visual. Second I will discuss the role of reflexive 
intentions in depiction. Third, following from the discussion of reflexive intentions, 
I will focus on pictorial style and convention. The outcome of this argument will be 
a two point understanding of misrepresentation. In focusing on depiction, I will 
draw out the condition of mode sensitivity. This is to say that misrepresentation 
happens within a mode of presentation — depiction, music, language — and 
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misrepresentation must misrepresent within that mode. After having established 
how misrepresentation must be mode-sensitive to depiction, I will give the 
following four point account of basic misrepresentation: 
1. There is some subject to which an utterer is referring. 
2. The utterer is representing this subject as having certain 
properties. 
3. The utterer intends that some of these properties are not 
actually possessed by the subject. 
4. None of the previous steps are taken by mistake. 
With this account of misrepresentation established, I will transition to the second 
section, where I will give an account of how misrepresentation is essential to 
satire, and what makes satiric misrepresentation distinctively satirical. 
 
1.2 The Visual Part of Visual Representation 
 
Since this argument is focusing visual representation, it is necessary to start with a 
brief discussion about just what it is that is visual about visual representation. 
There are two parts to this discussion: the experience, and what makes the 
experience appropriate. The visual experience of a visual representation is often 
referred to as “seeing-in,”67 as in some object is seen in the marks on a flat 
surface, so in this subsection I will give a brief account and discussion of “seeing-
in,” and then an account of what makes for an appropriate seeing-in response, 
which will lead to the next subsection, on reflexive intentions.  
 
 The defining characteristic of the experience of seeing-in is 
“twofoldness.”68 Richard Wollheim, the primary theoretician of seeing-in and 
proponent of twofoldness, is notoriously vague about just what twofoldness is. As 
he explains it, it is roughly that seeing-in is twofold such that the viewer 
simultaneously has an experience of both the representing surface and the thing 
 
67 One very prominent detractor of this approach is Dominic Lopes, who argues that seeing-in is 
insufficiently developed to explain all visual experience of representations, and also that it is quite 
bad at explaining demotic (as opposed to art) visual representations. Since I will not commit to any 
one theory of depiction, I do not believe that this criticism will affect anything that follows.  
68 Richard Wollheim, “What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual? (I),” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 77 (2003): 131. 
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depicted by the representing surface.69 Bence Nanay has helpfully disambiguated 
this into two distinct senses of twofoldness, each suited for a different task. First 
there is twofoldness such that it is necessary for aesthetic appreciation of a visual 
representation: “twofoldness of the experience of a painting means that one is 
visually aware of the represented object and the way it is represented 
simultaneously.”70 Opposite this is the sense of twofoldness such that it is 
necessary for understanding visual representations: “twofoldness of the experience 
of a painting means that one is visually aware of the (two-dimensional) surface and 
the (three-dimensional) represented object simultaneously.”71 Nanay then further 
separates the two senses by making his own contribution to twofoldness as 
necessary for aesthetic appreciation: it is not enough to just be aware of the way 
that the represented object is represented, but the audience must specifically 
attend to the way it is represented.72 So the appreciating audience must 
specifically attend to the way that the brushstrokes and colour of a painting create 
the experience of seeing some object. To be merely aware of the surface, as is the 
requirement for understanding visual representation, just requires that the 
audience be aware that the represented object is being represented on that 
surface, and not that they are viewing the object itself. Nanay clarifies awareness 
of the surface by way of the following example: if a person were shown a picture 
of an urban landscape and asked to indicate a house, they would indicate the 
house as marked on the surface of the picture, rather than trying to reach through 
the picture (as if it were a portal) and point to an actually present house in the 
distance.73 
 
 This account of seeing-in and twofoldness does not give an account of 
misrepresentation directly, but it does help clarify what an account of 
misrepresentation must do. Such that there are modes of representation that must 
be experienced in a certain way, misrepresentations by those modes must be able 
to be experienced by the appropriate sort of experience. In the case of visual 
 
69 Wollheim, 131. 
70 Bence Nanay, “Is Twofoldness Necessary for Representational Seeing?” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 45, no.3 (2005): 250. 
71 Nanay, 251. 
72 Nanay, 255. 
73 Nanay, 254. 
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misrepresentation, this means that since visual representations must be 
experienced by the process of seeing-in, visual misrepresentations must also be 
able to be experienced through seeing-in. So, for example, when Robert Hopkins 
provides the case of Tony Blair being depicted with enormous ears and wild, 
staring eyes, he, Hopkins, notes that what matters is not that Blair is experienced 
as the actual, existing Blair, but that he is experienced as he is misprepresented.74 
The misrepresented Blair is seen-in the marks on the two-dimensional surface.  
 
 While the Hopkins example helps show that misrepresentations must be 
experienced, it also highlights some work that seeing-in cannot do. He has 
stipulated that there is a picture of Blair with large ears and wild, staring eyes 
that is a misrepresentation, but he has not offered an explanation of why this is 
different from a mere representation of Blair as having large ears and wild, staring 
eyes. While the experience must be appropriate to the marks on the surface, 
Hopkins has provided no story about just what it is that makes some experience 
appropriate to those marks. This is a lacuna that he notes, but does not attempt to 
explain: “for if we ask the view to explain why we see one thing rather than 
another in the surface… I do not attempt to answer that question.”75 A theory of 
seeing-in, then, can only be one component in a theory of visual 
misrepresentation. 
 
 Even if seeing-in does not provide a theory of visual misrepresentation 
itself, it draws attention to what must be explained: why some marks make some 
experiences appropriate. This, in turn, makes clear that those marks need to be 
investigated. Accordingly, I now turn my attention to what makes some sets of 
marks on a flat surface have an appropriate experience. 
 
1.3 Appropriate Experience 
 
Wollheim has already shown the path to appropriate experience in his initial 
characteristics of seeing-in. Specifically, he notes that the appropriate seeing-in 
 
74 Robert Hopkins, “What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual? (II),” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 77 (2003): 159. 
75 Hopkins, 160. 
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for what is depicted is determined by, among other criteria, the picture-maker’s 
intentions.76 Given the constraint of twofoldness, this means not just that the 
audience will have a desired experience by looking at the picture, but that they 
will specifically have a desired experience by way of being visually aware of the 
marks on the two-dimensional surface that make up the picture. This means that 
the experience of Barack Obama by way of being visually aware of a certain set of 
marks on a two-dimensional surface is appropriate if such an experience was 
intended by the picture-maker. An experience being appropriate to a picture 
depending on the picture-maker’s intentions is another way of saying that what a 
picture is of depends partly on its maker’s intentions, and through this appeal it is 
possible to make use of the Gricean process of reflexive intentions. 
 
 In adopting the process of reflexive intentions, a picture is of something if it 
is intended by its maker to be of that thing, and the maker intends the audience to 
recognize that the picture is of that thing by way of recognizing the picture-
maker’s picture-making intentions. This is only a partial solution, however. If the 
approach of Gricean reflexive intentions is adopted, then it is natural to think of a 
picture as a sort of utterance, and if the picture is the utterance, then there must 
be some way that the picture-maker articulates that utterance’s content. This is 
the question of how the picture-maker makes their intentions manifest, and how 
the audience accesses those intentions.  
 
When the picture-maker makes a picture, they are making marks on a two-
dimensional surface so that the resulting picture references some subject. Since 
the picture-maker is engaging in pictorial reference, and not merely visual 
reference, the marks must give rise to a twofold experience of both the marked 
surface and the picture’s subject. There are a number of theories as to just what 
the picture-maker is creating with these marks, such that these marks can be said 
to “look like” the picture’s subject. For the purposes of my dissertation I do not 
 
76 Wollheim offers the following criteria: “it must not only be of the picture, but it must be had in 
front of the picture, and it must come about as a result of looking at the picture; it must be 
available to any spectator who is adequately sensitive and adequately informed; it must match, or 
tally with, the intentions of the artist in so far as these have been fulfilled; and the nature of the 
experience will be that of seeing something in the surface of the picture.” Wollheim, 131. 
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believe that I have to choose between theories of depiction, so I will simply 
articulate some of the candidates. John Hyman, a resemblance theorist, puts 
forward the subject’s occlusion shape (that is, its outline shape) as the property 
that makes a picture resemble its subject.77 Another resemblance theorist, 
Catherine Abell, simply works with the nonspecific term “the respects of 
resemblance.”78 Dominic Lopes, who does not identify as a resemblance theorist 
but I suspect may be conscriptable, argues that what pictures present are 
“aspects,” where an aspect is understood as a visual pattern of salience, and a 
picture is of a subject if it presents an aspect of that subject that brings to the 
fore whatever information was important in the development of the style in which 
the picture was created.79 Whichever approach is adopted, it is the things that this 
approach stipulates — occlusion shape, respects of resemblance, aspects — that 
the picture-maker is using to articulate the appropriate twofold experience.  
 
From here on I will use Abell’s term, “respects of resemblance,” because it 
is suitably vague and non-committal. Any feature may be a respect of 
resemblance, and no feature necessarily is. This means that in one picture, 
resemblance may be governed by shape, whereas in another it might be governed 
by colour. 
 
While a picture’s respects of resemblance determine of what it is a picture, 
it does not follow that every part of a picture is a respect of resemblance. While it 
is true that pictures are considered to be “replete,” which is to say that any 
feature of a picture could radically alter what it is depicting, that does not mean 
that every feature does so.80 This means that the marks that make up a picture 
play two separate roles: they are the basis of the twofold experience, and they 
make pictorial reference to the picture’s subject. While it is the case that for a 
picture’s subject to be properly pictorially referenced it must be accessed by way 
of twofold experience of the picture, it does not in turn follow that everything 
 
77 John Hyman, “Depiction,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 71 (2012): 142. 
78 Catherine Abell, “Canny Resemblance,” The Philosophical Review 118, no.2 (2004): 185. 
79 Dominic Lopes, Understanding Pictures, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004):107 
80 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968): 229-230. 
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experienced by way of the twofold experience of a picture must be pictorially 
referenced by the picture. Altogether, this means that there may be features of a 
picture which are not respects of resemblance, and do not pictorially reference 
the picture’s subject. It is these features that are needed to articulate how 
misrepresentation in pictorial representation may work.  
 
Recall Robert Hopkins’ example of Tony Blair misrepresented as having large 
ears and wild, staring eyes. By Hopkins, this misrepresentation of Blair is not 
twofoldly experienced simply as Blair, but as Blair misrepresented.81 I can now give 
the story that Hopkins did not, about why this is still a picture of Tony Blair; about 
why these marks still pictorially reference Tony Blair. And that story is this: the 
two-dimensional marks on the flat surface that give rise to the intended twofold 
experience of misrepresented Blair still sufficiently resemble Blair in terms of the 
respects of resemblance. The picture-maker also includes more detail in the 
picture than just those respects of resemblance: in this case the large ears and 
wild, staring eyes. These features are, importantly, not included as respects of 
resemblance. These are features over and above those respects. To meet the 
constraints of reflexive intentions, I must add that the normative audience 
understands that these additional features are not respects of resemblance but 
specifically additional, non-resembling features and also that they understand this 
by way of recognizing the picture-maker’s picture-making intentions. 
 
1.4 Addressing Style 
 
There is another hurdle that must be cleared, and it is one that I set up in the 
introduction. Misrepresentation is not the only way that a picture-maker may 
distort how a picture’s subject looks — there is also style. Styles may be broad, 
artistic movements like impressionism or cubism, or they may be smaller, personal 
styles that just consist in the way that one particular artist tends to depict things. 
I argue that misrepresentation is style-relative, which is to say that 
misrepresentation is something that occurs within a particular style. To hold that, 
 
81 Hopkins, 159. 
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however, I first need to give a short account of style, and how pictorial style 
should be understood (at least as is relevant to depiction and misrepresentation).  
 
Just what style denotes is unclear. As Raymond A. MacDonald notes, style 
originated as a way to describe the arrangement of the “small elements” of a 
work, such as the arrangement of letters and syllables.82 Up through the 17th 
Century, style was considered to be something akin to the way that the elements 
of a work were arranged — MacDonald cites Nicolas Poussin placing style alongside 
“theme, thought,” and “structure” as the four parts of the “grand manner” of a 
work of art.83 In the 18th Century, the meaning of style changed, and came to 
denote something like a set of concrete “common denominators,” and properties 
of a work by which different works can be identified as belonging to the same 
group.84 This is the sense of style that is used when discussing the Baroque style, 
or impressionism, although as MacDonald notes, the fuzziness surrounding style 
means that it is difficult to fully identify just what those styles are, and what it is 
for works to belong to them.85 
 
For what follows, I will adhere to how Catherine Abell uses style in 
understanding pictures, which is as a sort of convention.86 Similar to linguistic 
conventions, pictorial conventions are regularities of articulation and 
interpretation that emerge to solve the problem of getting meaning from the 
intentions of the utterer (or picture-maker) to be understood by the audience.87 
Artists may consciously adhere to a stylistic convention, although they do not have 
to — since conventions may (and frequently do) emerge from practice, a picture-
maker may adhere to convention simply by working in the manner that they always 
do. This approach fits snugly with both senses of style articulated by MacDonald — 
such that a stylistic convention is a way that the picture-maker articulates her 
intentions, it is consistent with the historical, process-focussed understanding of 
 
82 Raymond A MacDonald, “The Styles of Art History: Entities or Processes?” The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 7, no.1 (1993): 49. 
83 MacDonald, 50. 
84 Ibid. 
85 MacDonald, 51. 
86 Abell, 203. 
87 Abell, 203. 
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style. Historical styles such as baroque and impressionism can in turn be thought of 
as conventions such that they are processes of picture-making that picture-makers 
use to guide their making of a picture and audiences use to understand that 
picture. 
 
Pictorial conventions, such that they are particularly pictorial, are ways of 
arranging marks on a two-dimensional surface such that those marks depict that 
picture’s subject. This should be distinguished from conventions where a picture is 
used to visually reference something other than the picture’s subject. Consider yet 
another political cartoon, this time one of Steve Bell’s cartoons of David Cameron 
where Cameron is depicted as being an inflated condom. Bell’s pictorial style, 
here, has to do with his use of colour, texture, and shape. It has to do with how he 
makes and shapes the pictures. The condom-head is what is depicted, a visual 
reference to what Bell thinks the character of Cameron to be. This visual 
reference may be made in accordance with some other conventions to which Bell 
adheres — for example, he may just regularly draw people as condoms — but these 
are not specifically pictorial conventions. The pictorial conventions are just to do 
with how pictures are created, and pictorial content is articulated. 
 
To be clear, style does not necessarily exhaust the ways a picture-maker 
makes a picture. Picture-makers may deviate from both general and personal style 
in how they construct a picture. This will happen with some frequency in the 
creation of art pictures, where artists may seek novelty or expression, and rarely 
in the creation of demotic pictures, where simplicity in communication is often 
paramount.  
 
The Bell cartoon helps make clear how style and pictorial misrepresentation 
are to be reconciled. The colour, texture, and shape that Bell uses are part of his 
style, and his style is how he articulates the picture. David Cameron, and David 
Cameron’s condom head are what he is articulating. In drawing David Cameron, 
Bell depicts Cameron according to Bell’s conventional use of colour, texture, and 
shape. In giving David Cameron a condom head, Bell is adding a feature to the 
picture that is not just a depiction of David Cameron, but rather something that is 
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specifically not part of David Cameron. This condom head is in turn depicted using 
the same stylistic approach to colour, texture, and shape as the rest of the 
picture. This story matches up with the one that Robert Hopkins gave about 
seeing-in and misrepresentation, that I relayed earlier in this talk: just as we see 
Blair with large ears and wild, staring eyes in Hopkins’ picture, we see Cameron 
with a condom head in Bell’s picture. 
 
 
1.5 Residual Problems 
 
Appealing to the idea that style is a convention solves the initial problem to do 
with pictorial misrepresentation. Pictorial representation is relative to a style, and 
considering all pictures as being made within a style obviates the problem that 
picture-makers deviate from realism in depicting objects. Admitting that all 
pictures are within a style, pictorial misrepresentation may be considered to just 
be cases where a picture-maker depicts a subject but intentionally adds further 
detail that is not part of the actually existing subject. The cubist Obama is not a 
misrepresentation of Barack Obama since it is just a depiction of Barack Obama 
within the convention of cubist depiction — no additional details are (intentionally) 
added. Condom-head Cameron is a misrepresentation of David Cameron since 
Steve Bell adds the details of the condom-head to how Cameron would normally be 
depicted within Bell’s personal style.  
 
 I believe that appealing to conventions as I do prompts two sorts of 
objections, which can be thought of as being that the appeal to convention is 
either too strong, or too weak. I will start with the former. Giving such a strong 
role to convention can seem at odds with the apparent simplicity of understanding 
pictures. As Lopes notes, the threshold for pictorial comprehension seems very low 
and very general, so that someone who has never been outside of a small village in 
Polynesia can readily understand pictures from either the present day or pre-
historic Americas so long as they are familiar with the picture’s subjects.88 Even 
with pictures where they are not acquainted with the subjects — for example, the 
 
88 Lopes, 73. 
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picture may depict some animal or piece of technology with which they are 
unfamiliar — the pictures are still generally comprehensible. They may not know 
Nanabozho, but they can identify a humanoid figure with large, rabbit-like ears.89 
 
 The role of conventions can go from problem to solution in this case if 
stylistic conventions are thought of as things that developed in a context, either 
out of or in reaction to previously existing conventions. If conventions are thought 
of as developing in such a way — as opposed to being stipulated out of thin air 
— then there should be a considerable level of continuity between styles. This is 
not that a style will necessarily keep all the features of its precursor styles on its 
own, but that the people creating pictures within these styles, and pioneering new 
styles, would have learned from and been influenced by precursor styles. For 
example, one of the main precursors of the French impressionists were the French 
landscapists, and one of the main theoretical impetuses behind impressionism was 
the desire to find new ways to represent natural, three-dimensional space.90 Even 
if the impressionists deviated significantly from the landscapists in terms of colour, 
shape, and brushstroke, they nevertheless held the landscapists as a point of 
departure.91 Since the style of the impressionists developed from the style of the 
landscapists, and they used roughly similar subjects for their depictions, there is a 
high level of continuity between the two groups’ styles.  
 
This does not mean that all styles have the same origin. Depiction originated 
independently in any number of contexts. However, the evidence for these 
different geneses — figurative rock paintings — suggests that they were reasonably 
similar.92 Colours and particular shapes may vary, but shapes are still roughly 
 
89 Evidence for this may be found in a study run by Alan and Barnaby Dixson, which asked laypeople 
to interpret venus figurines taken from various eras and locations. While the meaning of the figures 
remained ambiguous, test subjects were reliably able to identify the figurines as representing 
middle-aged women with large breasts and thighs. Alan F. Dixson and Barnaby J. Dixson, “Venus 
Figurines of the European Paleolithic: Symbols of Fertility or Attractiveness?” Journal of 
Anthropology (2011), Article ID 569120. 
90 John House, “Introduction,” in Impressionism: Its Masters, its Precursors, and its Influence in 
Britain, ed. Royal Academy of Arts (Uxbridge: Hillingdon Press, 1974): 7-8. 
91 House, 11. 
92 J.D. Lewis-Williams and T.A. Dowson, “The Signs of All Times: Entoptic Phenomena in Upper 
Paleolithic Art” Current Anthropology 29, no.2 (1988): 201.  
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similar.93 In every case it also seems that roughly the same things were depicted, 
specifically people and animals.94 This means that even if different stylistic 
traditions don’t have the exact same distant base, they at least have a similar one. 
Altogether, given that depictive traditions have similar bases, and that present-day 
styles have developed over time, stylistic conventions should be expected to have 
the effect that pictures are readily understandable across contexts.  
 
 Another objection may be that the appeal to convention is still too weak to 
distinguish misrepresentation from stylized depiction. Consider Hopkins’ example 
of Tony Blair, misrepresented by wild eyes and large ears — it might be argued 
that in a concrete case (for example, a Steve Bell cartoon, which I suspect was 
Hopkins’ point of reference for his example) there may be little or nothing visually 
apparent to distinguish misrepresentation from depiction within style. If, in the 
case of pictures, misrepresentation has to be visually apparent, this could lead to 
a possibly large number of cases where it is unclear whether or not something is a 
misrepresentation or just a depiction within style. 
 
 To precede my answer, I want to again stress that all pictures are to be 
understood from the perspective of a normative audience, where part of what 
makes a normative audience a normative audience is that they are stipulated to be 
appropriate as an audience to that picture. An important part of this is that they 
have the appropriate knowledge and skills to understand the picture in front of 
them, and that will include at least a basic understanding of style and depictive 
practices. Just how normalized this audience is may be further questioned — how 
expert should the audience be? Is the audience supposed to be experts in 
understanding this particular artist, or just broad style in general? — but for 
current purposes it is enough to note that the audience has at least a broad 
 
93 Compare, for instance, the rock art of Altamira, in Spain, with that of Wuikinuxv Territory, 
Canada. “The Art of Altamira,” Museo de Altamira, 
http://www.culturaydeporte.gob.es/mnaltamira/en/cueva-altamira/arte.html; “Rock Art of 
Wuikinuxv Territory, Central Coast, British Columbia, Canada,” Bradshaw Foundation, accessed 
January 4, 2017, http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/canada/wuikinuxv_territory/index.php. 
94 Lewis-Williams and Dowson push this further, and show that even abstract symbols such as 
lattices and nested curves come from entoptic phenomena. While the meaning of these symbols is 
unclear, they appear across contexts (Lewis-Williams and Dowson use the Shoshone, San, and Upper 
Paleolithic peoples as examples) and are even reliably integrated into representative figures. 
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understanding of style and context-appropriate picturing practices. However, this 
is still not a full answer to the challenge. 
 
 Even if the normative audience is accounted for, it may be argued that 
there will still be pictures where it is unclear whether they are misrepresentations 
or merely stylized depictions. In this case, the supposed challenge is actually 
identifying a strength of the account, since the existence of many pictures that are 
difficult to distinguish is something that a good account should predict. This is 
because an account of misrepresentation in depiction should have space for and be 
able to explain bad pictures. A bad picture in this sense is one where the picture-
maker has failed to make clear her picture-making intentions. Since her intentions 
are unclear, it is unclear to the audience whether the marks on the two-
dimensional surface that make up the picture are meant to bear the depictive 
relationship to the picture’s subject (resemble it, by the resemblance theory), or 
if they are meant to depart from the picture’s subject and thus misrepresent that 
subject. That style departs from realism gives a reason why it is unclear whether 
or not some pictures are misrepresentative — that a picture is not realistic does 
not necessarily mean that the picture-maker was not still attempting to depict the 
picture’s subject as it is.  
 
Considering pictures as created within styles also allows for the 
identification of two separate ways that a picture may be unclear, and this is also 
a strength of the account.95 It may be the case that the picture-maker failed to 
make a misrepresentation that sufficiently departed from their personal style. The 
Hopkins-Bell Blair example may be imagined to fall into this pile. While Blair looks 
manic, it is not clear that his depiction departs from the way that Blair would 
standardly be depicted within Bell’s style. Another way unclarity may arise is if the 
style lends itself to depictions where it is not clear where depiction ends and 
misrepresentation begins. A famous example of this is Luz’s depiction of 
Mohammed for Charlie Hebdo. Hebdo’s caricatures, Luz’s in particular, make use 
 
95 I will present a fuller account of “clarity” at the end of the fourth chapter. 
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of a particular basic style of cartooning with exaggerated, unflattering features.96 
The Mohammed caricature in particular is defined by a long, thin nose and a 
scraggly beard. Whether this is merely within Hebdo’s style, or if it is 
misrepresenting Mohammed using the “dirty Arab” stereotype, is unclear. And this 
sort of unclarity is predicted by the role style is given within depiction. 
 
1.6 Generalizing the Account 
 
I have so far given an account of misrepresentation in depiction. Since my goal is 
to give an account of misrepresentation more broadly, I must now give an account 
of how the depiction case generalizes. This requires schematizing the account of 
misrepresentation in depiction, to show that the sort of account given for 
misrepresentation in depiction is not limited to depiction. To this end, I believe 
that my account comprises two fundamental components: a general account of 
misrepresentation, and a condition of mode sensitivity. The former is basic to 
misrepresentation, while the latter is necessary to make sense of 
misrepresentation in particular contexts. 
 
 My focus on misrepresentation is such that misrepresentation is something 
that is intentionally done. It is an intentional act by a person who is intentionally 
misrepresenting some subject. This means that the following is necessary for 
misrepresentation, such that I am discussing it: 
1. There is some subject to which an utterer is referring. 
2. The utterer is representing this subject as having certain 
properties. 
3. The utterer intends that some of these properties are not 
actually possessed by the subject. 
4. None of the previous steps are taken by mistake. 
The misrepresenting utterance may be made with either communicative or 
expressive intention. This means that the utterer may be either communicating to 
 
96 For further discussion of the aesthetic style of Charlie Hebdo see Jeet Heer, “The Aesthetic 
Failure of Charlie Hebdo,” New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/121748/arrested-
development-and-aesthetic-failure-charlie-hebdo (Accessed January 4, 2017). 
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a particular audience, or to no audience in particular.97 The fourth step is, again, 
to focus this analysis on misrepresentation as something that is intentionally done. 
It is possible to misrepresent something by mistake, but that is not the sense in 
which I am investigating misrepresentation. 
 
 The condition of mode sensitivity is to recognize that misrepresentations 
take place within particular modes and different modes, in turn, communicate 
information in different ways. Accordingly, to misrepresent within some particular 
mode, the subject must be misrepresented according to how that mode embodies 
and communicates information. In the context of the mode of depiction, this 
means that misrepresentations must be sensitive to how pictures refer and hold 
pictorial content. To use the four point scheme above, pictorial misrepresentation 
requires: 
1. There is some subject to which an utterer is referring by way of 
pictorial reference (there is a picture of a subject). 
2. This picture represents its subject as having certain properties. 
3. The utterer intends that some of these properties are not 
actually possessed by the subject. 
4. None of the previous steps are taken by mistake. 
The discussions about seeing-in, pictorial reference, and style are all part of the 
story about how pictures refer and have content.  
 
 Requirements for adhering to different modes may be more or less 
stringent. Pictures are the most stringent mode, since a pictorial 
misrepresentation must be not just understood visually, but in the way that 
pictures must be engaged by an audience, while also referring to its subject in a 
particular, pictorial way. Other modes are much less stringent. Languages, for 
instance, are not stringent at all. Speaking English, I may intentionally 
misrepresent the six-foot-tall John just by saying or writing “John is ten feet 
tall.”  
 
 
97 Importantly, this requirement rules out duplicity by way of misrepresentation. Duplicity is a 
separate phenomenon, where the utterer disguises the sort of utterance they are making. 
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 Some modes allow for different approaches to misrepresentation. In 
misrepresentation by performance, for example, a subject may be misrepresented 
in their appearance, their affect and mannerisms, or their behaviour. I may 
misrepresent myself as someone else by dressing up as that person. Or, in 
performing a stage play, I may misrepresent the character I am portraying by 
changing their voice — for example, I may misrepresent Winston Churchill as 
having a chicken voice. Similar to depiction, in the case of stage performances, 
what is misrepresentation and what is merely representation within the style of 
performance will depend in part on conventions to do with how characters are 
performed in the context of stage performances.  
 
 Musical misrepresentations are another sort of misrepresentation where 
particular instances may be very hard to decipher. For a misrepresentation to be 
musical, that means what is being misrepresented must be a musical feature, such 
as tone, rhythm, or instrumentation. However, these are elements that musicians 
frequently play around with, even (or especially) when performing known pieces. 
This means that making a musical misrepresentation clear to an audience can be 
quite difficult. The comedy music group Axis of Awesome accomplishes this in 
some performances of their song “Four Chord Song.”98 The song consists of band 
members Jordan, Benny, and Lee signing short refrains of other popular songs. 
These are for the most part just performances. However, when Lee sings the hook 
from “Not Pretty Enough” by Kasey Chambers, the other band members pause, 
drawing focus to the fact that Lee is not singing properly in tune. All songs 
performed within the larger song are changed from their original performances 
such that they are now being performed by Axis of Awesome. However, through 
their performance, the band is able to make clear that it is only one these songs, 
“Not Pretty Enough,” that is specifically being misrepresented. It is only for this 
song that the focus is on the musical properties that do not match the original 
song. For the others, the focus is that the original song is just being represented 
(especially when Benny manages the high note for “Take On Me” by A-Ha).  
 
 
98 The particulars of this song change with every performance. I have in mind the performance from 
the 2009 Melbourne Comedy Festival. 
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 In this section, I have given an account of misrepresentation as something 
that is done intentionally. I started by focusing on the paradigm case of 
misrepresentation in depiction, where I showed that there are features of 
depiction that are particular to depiction, which must in turn guide an account of 
misrepresentation. This account has two components — a basic account of 
misrepresentation, and a condition of mode sensitivity. The basic account of 
misrepresentation is just what it is to intentionally misrepresent something. It 
may be presented as the following four steps: 
1. There is some subject to which an utterer is referring. 
2. The utterer is representing this subject as having certain 
properties. 
3. The utterer intends that some of these properties are not 
actually possessed by the subject. 
4. None of the previous steps are taken by mistake. 
The condition of mode sensitivity, in turn, is just that to misrepresent a subject 
by a certain mode of presentation, the misrepresentation must be presented as 
representations are made within that mode. I would like to now turn my attention 
to satiric misrepresentation, and how the account of misrepresentation I have 
given can clarify how satire works. 
 
2. Satiric Misrepresentation 
 
It is a feature of my account that misrepresentation plays a central role within 
satire. This section will elaborate the role of misrepresentation in satire in two 
ways. Firstly, and briefly, I will show how my account of misrepresentation maps 
on to satire. Secondly, and more thoroughly, I will give an account of just what 
satiric misrepresentation is, such that misrepresentation may be used to 
distinguish satire from its close relatives (on either side) comedy and invective. 
 
 For satire to be satire, there must be something being satirized. Berys Gaut 
refers to this target of satire as its “double object,” and I will adopt his 
terminology.99 The double object is the target of satirical criticism, and its double 
 
99 Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 248. 
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nature is that it is both the thing that is the target of criticism within the satirical 
work — the “intentional object” — and the target of criticism outwith the satirical 
work — the “model.”100 The satirical work of art criticizes the intentional object, 
and by criticizing the intentional object levels the same criticism against the 
model. It is the model, then, which is the thing that is being satirized.  
 
 It is necessary for the relationship between the intentional object and 
model to be one of misrepresentation, and not of mere representation. This is 
because for the double object to be a double object, there must be some 
difference between the intentional object and model. If there is no difference, 
then there is no double nature to the object — the model is just represented 
within the work as itself. How the model is misrepresented is also critical to 
satirical misrepresentation. In the previous section, I argued that part of 
misrepresentation is the intentional attribution of properties to the 
representation that the represented subject does not possess. In the case of 
satire, it is by the attribution of these properties to the intentional object that 
the model is criticized. This may be either by way of the attributed properties 
themselves constituting the criticism, or by way of the criticism of the model 
operating through the way that it is misrepresented.  
 
2.1 Criticism Through Misrepresentation 
 
In the previous subsection I gave an account of how misrepresentation maps on to 
satire. In this subsection, I will defend that account by way of giving an account of 
satiric misrepresentation. There will be three steps to the articulation. First, I will 
show how satiric misrepresentation criticizes the model by way of misrepresenting 
it. Second, I will defend the claim that the intentional object must be a 
misrepresentation of the model. Third, and last, I will argue that it is a 
requirement for satire that the misrepresentation must be humourous.  
 
 
100 Gaut, 248. 
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 The essential role of the double object in satire is that it separates satire 
from what Northrop Frye refers to as mere invective.101 Invective, as the name 
suggests, is nothing more than an attack or expression of ill will towards a target. 
Satire, such that it satirizes its target, does not just express ill will towards a 
target, but articulates a particular criticism. For an example, consider two 
different ways in which Michael Moore has been presented in film. He is satirized 
in Team America: World Police (2004) by being misrepresented in two ways. The 
first is that he is always shown as having fast food in hand, suggesting that he is a 
glutton and thus, in contradiction of his words about helping the less fortunate, a 
hypocrite. The second is that he is exaggerated into being a literal suicide-
bombing terrorist, with the point being that he has an irrational, extreme hatred 
of the virtues of America. In contrast to Moore as he is presented in Team 
America, there is Moore as he is presented in An American Carol (2008). The 
movie takes the form of Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol (1843), where Moore 
is visited by three ghosts who teach him the value of America by what may fairly 
be described as subjecting him to 90 minutes of abuse without rhyme or reason. 
Since the film merely presents Moore being subject to abuse, no criticism 
becomes manifest. Consequently, the film is merely invective.  
 
 The role of misrepresentation in satirical criticism can be clarified by 
appealing to the four point account of misrepresentation articulated in the first 
section. Specifically, it is the third point — the intentional attribution of 
properties that the subject does not possess — that is important. In the case of 
Team America, the intentional object Moore is attributed two properties that he 
does not possess — the eternal food-in-hand and the derangement. The inclusion 
of these properties is identified, interpreted, and understood by the audience as 
being intended (following whatever theory of interpretation one wishes to use) to 
convey certain criticisms. In this case, the criticisms are that Moore is a glutton 
— and thus a hypocrite — and that he is deranged. In contrast, the American Carol 
Moore has no additional, misrepresentative properties. No misrepresentative 
properties means that there are no misrepresentative properties to be identified, 
 
101 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1957), 222-3. 
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interpreted, and understood by the audience as being intended to convey any 
criticisms.  
 
 It is important to note that misrepresentation is not sufficient for satire. 
This can be illuminated by Michael Crichton’s book Next (2006). Previous to Next, 
literary critic Michael Crowley had criticized Crichton’s global warming 
denialism.102 As an act of revenge, Critchton inserted into Next the character of 
Mick Crowley. The character Crowley was mentioned only in passing, and as a 
pedophile with a small penis. In this case, the real life Michael Crowley is 
misrepresented as the fictional Mick Crowley, and he is misrepresented by being 
characterized as a pedophile, but it is not clear that he is being criticized. Rather, 
the misrepresenting characteristics — being a pedophile with a small penis — are 
added merely as insult. Consequently, the misrepresentation of Crowley is merely 
invective, and not satirical. 
 
 My characterizations of Next, An American Carol, and Team America may 
be challenged, but I believe doing so underlines a strength of my account. 
Specifically, I believe that arguments over whether or not any of these three 
works are properly satirical will turn on the question of whether or not they may 
be rightly considered to be misrepresenting and criticizing their subjects. So, for 
example, a challenge that An American Carol was actually satirical could take the 
form that Moore in fact is misrepresented, maybe as an Ebeneezer Scrooge type 
figure by way of being placed in a Christmas-Carol-type story. Or perhaps Crichton 
really is criticizing Crowley by accusing him of not being a “real man” in some 
light. What both of these challenges have in common, however, is that they take 
misrepresentation and criticism to be essential to satire. Whether or not they are 
successful, they accept the account of satire I have given so far. 
 
 The case of the two Moores gives an insight into why the relationship 
between the intentional object and model needs to be one of misrepresentation. 
Recall that it is the properties attributed to the intentional object that are the 
 
102 Felicia R. Lee, “Columnist Accuses Crichton of Literary ‘Hit-and-Run,’” New York Times, 
December 14, 2006, https://nyti.ms/2p8Kshs. 
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basis of the satirical criticism. These properties are not just how the work levies 
criticism against both the intentional object and model, but specifically against 
the model by way of the intentional object. “By way of the intentional object” 
can work one of two ways. One way is that the misrepresentation itself 
constitutes the criticism, as is the case with the Team America Moore being 
misrepresented as having a deranged hatred of America. Many political cartoons 
fit this model, where some political figure is saddled with some feature — like 
Pinocchio’s long nose — that identifies them as lying or corrupt. The other way 
that the model may be criticized by way of the intentional object is that the way 
the model is misrepresented may determine and direct the criticism without 
constituting the criticism itself. This is often the case in dystopian satires. For 
example, in the film Brazil (1985), the world is in a constant state of 
Christmastime. The associated criticism is nothing to do with the real world’s 
ability to understand calendars or schedule celebrations, but rather something to 
the effect that late capitalism has devalued historical rituals. 
 
 If misrepresentation is essential to satirical criticism, and the satirical 
double object is the target of satirical criticism, then misrepresentation is 
essential to the double object. More specifically, if satirical criticism is found in 
how the model is misrepresented, then if the model is not misrepresented then 
there can be no satirical criticism. This does not mean that there can be no 
criticism of any sort but rather, as in the case of the American Carol Michael 
Moore, criticism will not be satirical but merely invective. 
 
 The last criterion for satirical misrepresentation is that the 
misrepresentation must be humorous, or amusing. For this section I want to adopt 
the disposition theory of humour, which may be thought of as an anti-theoretical 
approach to humour that holds that whatever is amusing is whatever reliably 
brings about the humour-related reaction in the audience, and that there is no 
way that this disposition may be systematized.103 Despite this anti-theoretical 
approach, some account may still be given as to the role of humour in satire. 
 
103 By these terms, other candidate theories of humour, such as incongruity, superiority, and 
psychoanalytic theories, may be thought of as theories which seek to define and systematize the 
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 An important distinction for understanding humour in satirical 
misrepresentation is that between prescribed and merited responses.104 The 
prescribed response to a work of art is the response that the work attempts to 
bring about in its audience. The merited response is the response that the 
audience ought to have. These two responses are most easily separated in bad 
genre fiction, especially horror and comedy films, which are found to be either 
not scary or not funny, respectively. A good example is the 2014 horror film 
Annabelle, about a doll possessed by the ghost of a murderous cultist. In one 
scene in particular, the protagonist is attacked by the cultist’s ghost. Between the 
fact that Annabelle is a conventional horror film, and the musical sting in the 
scene, it is fair to conclude that this scene prescribes a reaction of fear. However, 
when rushing the protagonist, the ghost bumps into the room door, and then the 
door frame. It also runs with uneven stutter steps, as if it is afraid to reach the 
protagonist too quickly. The ghost appears incompetent and unthreatening, so a 
response of fear would be unmerited. 
 
 When holding that satirical misrepresentation must be humourous, what I 
mean is that a humour response is merited.105 While a humour response may, and 
often will be, prescribed, it is not necessary that is must be.  Cases of satire 
where something is humourous despite no humour being prescribed will often be 
found in works where the satire resides in the premise. Consider the 2015 film 
CHAPPiE, by Neill Blompkamp. It is the story about how a software designer, 
played by Dev Patel, creates an artificial intelligence that is kidnapped by two 
gangsters and taught to commit crimes. Central to the story, and fundamental to 
it being a satire, is that both Patel and his boss are, despite all their aspirations 
about innovations and future-mindedness, dull and without imagination. The 
characters and their company are misrepresentations of the technology industry 
where, despite all their noble proclamations about the possibilities of technology, 
 
humour-causing disposition. The disposition theory serves as a placeholder here, and I will present 
my account of humour in the next chapter. 
104 Gaut, 231. 
105 I use the term “humour response” to sidestep the question of whether or not humour is an 
emotion. 
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they are not capable of conceiving of much more than a better gun, or a slightly 
better servant. At no point in the film is this facet brought to focus in such a way 
that might prescribe a humour response, despite it being an inescapable feature 
of the premise. However, that the self-styled geniuses of the technology industry 
are satirized as sightless dullards is nevertheless amusing, and were an audience 
member to find this funny then their reaction would not be unmerited.  
 
 Another way that a work may merit a humour response without prescribing 
one is that, for a response in question, the work may prescribe some reaction 
more strongly than one of humour. Accordingly, while a humour response may be 
merited — what is occurring in the work is funny — what the work prescribes is 
being frightened, or thrilled. The climactic action scene in CHAPPiE provides a 
good example. Throughout the film the antagonist is an engineer played by Hugh 
Jackman, whose driving motivation is that human beings’ emotions are necessary 
for making sound judgements, and artificial intelligences lack this human 
emotionality. In the climax, he pilots an assault robot in an attack on the 
protagonists. As Jackman’s acting makes clear, his character is motivated by a 
mix of paranoia and bloodlust. This is funny: after a film of pontificating about 
the importance of human emotions, his character is shown to be a bloodthirsty, 
slavering idiot. However, during the action scene, the focus on the character’s 
reactions do not prescribe a humour response. They prescribe discomfort and fear 
for the protagonists, but not humour. 
 
 The two examples from CHAPPiE help show the role of humour in satirical 
misrepresentation. Specifically, humour acts as a guarantor of the criticism that 
inheres in the way that the model is misrepresented in the intentional object. In 
each case, it is essential to the humour of the misrepresentation that the criticism 
is applicable to the model. The technology industry being misrepresented in the 
unimaginative Dev Patel and his boss would not be funny if not for the fact that 
the technology industry specifically espouses utopian ideals of progress, and Hugh 
Jackman’s murderous bloodlust would not be funny were his character not the 
misrepresentation of a humanist ideology. In each case, the humour is the product 
of the accuracy of the criticism in the misrepresentation, and if there was no 
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criticism then the misrepresentation would not be amusing. This helps distinguish 
the satirical from the non-satirical in two ways. The first way is where there is no 
criticism in the misrepresentation, as is the case in many allegories, where 
archetypal humans are misrepresented as animals. The second way is where the 
attempt at criticism is sufficiently cruel that all humour is squashed. This point 
requires further argumentation, as I must establish that it is possible for humour 
to be squashed by cruelty, and I will provide this argument in chapter 5 where I 
focus on the ethical evaluability of humour. For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
enough to say that the example of Michael Crowley being misrepresented as a 
pedophile in Michael Crichton’s Next may be taken as an example of such a 
phenomenon. If it were taken to be the case that in being misrepresented as a 
pedophile, Crowley were being criticized for being exploitative or unmanly, then 
this misrepresentation would be cruel to the point that it would not be 
humourous, and, accordingly, the misrepresentation would be mere invective. 
Misrepresenting Crowley as being a pedophile is cruel because it is beyond all 
reasonable scope — for the moral crime of criticizing Crichton he is 
misrepresented as a sexual predator and one of the most reviled sorts of people in 
Western society.  
 
 Humour in satirical misrepresentation does not only help distinguish the 
satirical from the non-satirical, but it also helps distinguish between sorts of 
satire. Satires are often considered to belong to one of two categories: either 
they are Juvenalian, or Horatian.106 Juvenalian satires are the sorts of satires that 
put a significant emphasis on the criticism, and really put an effort into tearing 
down the work’s target.107 Famous examples of Juvenalian satire would be 
Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal, or George Orwell’s Animal Farm, while 
modern examples would include the comic series 2000 A.D. or the film Sucker 
Punch. In contrast to Juvenalian satire is Horatian satire, which is satire that 
shows the foibles of its target in a friendlier, or more sympathetic light.108 While 
 
106 Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994): 
24. In practice, of course, a particular work may draw from both Juvenalian and Horatian traditions 
without belonging exclusively to one or the other. 
107 Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967): 21 
108 Paulson, 21. 
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the model is shown critically, and is the object of ridicule, it is not the target of 
vicious attack as it would be in Juvenalian satire. The most prominent current 
Horatian satire is probably found in the long-running television show The 
Simpsons. In it, the stereotypical American family is satirized in its titular Simpson 
family, especially the incompetent drunk of a patriarch, Homer. Homer is the 
most regular object of ridicule throughout the series, as he attempts to navigate 
the demands of fatherhood both at home, where he offers his children advice like 
“trying is the first step towards failure,” and the workplace, where he is 
incompetent but somehow keeps his job. At the end of most episodes109, however, 
the Simpson family comes to some amicable and mutually supportive conclusion. 
Altogether, even if the Simpsons are the object of ridicule, the attitude taken 
towards them is ultimately a sympathetic one. Their failures are the ones of the 
audience, or at least people like the audience. The American family may be 
satirized in the Simpson family, but they are not condemned. 
 
 The key difference between Juvenalian and Horatian satire is the attitude 
that each takes towards its target. Horatian satire is ultimately sympathetic with 
its subjects, whereas Juvenalian satire seeks to destroy them. Humour facilitates 
this division. Such that humour may manage group membership, it may be 
affiliative or disafilliative.110 This distinction will be explored more fully in the 
next chapter, but for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to invoke the 
familiar distinction between “laughing with” and “laughing at.” The humour of 
Juvenalian satire encourages “laughing at,” where the humour places the 
audience opposite the model upon which the intentional object is based. In 
Horatian satire, even if it does not strictly encourage “laughing with” the model 
upon which the intentional object is based (although it may), the humour places 
the audience alongside the humour’s targets. In each case, the sort of satire the 
work is is determined by the attitude displayed towards the double object, and it 
is by way of the humour that that attitude is expressed. 
 
 
109 At least for the first several seasons. I do not make this claim over the last 15-20 years of 
mediocrity. 
110 Philip Glenn, Laughter in Interaction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 29-30. 
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 It is worth underlining that this account is just of the role of humour in 
satiric misrepresentation, and not exhaustive of the role of humour in satire more 
generally. While I afford a very prominent role to misrepresentation in satire, 
there are still important and conventional roles for humour beyond its mediation 
of misrepresentation. For example, there is the role of humour in creating tonal 
shifts within satire (that is, from the humourous to the non-humourous or vice 
versa) as a way of clarifying to the audience that a work is satirical, as well as the 
role of humour in making satirical works generally more palatable and 
consumable. I will engage these topics in future chapters: the role of tonal shifts 
in chapter 3, which is on humour; and the role of humour as rendering satire 
consumable in chapter 6, which is on satirical works of art as commercially 
created and distributed products. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In this section I have given an account of satirical misrepresentation. Central to 
this account is the satirical double object, which is the target of satirical criticism 
both within and outwith the satirical work. The double object is composed of two 
halves: there is the intentional object, which is the target of the criticism within 
the work, and the model, which is the thing outwith the work which form the 
basis of the intentional object. The relation between the intentional object and 
the model is one of misrepresentation, where the model is misrepresented as the 
intentional object. The relation must be one of misrepresentation otherwise there 
is no double object — the model is simply represented within the work. 
 
 Such that misrepresentation is essential to the operation of satire, I have 
given the following account.  First, satiric criticism is specifically that criticism 
which depends upon how the model is misrepresented as the intentional object. 
This may be either through the misrepresenting properties, as attributed to the 
intentional object, themselves constituting the criticism of the model, or through 
the misrepresentation determining and directing (but not constituting) the 
criticism. Second, the requirement that satire must work through 
misrepresentation polices the boundaries between satire, mere invective, and 
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mere comedy. Without misrepresentation the work is just attacking its target, and 
is thus merely invective. Where there is misrepresentation but not criticism by 
way of that misrepresentation, the work is merely comedy (perhaps parody, or 
pastiche). Third, humour acts as a guarantor of satiric criticism. For potential 
satiric criticism — which is, again, criticism through misrepresentation — to be 
funny, it must be applicable to the model, and if the potential satiric criticism is 
not applicable to the model, then it is not funny. Fourth, and last, the nature of 
the satiric humour determines whether the satire in question is Juvenalian or 
Horatian. If the humour is oppositional, and expresses a strongly negative attitude 
towards its targets, then it is Juvenalian satire. If the humour is more sympathetic 
and forgiving, and encourages the audience to identify with the targets (in part or 
in whole), then it is Horatian. 
 
 In this first section of this chapter, I offered a four point account of 
intentional misrepresentation. It can be expanded so as to be made specific for 
the account of satiric misrepresentation given in the second section: 
1. There is some subject to which an utterer is referring. 
2. The utterer is representing this subject as having certain 
properties. 
3. The utterer intends that some of these properties are not 
actually possessed by the subject. 
4. These added properties either constitute a criticism of the 
subject, or will be used to make a criticism of the subject. 
5. Within the context of the work, it is right to find these added 
properties funny. 
6. None of the previous steps are taken by mistake. 
The qualification of “within the context of the work” is added to make 
clear that what is funny is some feature of the work to which the 
audience reacts when appreciating that work, rather than some fact about 
the work. For example, in Jason Friedberg and Aaron Seltzer’s Meet the 
Spartans (2008), the titular Spartans are the Spartans from the film 300, 
but misrepresented as being effete and coded as gay. That the Spartans 
were represented in this way may be funny such that it shows the 
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complete moral and intellectual wretchedness that manages to float to 
the top in the creatively dead industry of Hollywood film (or something 
like that). But the work itself, however, is not funny. 
 
 Aptly, I turn now to the question of how best to understand 
humour, and the roles it may play in satire. 
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Chapter 3: Humour 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the role of humour in satire. This will be 
done to two ends. The first end is to further the definition of satire. I have argued 
that it is essential that satirical misrepresentation is funny, or amusing. In this 
chapter I will give an account of what it is for a satirical misrepresentation to be 
funny. The second end is to give a more general discussion of the role of humour in 
satire. There are uses of humour that are characteristic either of satire generally 
or of specific types of satire, but are not definitional to satire. These uses of 
humour deserve discussion, and I will address them in this chapter.  
 
 To support my argument about satire, I will have to give an account of 
humour and what it means for something to be funny. The account of humour that 
I give will cut against contemporary philosophical accounts of humour and will take 
up the majority of this chapter. The current triad of dominant philosophical 
theories — Noel Carroll’s account of comic amusement as a cognitive emotion, 
John Morreall’s account of humour as deriving from a ‘cognitive shift’, and 
Matthew Hurley et al’s account of mirth as an epistemic emotion — are what I will 
term “internalist” theories. This is to say that they primarily identify humour with 
a process or experience that happens inside the person. The essence of humour, by 
their theories, is in a person’s reaction to some stimulus, and an account of 
humour in turn must focus on the nature of the individual’s reaction. In contrast to 
these internalist accounts, I will give an account of humour as a social practice. 
This will take the focus of the account outside of the individual’s reaction and 
instead focus on the relationship between the humourist, the audience, and 
anybody caught in the crossfire. The psychologist and neuroscientist will be 
deprioritized (although not ignored) while greater importance will be given to the 
historian and sociologist. 
 
 Central to motivating the social account of humour will be an analogy 
between humour and art. The two are relevantly similar in that they have a very 
similar heritage. Both terms, as commonly understood in the present day, 
originated in similar circumstances. Specifically, they came about as 
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industrialization and colonialism allowed for the creation of a new bourgeoisie, 
and this brought about a new way of seeing and understanding the world. Both art 
and humour inherited some distinctions that have shaped theory in ways that 
present day theorists would not accept. In the case of art, these distinctions lead 
back to gendered differences between arts and crafts, and the effects of these 
differences are increasingly being removed from art theory.111 Humour has 
inherited some classed distinctions, and importantly, these distinctions are not 
acknowledged in contemporary theories, and their effects have not been removed. 
Altogether, I believe that the analogy between art and humour can be used to shed 
light on where contemporary humour theory is failing and what must be done to 
correct it. 
 
 The three sections of this chapter, then, will be divided into a total of seven 
subsections. The first section will develop the account of humour as a social 
practice and be divided into five subsections: (1) A survey of contemporary 
philosophical theories of humour and a defence of the claim that these should be 
understood as internalist theories; (2) an appeal to the work of Stephen Davies on 
the development of art out of aesthetics, where he argues that any theorizing 
about art must prioritize the actual practice of art, and a defence that Davies’ 
argument analogizes to the case of humour; (3) a historical look at actually 
existing humour practices and an argument that humour-as-practiced puts a much 
greater focus on laughter than current theories allow; (4) a delineation of two 
standards of humour that emerge from approaching humour as a social practice 
and (5) a small section on how a social account of humour can account for 
naturally occurring funniness. The second section will articulate, in light of the 
first section, just what it means that a satirical misrepresentation must be funny. 
The third section will contain two subsections: (1) The role of humour in 
determining Horatian and Juvenalian satire; and (2) the importance of humour in 
making satire identifiable as satire. 
 
 
111 For an example of such an excavation, see the chapter “Beauty Resurrected” in Matthew Kieran, 
Revealing Art, (Oxford: Routledge, 2005). 
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 There are two main motivations for suggesting accounting for humour as a 
practice rather than an experience. The first is that the internalist theories have 
inherited historical baggage that I do not believe they recognize, and that this 
unwarrantedly directs the sorts of explanations they give. Accordingly, by focusing 
on the social practice of humour, I may help reorient the internalist theories. 
However, I believe that I am providing more than a correction or augmentation to 
the internalist approach. Rather, I believe that accounting for humour as a social 
practice not only strengthens the philosophical discussion of humour, but is 
considerably better at interrogating certain phenomena. It is much better able to 
answer questions about how humour works, what it can accomplish, and how it 
ought to be used. These virtues of the social account will be evident in this 
chapter in discussions not only about how humourous misrepresentations work, but 
also about the role of humour in satire more generally. I believe that the 
discussion I will provide will be of the sort that internalist accounts are ill-
equipped to provide, since I will discuss satire in a way that involves relationships 
between author, audience, and target. The virtues of the social account will be 
most prominent in later chapters when I discuss the ethics of humour and the 
social and political roles satire may play.  
 
 There are two clarifications that I would like to include in this introduction. 
The first clarification is about the distinction between humour, what is funny, and 
(comic) amusement. Alan Roberts has recently published an argument for the 
principled distinction between the three.112 I would like to adopt a close version of 
his distinction, but as a stipulation and without committing to the argument 
behind it. It is as follows: 
• Humour is the practice of creating things that are funny. 
• Funniness is the evaluation of a humour-appropriate reaction. 
• (Comic) amusement is the humour-specific response. 
I can only adopt a close version of it, and not the exact thing, because Roberts 
implicitly adopts an internalist account of humour by giving priority to 
 
112 Alan Roberts, “Humour is a Funny Thing,” British Journal of Aesthetics 56, no.4 (2016): 366. 
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amusement.113 Since I am giving an account in contrast to internalist accounts, 
Roberts’ distinction does not map well on to what I will propose in this chapter. I 
am accepting the distinction between humour, funniness, and amusement just as a 
stipulation because the language surrounding the practice of humour is both 
relatively new and highly informal. Because of the newness of the language — the 
term “humour” as presently used only started to emerge in the late 18th century 
— and how informal discussion surrounding humour is, there is good reason to 
expect that the terms ‘humour’, ‘funny’, and ‘amusing’ are generally applied 
loosely and should not be expected to each track distinct phenomena.114 The 
stipulated distinction is useful for making philosophical writing clear, but I do not 
want to commit any further than that. 
 
 The second clarification is about the extent of my argument. While the 
social practice account of humour I am giving is in opposition to internalist 
accounts of humour, it does not negate them. This is to say that even if the 
account I propose is wholly and unambiguously correct, there is no part of it that 
renders an internalist account impossible. I will argue that the present accounts 
are not correct, and I believe that my social practice account makes it very 
unlikely that a unified internalist account will be possible, but it is nevertheless 
impossible for me to completely rule out that there is some underlying, unifying 
internal phenomenon. 
 
1.1 Internalist Accounts 
 
There are currently three dominant philosophical theories of humour.115 There is 
Noel Carroll’s theory that the essence of humour is comic amusement, which is a 
cognitive emotion that is directed at incongruity. There is John Morreall’s theory, 
 
113 Specifically, amusement is essential to appreciating humour, and funniness is defined as 
meriting amusement. Roberts, 366. 
114 Jan Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, “Introduction,” in A Cultural History of Humour, eds. Jan 
Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, 1-3 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997).  
115 I should note that in engaging philosophical theories of humour, not all theories of humour. In 
The Psychology of Humour, Rod Martin and Thomas Ford list three main psychological theories of 
humour: Reversal Theory, Comprehension-Elaboration Theory, and Benign Violation Theory. I do not 
engage them here but, as they are psychological theories of humour, it is not a stretch to accept 
them as internalist theories. Thomas Ford and Rod Martin, The Psychology of Humour: An 
Integrative Approach (London: Academic Press, 2018): 72. 
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which holds that humour is a sort of aesthetic experience that a subject 
experiences when one undergoes a certain type of cognitive shift. Lastly, there is 
Matthew Hurley et al’s theory that the essence of humour is the epistemic emotion 
of mirth, which originated as a motivation for an informational filter in the brain 
but has since developed to be readily triggered by a wider range of stimuli. These 
three theories are quite diverse, with each locating humour in a different type of 
reaction — a cognitive emotion, an epistemic emotion, or not an emotional 
reaction at all. However, what they all have in common is that they explicate 
humour primarily in terms of something that happens within the person. The 
essence of humour, by these theories, is an internal reaction and experience. 
Accordingly, I term them internalist theories. In this subsection I will give a brief 
summary of each account and show just how each one is internalist. To start, 
however, I will begin with a summary of current theory on laughter and evolution 
which is common to all three accounts. 
 
1.1.1 Laughter and Play 
 
The role of laughter in humour has come under reevaluation recently, but is still 
generally seen to be nonessential.116 The conventional position is that not all 
laughter is as a result of humour, and not all humour leads to laughter, therefore 
laughter does not have a necessary relationship to humour. Laughter is 
acknowledged as a “typical” humour reaction, but no stronger.117 This is because 
laughter is a social signal and, even if it is deeply connected with humour in 
practice, it serves other purposes.118 Research by Robert Provine has shown that 
the main use of laughter in social settings is to signal recognition or familiarity.119 
Further research by Provine, as well as sociologists like Philip Glenn, has shown 
laughter to be mostly used for purposes of navigating interpersonal relationships: 
recognition, affiliation, disaffiliation, and directing conversation.120 Altogether, in 
 
116 For a look at the re-evaluation of the role of laughter in humour, see Joshua Shaw, “Philosophy 
of Humor,” Philosophy Compass 5, no.2 (2010): 112-126. 
117 For instance, see Matthew Hurley, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald Adams, Jr. Inside Jokes: Using 
Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind (Camrbidge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011): 23-4. 
118 Philip Glenn, Laughter in Interaction, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 29. 
119 Robert Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation, (New York, NY: Viking, 2000): 40. 
120 Glenn, 29. 
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a collection of his research published in 2000, Provine reckons that less than a 
quarter of all laughter is in what would be considered humourous contexts.121  
 
Since laughter is a social signal, it is pointedly absent in non-social 
situations. A 1989 study by Provine and Kenneth Fischer showed that people 
laughed 30 times more frequently in social settings than outside of them, and that 
this includes humourous laughter.122 A person by themselves reading a humourous 
story or joke is far less likely to laugh in response to the humour than if they had 
read that same story or joke in a group. To further the separation between humour 
and laughter, Hurley et al cite a neuropsychological study showing that the neural 
networks in the brain relating to humour and laughter are completely separate and 
that laughter may be neurologically triggered (by disease or chemical stimulant) 
without any self-reported feelings relating to humour in the subject.123 
 
 Philosophical accounts of humour may also make use of the idea of 
Duchenne laughter. While only Hurley et al explicitly reference Duchenne 
laughter, if I am going to argue against the existing theories and in favour of a 
larger role for laughter then it is an important distinction to manage.124 Duchenne 
laughter is a particular sort of laughter that is defined by being stimulus-driven, 
showing upturned corners of the laugher’s mouth indicating an emotional reaction, 
and being particularly difficult to fake.125 It is put in contrast with laughter that is 
considered the opposite: affected rather than stimulus driven, and not indicating 
any emotional state as such. As Matthew Gervais and David Sloan Wilson note, 
while this is often discussed as if it is a dichotomy that accounts for all laughter, 
there is also the existence of stimulus-driven non-Duchenne laughter.126 I will make 
use of stimulus-driven non-Duchenne laughter later; what is important at this stage 
of the argument is that there is this distinction between Duchenne and non-
Duchenne laughter. This distinction is put to use by Hurley et al to navigate the 
 
121 Provine, 40. 
122 Robert Provine and Kenneth Fischer, “Laughing, Smiling, and Talking: Relation to Sleeping and 
Social Context in Humans,” Ethology 83, no.4 (1989): 301. 
123 Hurley et al, 21-22. 
124 Ibid, 19.  
125 Ibid, 20. 
126 Matthew Gervais and David Sloan Wilson, “The Evolution and Functions of Laughter and Humor: 
A Synthetic Approach,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 80, no.4 (2005): 401. 
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situations in which people laugh as set out by Provine and Glenn. Amused laughter, 
write Hurley et al, is Duchenne laughter while mere conversational laughter of the 
sort that Provine and Glenn identify is non-Duchenne laughter.127 
 
 Philosophical accounts of humour integrate laughter into humour by way of 
the play theory.128 In its most basic form, play theory holds that humour developed 
from play practices in early hominids. It takes its evidence from signs of proto-
laughter in chimpanzees: when playing, chimpanzees will let their jaw hang 
loosely while panting to make a staccato sound.129 The panting and loose jaw 
prevent the chimpanzee from biting hard, and so this serves as a signal to other 
chimpanzees that its behaviour is mock aggression and not genuinely 
threatening.130 These observations about chimpanzees are extrapolated to have 
applied to early hominids as well, and then an evolutionary story is theorized to 
explain how this behaviour developed into human humour practice. Morreall posits 
the following story: laughter was at some point used as a signal that some threat 
was no longer present, which he calls “false alarm” laughter.131 Since this laughter 
was to return the group to normal from a state of high alert, it had an enjoyable, 
relaxing (or untensing) effect on the group.132 Since this effect was enjoyable, 
early hominids developed practices to trigger this effect — an example he uses is a 
member of the group pretending to be a large predator lurking in the grass and 
then announcing themselves and using laughter to indicate that there was no real 
threat.133 Over time this behaviour attached itself to linguistic communication, 
where it was useful for a speaker identifying that what they meant was a joke and 
meant to bring pleasure, as opposed to a deception or mistake. No two play 
accounts give exactly the same story but Morreall’s is typical: there is some 
pleasurable function of laughter, early hominids come to exploit this function, and 
 
127 Hurley et al, 2003. 
128 While Carroll explicitly rejects the play theory as a theory of humour in itself, he still offers 
criteria that make use of it in a similar manner to Morreall.  
129 John Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Humor (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009): 37-38. 
130 Morreall, 37-38. 
131 Ibid, 44. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid, 45. 
 78 
over time linguistic communication comes to make use of this function for one 
reason or another. 
 
 It is worth noting that the play theory, by giving an evolutionary story, lends 
itself to an internalist theory of humour. Even when detailing social practices, as 
could be argued Morreall is doing when he invokes the development of linguistic 
humour, what the play theory is seeking to explain is how two internal processes — 
laughter and amusement — became related. To the extent that social phenomena 
feature in the explanation, it is to the extent that they can be used to explain 
internal phenomena. The use of evolutionary stories in this manner will be brought 
to the fore by Davies in his exploration of how aesthetic sensibilities developed 
into art practice, and I will argue that it constitutes a serious weakness in 
internalist philosophical accounts of humour. For this section, though, it is enough 
to note that the play theory makes use of evolutionary explanations to give a story 
about how some laughter became tied to amusement. 
 
1.1.2 Noel Carroll and Humour as a Cognitive Emotion 
 
According to Carroll, the proper analysandum of humour is the cognitive emotion 
of comic amusement.134 There are two parts to his argument: first, arguing that 
the object of comic amusement is incongruity, and then that comic amusement is 
indeed a cognitive emotion. Since all I am seeking to establish here is that 
Carroll’s theory is internalist, I will focus on his argument that comic amusement is 
a cognitive emotion. 
 
 Carroll advances his argument by way of analogy in four points. Each point is 
a characteristic typical of paradigmatic emotional reactions, and in each case he 
argues that the reaction of comic amusement works in the same way as other 
emotional reactions. The four characteristics are as follows: Comic amusement (1) 
is directed; (2) has a formal object, or criterion of appropriateness; (3) generates 
a mood, which affects how other things are perceived; and (4) is contagious.135 
 
134 Noel Carroll, Humour: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014): 4. 
135 Carroll, 55-7. 
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That comic amusement is directed is to say that there is something in particular 
that is found comically amusing.136 A person is not just in a state of comic 
amusement, but they are in such a state because there is something to which they 
are reacting. The formal object, or criterion of appropriateness, is what 
determines whether or not some stimulus ought to comically amuse a subject.137 
To Carroll, this formal object is incongruity.138 The third characteristic, to 
generate a mood, means that once a person has found one thing funny, they are 
more likely to find others things funny.139 That amusement is contagious means 
that emotional reactions are stronger or more likely in a group of people 
experiencing the same emotion.140 As an example he appeals to the practice of 
laugh tracks on sitcoms, which are meant to facilitate the audience’s amusement. 
To these four points of analogy, Carroll adds a fifth characteristic of amusement 
which is an experience of levity.141 When one is amused one has an experience of 
“pleasant lightness,” and if one does not experience levity then one is not in a 
state of comic amusement.142 
 
 Since I am merely trying to establish that Carroll’s theory is an internalist 
theory, I will not evaluate it for correctness. Instead, I will just argue that he 
defines humour by what happens within the person. There are some ways that this 
is easy: just that humour is analyzed by way of comic amusement, for one, as well 
as the fact that a particular experiential state — levity — is a necessary condition 
for being amused. The third and fourth characteristics, of mood and contagion, are 
also straightforwardly internalist since their primary focus is on the experiential 
state of the amused subject. The first and second characteristics, of directedness 
and of having a formal object, are internalist inasmuch as they concern what a 
subject is perceiving. Even though the thing the subject is perceiving is outside of 
the subject, the thing being perceived is still being understood as it effects the 
 
136 Carroll, 55. 
137 Ibid, 56. 
138 While Carroll offers examples of what are supposed to be amusing things that make use of 
incongruity, just what it means to call something incongruous is never substantially explored or 
defined.  Ibid. 
139 Ibid, 56-57. 
140 Ibid, 57. 
141 Ibid, 58. 
142 Ibid. 
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subject’s experience. For the characteristic of directedness, it is that the object is 
perceived to have the qualities that generate the state of comic amusement. 
Similarly, for the characteristic of formal object, what is at issue is that there is 
an object that ought to effect an experience in the subject. Even if both 
characteristics look to objects outside the subject, these objects are important 
inasmuch as they can be related to experiences within the subject. 
 
 I do not believe that casting Carroll’s theory as internalist is controversial or 
will make anybody unhappy. After all, the first move he makes is to locate the 
object of inquiry for humour in an emotional reaction. However, this does not 
mean that Carroll excludes the actual practice of humour. He invokes many 
examples in his argument for incongruity as the formal object of comic 
amusement. I will return address these examples in the section on the historical 
practice of humour. 
 
1.1.3 John Morreall and the Cognitive Shift 
 
Of the three major philosophical accounts of humour, John Morreall’s is the only 
one that does not hold the humour-reaction of amusement to be an emotional 
reaction. Rather, he holds amusement to be having one’s attention agreeably 
occupied in a particular sort of way.143 Since humour is not an emotion, he cannot 
provide the sort of analysis that Carroll does. Instead, Morreall argues that humour 
inheres in what he calls a “cognitive shift” — a rapid transition from one cognitive 
state to another.144 He develops this account to have four characteristics of the 
humorous cognitive shift: 
1. We experience a cognitive shift — a rapid change in our perceptions or 
thoughts. 
2. We are in play mode rather than serious mode, disengaged from conceptual 
and practical concerns. 
 
143 It is worth noting that this is what Morreall considers amusement in the narrow sense. The wide 
sense of amusement is just to have one’s attention agreeably occupied in any way. The narrow 
sense is meant to capture that when talking about amusement in relation to humour, both 
philosophers and people more generally are after something more specific than the way one might 
be amused when playing a game. Morreall, 63. 
144 Ibid, 44. 
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3. Instead of responding to the cognitive shift with shock, confusion, 
puzzlement, fear, anger, or other negative emotions, we enjoy it. 
4. Our pleasure in the cognitive shift is expressed in laughter, which signals to 
others that they can relax and play too.145 
 
As the four criteria suggest, Morreall gives a large role to play theory in his 
account of humour. And, indeed, his account is deeply based in an evolutionary 
story. As I detailed in section 1.1.1 of this chapter, Morreall roots the origins of 
humour in human or proto-human “false alarm” laughter — to signal that a threat 
has passed — and the subsequent development of techniques to exploit false alarm 
laughter and the pleasant feeling that accompanies it.146 This story is present in 
each of the four characteristics that Morreall presents.  The first characteristic, 
for instance, derives from the hypothesis that false alarm laughter brought about a 
shift from a state of tension to a state of relaxation. The second characteristic 
straightforwardly shows humour’s history in play — specifically that humour has 
developed out of play practice.  The third characteristic shows that humour 
inherited the enjoyable affective feeling of play. Lastly, the fourth characteristic, 
that pleasure in the cognitive shift is expressed in laughter, is the end point of the 
development from false alarm laughter through play signal laughter. 
 
Since Morreall foregrounds the cognitive shift in defining humour — he 
describes his own theory as the cognitive shift theory — it should be, as with 
Carroll, uncontroversial to describe his theory as an internalist theory. Despite 
invoking play practice, everything that Morreall uses to define humour is 
something that happens within the body. The first characteristic, the cognitive 
shift, concerns a process that happens within the body. The second and third 
characteristics concern attitude and affect; they are about the mental states of 
the subject. Lastly, while the fourth characteristic concerns the social signal of 
laughter, it engages it from the perspective of the motivation of the subject. The 
laughter is specifically an expression, which is to say Morreall is concerned not 
with the social signal but what underlies it. 
 
145 Morreall, 63. 
146 Ibid, 45-46. 
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1.1.4 Matthew Hurley and Mirth 
 
In Inside Jokes, the primary goal of Matthew Hurley, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald 
Adams147 is to explore the impact of humour on the philosophy of mind. The theory 
of humour they initially offer up is just a basic dispositional theory — humour is 
whatever reliably triggers the humour-appropriate neurological process under 
normalized conditions.148 The bulk of the book is exploring what this humour-
appropriate neurological process might be. While they acknowledge that whatever 
humour is now has been greatly shaped by biological and cultural evolution, they 
do start their investigation by attempting to articulate a core mechanism of 
humour.149 This is the original mechanism and purpose of humour from which 
current practice evolved. 
 
 At the centre of Hurley et al’s account of humour is the epistemic emotion 
of mirth.150 By epistemic emotion, they mean an emotion that encourages “the 
mental behaviours that constitute a certain form of reasoning and epistemic 
assurance.”151 The mental behaviour that mirth encourages is the sorting through 
beliefs for the purpose of identifying incompatible committed beliefs.152 The 
reason that the mirth reaction associated with humour is so powerful, and the 
desire towards humorous stimuli is so strong, is that this process was essential to 
the survival and success of some early sort of hominid.153  
 
 
147 As the foreword to Inside Jokes explains, the basis of the book is student work done by Matthew 
Hurley, so he will be credited as the main author of the theory. 
148 Hurley et al, 17. 
149 Ibid, 1-2. 
150 While in this chapter I will speak just of mirth, it is worth acknowledging that towards the end of 
their book, Hurley et al allow for different sorts of specialized mirth. The one example they invoke 
is the possibility that mirth is the main emotional reaction to certain types of musical engagement. 
To the extent that there is a meaningful distinction to be had, all mentions of mirth in this chapter 
should be considered to refer to humour-specific mirth. Hurley et al, 240. 
151 Hurley et al note that this is very close to what many philosophers mean by “cognitive emotion,” 
they wish to eschew that term since they believe that invoking cognition as such brings with it 
unnecessary and unhelpful baggage. Ibid, 66. 
152 Ibid, 116. 
153 Ibid, 1. 
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 This sort of incompatible belief detection process may be the core 
mechanism of humour, from which present humour developed, but it is not 
necessary for humour. While Hurley et al write that humour has since developed 
through cultural and biological evolution, they do not articulate exactly what 
these developments are. Nevertheless, they do provide for two ways that forms of 
humour may deviate from simple incompatible belief detection. The first way is 
that humour may be made to “run backwards.” Hurley et al invoke research that 
shows affecting the outward behaviours of Duchenne laughter — smiling and 
laughing in a particular way with upturned corners of the mouth — can reliably 
trigger the emotional reaction of mirth.154 Accordingly, instead of humour seeking 
to provoke a mirth reaction and in turn generate laughter, it may instead seek to 
provoke a Duchenne laughter reaction and in turn generate mirth. This bypasses 
the incompatible belief detection system. The second way is that there may be 
transference from “one emotional modality to another,” which is to say that the 
arousal of one emotional reaction may be transferred to another.155 These result 
from shortcuts the brain creates when dealing with stimuli that reliably trigger 
together.156 
 
 
154 Hurley et al, 20. 
155 Ibid, 218. 
156 This transference is possible because of what Hurley et al call a “credit-assignment problem”: 
the difficulty that the brain faces in properly attributing a reward in response to a complex set of 
events. The brain has two solutions available to it: 
The first is Hebbian: Reward everything “in sight” but don’t look too widely, and then 
leave it up to statistical regularities over time to sort out proper accreditation for 
patterns of events. The second solution involves metacognition: If a causal 
“hypothesis” (right or wrong) can be temporally associated with an emotion and this 
association is (rightly or wrongly) rewarded with that emotion or also with the Aha! 
emotion of discovery or insight, this labels the thought that preceded the emotion as 
credit-worthy. Unlike the first solution, the second solution can also be used to 
accredit memory after the fact — either in imagination or in attentive repetition of the 
event. 
In simplified terms, the first solution functions by the brain creating a permanent association 
between two emotions that reliably respond to the same stimulus. For an example, a gross out joke 
presents a certain stimulus that the brain is not sure how to precisely process, so it triggers both 
digust and humour emotional responses. Over time, if gross out humour triggers both disgust and 
humour with statistical regularity, then the brain creates a system where the two become related. 
For the second solution, emotional responses can become connected by reliably triggering in 
proximity. This creates a practice in the brain where one emotion (disgust in the case of gross out 
humour) may reliably be taken as an indicator of humour. In either circumstance, the effect is that 
of the brain tying the triggering of the humour emotion of mirth to other emotional reactions. Ibid. 
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 As with Carroll and Morreall, identifying the theory of Hurley et al as 
internalist should not be controversial. Humour is primarily associated with an 
emotional response — mirth — and is further articulated in terms of a cognitive 
task that it either serves or served in an evolutionary predecessor. While Hurley et 
al accept the development of humour beyond this original mechanism, extensions 
are still explicated in terms of internal process. Laughter-first humour and 
transferred humour are both humour because they trigger the emotional reaction 
of mirth, and how this happens is explicated in biological and psychological terms. 
 
1.2 Moving Beyond the Internal 
 
I would like to seize on Hurley et al’s appeal to evolution and use it as a basis to 
start to move beyond the internalist approach to humour. After all, the internalist 
approach to humour is as much as anything an artifact of the times in which the 
analyses are conducted. As Jan Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg note in their 
introduction to A Cultural History of Humour, it is only recently that humour has 
primarily become the domain of psychologists and sociologists.157 In previous eras 
it has belonged to philosophers and rhetoricians, monks and theologians, and 
essayists.158 The internalist approach fits snugly with the psychological approach 
and may be spurred on in general scientific advances facilitating the study of the 
brain, but it is not the only possible approach. The purpose of this section, then, is 
to evaluate the general strategy of using an internalist approach to humour and 
argue that the proper focus of a theory of humour is on its practice. To make this 
argument, I would like to argue by an analogy to the practice of art. Art, like 
humour, is a pan-human practice with its origins in some deep but ambiguous and 
largely unknown evolutionary history. Recently, Stephen Davies released the book 
The Artful Species, which looks at art through the lens of evolution and argues for 
the foregrounding of practice. I will marshal that argument to my own ends so 
that, as with art, the proper focus for the philosophy of humour is the practice of 
humour. Accordingly, this section will present two things: I must not just present 
Davies’s argument, but also argue for an analogy between humour and art in this 
 
157 Bremmer and Rodenburg, 6. 
158 Ibid. 
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case. I will begin by establishing a baseline for the analogy between humour and 
art, so that appealing to Davies’s work in the general sense will be justified. After 
presenting Davies’s argument, I will justify the analogy to the details of his 
argument, so as to establish that what he concludes for art applies as much for 
humour. 
  
1.2.1 Similarities in the Historical Development of Art and Humour Discourses 
 
The best motivation for the analogy between art and humour is that both terms 
emerged in the 18th century under similar circumstances. This is not to say that the 
words “art” and “humour” did not exist before then, but this is when they 
emerged in something resembling their current sense. As the historian Constance 
Classen notes, the development of “art” in the current sense came about through 
a bifurcation between arts and crafts.159 This bifurcation was not just one that 
tracked practice, but also a number of gendered and classed divisions. For 
example, art was a men’s activity and was thus considered to display 
excellence.160 Crafts, on the other hand, were considered the domain of women 
and consigned to the beautification of functional objects.161 The detachedness of 
art reflected the bourgeois ideal that art was a sign of a sophisticated intellect and 
separate from the concerns of everyday life.162 The current understanding of art no 
longer appeals to these classed or gendered justifications, but their effects 
lingered for quite some time and in some cases linger still. For example, it was a 
frequent component of theories of art that artistic appreciation must be 
“disinterested,” which is to say detached from any other concern or cognitive 
activity. As Davies notes, some vestiges of the 18th century European bourgeois 
approach still remain, such as the belief that it is distinctive of art that it is 
associated with virtuosic skill.163 
 
 
159 Constance Classen, “Feminine Tactics: Crafting an Alternative Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries,” in The Book of Touch, ed. Constance Classen, 228 (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2005). 
160 Classen, 229. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Stephen Davies, The Artful Species (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012): 26. 
163 In his discussion on characteristics of art, Davies notes that in some cultures art-making is 
defined by its inclusivity and unskilled nature. Virtuosic skill, in these cases, would be antithetical 
to art. Davies, 27-8. 
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 That the term “art” developed in such a limited historical context does not 
mean that it is limited to refer to what it originally referred. After all, as Davies 
notes, that would exclude more or less everything that was not developed within 
the Western European art tradition from the Enlightenment onwards.164 Rather, art 
must be understood as something with a multitude of practices across a multitude 
of contexts, and any proposed definitions or ways of understanding art must be 
evaluated in that light. It is at this point that Davies invokes biological and 
evolutionary accounts for the development of art. It is these accounts that 
correspond to the internalist accounts of humour which I detailed in the previous 
section. Importantly, with humour as with art, the term “humour” developed in 
the Enlightenment context to refer to phenomena far more limited than the term 
is taken to refer to today.  
 
 Both Carroll and Morreall recognize that “humour” as it is currently used, is 
a historical development of the Enlightenment period.165 However, since both of 
them offer internalist theories, neither of them interrogate the context of the 
development of the language of humour and what baggage the context could have 
placed upon the language. As Michael Billig details in Laughter and Ridicule, this is 
a relevant omission. Billig situates the development of humour discourse, alongside 
the development of the incongruity theory of humour, in the early colonial era, 
which brought about the advent of coffee-houses and cocoa-houses.166 These were 
a new class of social space, public but definitely bourgeois and male.167 
Accordingly it was these values which influenced the original articulations of 
humour, values which, argues Billig, positioned humour as the proper laughter of 
the bourgeois and against the uncouth laughter of the lower classes.168 The effect 
of the division was to identify proper laughter as being an appreciation of wit and 
other intellectual virtue as opposed to the uncouth laughter of ridicule and 
domination. The laughter of humour was quieter and more restrained than the 
 
164 Davies, 26. 
165 Carroll, 5; Morreall, 58. 
166 It is worth noting that Billig focuses specifically on the British context. Michael Billig, Laughter 
and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour (London, UK: SAGE Publications, Ltd, 2005), 59. 
167 Billig, 59. 
168 Ibid, 76. 
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raucous laughter of lower-class bawdiness.169 As Billig identifies in the writing of 
early humour theorists like Francis Hutcheson and Lord Shaftesbury, the laughter 
of humour was identified as being “relaxing” and “innocent.”170 While there is 
positional jockeying in humour, it is important that one is “quick, clever and 
cheerful, not a point-scoring bully.”171 
 
 Another insight into the role of laughter can be gleaned from the work of 
Quentin Skinner. In his 2001 Henry Tudor memorial lecture he identifies two 
important points in the historical development of theorizing over laughter. Interest 
in theories of laughter (and later humour) began in the Renaissance with doctors 
and other medicalists engaging classical texts on laughter.172 Where the classical 
texts presented certain laughing behaviour as unethical, the Renaissance 
medicalists sought to pathologize that behaviour.173 The result was that open, 
raucous laughter came to be understood as symptomatic of some physical or 
spiritual illness.174 Skinner also places this in the context of the modern conception 
of “civilization,” which put an emphasis on the control of bodily reactions.175 Since 
ideas like “civilization” and “civility” began by tracking the behavior of the court 
and aristocracy, the association of controlled laughter with civility also indicates 
an association of uncontrolled laughter with the lower classes.176 These two points 
together, of medicalization and civilization, suggest that theories of laughter were 
developed in a way that they were laden with political judgements. Laughter was 
unclean, and unworthy. The period that Skinner is writing about is slightly anterior 
to the period that Billig discusses, so medicalization and civilization are best 
understood as precursors to the classed dynamics that Billig discusses. They are 
the theories of laughter that informed the later theories of humour. 
 
169 A frequent target of the Enlightenment Humour Theorists was a book titled Joe Miller’s Jests, a 
compendium of jokes and witticisms centred around the basic humour elements of sex and shit. 
The Jests were uncouth and therefore not humour. Billig, 67. 
170 Ibid, 59.  
171 Ibid, 65. 
172 Skinner identifies the first publication as The Book of the Courtier by Baldassare Castiglione, 
published 1528. Quentin Skinner, “Why Laughing Mattered in the Renaissance: The Second Henry 
Tudor Memorial Lecture,” History of Political Thought 22, no.3 (2001): 418. 
173 Skinner, 423. 
174 Ibid, 424. 
175 Ibid, 445. 
176 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2000): 54-5. 
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 The importance of this history of the development of the term humour is to 
identify that “humour,” as it originated in 18th-century Britain, did not track the 
same sort of thing that contemporary humour theorists attempt to track. 
Hutcheson and Shaftesbury were not identifying a basic phenomenon common to 
all humans, but were rather rendering what was fundamentally a moral evaluation 
of a human practice. In this sense, I believe that the analogy to the history of art, 
and the history of the language of art, holds. Both arose around the same historical 
period to create a moral, evaluative divide in an already existing practice. The 
philosophy of both art and humour has proceeded in such a way that no longer 
recognizes this divide, instead focusing on something basic and pan-human. Both 
have taken a turn to the internal, defining art and humour as based in aesthetic 
sensibility and some basic emotional or aesthetic reaction, respectively. 
Accordingly, I now turn to Stephen Davies’ evaluation of biological and 
evolutionary appeals in defining art, which I will then analogize to the philosophy 
of humour. 
  
1.2.2 Continuing the Analogy: The Role of Evolutionary History 
 
The practice of art stands in one of four possible relations to evolution.177 The first 
possibility is that art-behaviour (which consists of both art-making and art-
appreciating) is a direct evolutionary adaptation, which is to say that art-
behaviour is genetically transmitted and provides benefits that let people who 
possessed art-behaviour genes outcompete those without. The second possibility is 
that art-behaviour is a spandrel. A spandrel is a feature that is genetically 
transmitted like an adaptation, but instead of providing a benefit it simply does 
not provide so much of a hindrance that it prevents its carriers from reproducing. 
The third possibility is that art is a technology. Technologies have no genetic basis 
and propagate entirely through cultural transmission.178 Technologies may still be 
evolutionarily selected for, but only on the cultural level. Lastly, there is the 
possibility that there is no significant relation between art-behaviour and 
 
177 Davies, 45. 
178 Fire-making is a paradigmatic technology. 
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evolution. To evaluate these four options, one of the tasks that Davies must 
complete is to determine just how evolutionary data is to be employed. 
 
 In considering the role of appeals to evolution in the development of art, 
Davies refers to the claw of the archaeopteryx.179 The archaeopteryx, a 
particularly bird-like dinosaur, had a claw that was perfectly shaped for perching 
on tree branches. However, this claw was also the same as that many other 
dinosaurs, which did not perch in trees and just used their claws for snatching 
prey. The significance of this is that even though the claw was perfect for the 
archaeopteryx to perch in trees, this does not mean that the claw developed for 
the purpose of perching in trees. By analogy, some human behaviour being 
perfectly suited to art-making or art-appreciation does not mean that that 
behaviour was selected for its benefit towards art-behaviour. Davies writes: 
[S]tories of a trait’s or behaviour’s evolutionary origin can be 
irrelevant to its current function, whether that function is adaptive or 
not. With this in mind, we might question the interest of 
demonstrating that some forms of aesthetic reaction or art making 
were ancestral responses to ancient environments or circumstances. 
We are physically removed from the environments in which our 
forebears lived and culturally removed from their ways of thinking. By 
studying the past, we might learn about the origins of some of our 
behaviours, but it might be doubted that this is relevant to explaining 
their current relevance or justification.180 
Davies notes that there are cases where this argument may be qualified with 
respect to aesthetic sensibilities, but it is harder to do so with respect to art-
behaviour.181 In the case of aesthetic preferences, evolutionary reasons may be 
given as to, for example, why certain things came to be considered beautiful or 
aesthetically pleasing. Davies uses the example of a landscape view — it could be 
the case that such a vista came to be aesthetically pleasing since wide views 
improved the survival of ancestors who occupied such vantage points, and 
 
179 Davies, 58-9. 
180 Ibid, 59. 
181 Ibid, 60. 
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accordingly a preference for such views came to be selected for evolutionarily.182 
Art-behaviour, however, is far more varied. Using the example of cave paintings, 
Davies writes that the paintings on the wall of the caves at Chauvet and Lascaux 
are too isolated and difficult to access for them to be thought of as primarily 
created for the purpose of impressing potential mates.183 Accordingly, it is more 
difficult to attribute this behavior to something directly related to evolutionary 
benefit like reproduction or survival. 
 
 I argue that a consequence of Davies’ argument is that when considering 
the contribution of evolution to art-behaviour, actual artistic practice needs to be 
given precedence. As the case of the archaeopteryx claw shows, the reason for 
some feature’s development does not necessarily explain why that feature is used 
as it is. Similarly, even if aesthetic sensibilities developed for purposes of 
improving survival, that does not mean that they were incorporated into art-
behaviour for those reasons. And even if impressing potential mates was a driving 
force in developing art, the actual practice of art includes instances of art where 
that is not the goal of the practice. What all of these cases show is a potential 
discontinuity between the evolutionary story and the practice being explained. It 
is not that the posited evolutionary past did not happen, but rather that it is not 
necessarily relevant to explaining the phenomenon in question. There is an 
evolutionary history to the archaeopteryx claw, but it does not have to do with 
perching on branches. There may have been some point where the development 
of art-practice involved impressing potential mates, but that does not help 
explain the actual art-practice that involved painting the insides of the Chauvet 
and Lascaux caves. If an evolutionary story is going to be given about a practice, 
it has to first be shown to apply to that practice. Art is not art because it is the 
end process of some evolutionary process, but rather some evolutionary story is 
relevant insofar as it is relevant to the development of art. This story cannot be 
given without a prior account of what art is. The practice of art must come first. 
 
 
182 Davies, 60. 
183 Ibid, 62. 
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 Just as the practice of art must come first when tying an evolutionary story 
to a theory of art, so to must the practice of humour come first in giving an 
account of humour. Any internalist story has to be shown to apply to humour, and 
for that to be done there has to be some clarity as to what humour is. Or, put 
another way, the internalist story has to be shown to explain the phenomena in 
question. This is an issue in the case of humour because, as I showed in section 
1.2.1, “humour” as distinguished by theorists like Hutcheson and Shaftesbury was 
a very classed phenomenon, different from the pan-human phenomenon that 
Carroll, Morreall, and Hurley et al try to get at. Billig argues that the effect of the 
class distinction of humour is what he calls an “ideological positivism.”184 As is 
relevant to internalist explanations, this means that the phenomena that the 
internalist theories are seeking to explain — the evolutionary genealogies that 
they are giving — are far too narrow, and do not cover the full human practice of 
humour. 
 
1.2.3 Historical Humour Practices 
 
In this section, I give a brief overview of different humour practices from 
antiquity to the present day. I do not mean to contend that each and all of these 
detailed practices are paradigmatic accounts of humour. Rather, I just wish to put 
forward that these are ways that humour has been practiced and, consequently, 
they are data points for which a theory of humour must account. Accordingly, my 
goal is to show the breadth of humour practice across time. The historic-
mindedness of my approach is to try to avoid the trap of presentism. As Billig 
notes, philosophical and psychological studies of humour and amusement 
unquestioningly take current-day instances of humour, usually jokes,185 to be the 
paradigmatic examples of humour that must be explained.186 However, that these 
 
184 The class distinction is not the only reason for ideological positivism, but it is the one I feel I can 
discuss. Billig also attributes positivism to personalities and positional jockeying within the 
academy, where authors and researchers wish to show that they are funny and, therefore, superior. 
While he may identify something genuine, I do not believe myself to be in a position to discuss such 
dynamics with any authority. 
185 Berys Gaut compares the narrow focus of humour studies on jokes to literature studies focussing 
near-exclusively on advertising slogans. Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 242. 
186 Billig, 2. 
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examples are paradigmatic may be challenged on two grounds. The first ground is 
that current-day paradigmatic instances of humour may be determined by 
material circumstances or even just historical coincidence — some humour 
practice being dominant now does not necessarily mean that this practice is 
timeless or representative of all possible practices. The second ground is that 
what is taken as a paradigmatic example of humour may be prefigured by theory, 
thus amounting to a subtle form of question-begging.187 This is most evident in the 
work of Noel Carroll when responding to a challenge to his incongruity theory of 
humour.188 He articulates incongruity theory by appealing to what he considers to 
be paradigmatic examples of humour, and then claiming that incongruity is what 
they have in common.189 Against the challenge that the incongruity theory does 
not capture instances of humour that trade on recognition or familiarity, he 
claims that these instances of potential humour do not trade on incongruity, so 
therefore are not real instances of humour.190 The recognition-based humour is 
only able to be ruled out because it is not considered to be a paradigmatic form 
of humour that has to be explained, and the incongruity theory is only able to 
stand because only incongruity-supporting examples are considered paradigmatic 
examples that have to be explained. Altogether, then, my goal is to present a 
historically-minded overview of different humour practices for the purpose of 
getting an idea of the range of possible humour practices, and, following from the 
previous subsection, it is these varied practices for which a theory of humour 
would have to account. 
 
 There is a worry that I believe is best addressed at the start. If I am 
accusing other theorists of using gerrymandered examples of humour — even if 
they themselves are not doing the gerrymandering — then how am I to be sure I 
 
187 Marshall Sahlins identified this general trend in 1971, when he wrote of sociobiology, “Ever since 
Hobbes placed the bourgeois society he knew in the state of nature, the ideology of capitalism has 
been marked by a reciprocal dialectic between the folk conceptions of culture and nature. Conceived 
in the image of the market system, the nature thus culturally figured has been in turn used to explain 
the human social order, and vice versa, in an endless reciprocal interchange between social 
Darwinism and natural capitalism." The crucial idea being that the idea of “nature” that was being 
appealed to was itself already heavily the product of cultural influence. Marshall Sahlins, The Use and 
Abuse of Biology (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1976), xv. 
188 Carroll, 48, 52. 
189 Ibid, 48-49. 
190 Ibid, 48. 
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am not guilty of the same? What is it that makes these examples of humour 
examples of humour? My first response is that I have specifically chosen these 
examples from historical accounts of humour practice. Accordingly, I can at least 
say that it is not just myself understanding these practices as being of humour. As 
I will argue, these are all activities centred around the provocation of laughter, 
and the social role that that laughter plays; this is an additional reason to think of 
all the examples I present as being of the same sort of thing. Lastly, I do not 
believe that any of the presented examples will challenge the reader’s intuitions 
very strongly. While they may fall outside of the realm of the so-called 
paradigmatic examples of humour provided by the internalist theorists, I do not 
think that any of the examples will be unacceptable as examples of humour. 
 
 The three eras from which I will draw examples are classical Greece, 
medieval Europe, and early-modern Italy. These cases are by no means exhaustive 
of historical practice, but they are enough to establish a range of humour 
practice. There are two points of interest in Greece. First is the character of the 
gelotopoios — literally, the “laughter producer.”191 The gelotopoios would make 
their living by getting invited to the dinner of a rich patron in exchange for 
making the patron and the guests laugh.192 Surviving materials, in the form of 
accounts and guide materials, suggest that the gelotopoios did three main things 
to make the host and guests laugh: they told jokes, they engaged in mimicry, and 
they flattered the host.193 What is relevant here is that all three activities were 
considered to be part of the same practice, which was making the host and guests 
laugh. By contemporary standards, only the jokes would fall under the category of 
“humour,” but in the ancient Greek context, all of joking, mimicry, and flattering 
were part of the same practice of producing laughter. Greek antiquity also saw 
various festivals which were characterized by insult humour. The Lenaea and the 
Anthesteria, for instance, were festivals in honour of Dionysus and were 
characterized by the suspension of social mores.194 In particular, men would stand 
 
191 Jan Bremmer, “Jokes, Jokers and Jokebooks in Ancient Greek Culture” in A Cultural History of 
Humour, eds. Jan Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, 11-28 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997). 
192 Bremmer, 13-14. 
193 Ibid, 13-14. 
194 Ibid, 13. 
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on wagons and mock passersby.195 Accordingly, insults can be added alongside 
jokes, mimicry, and flattery as things that could be part of humour practice in the 
context of ancient Greece. 
 
 Medieval Europe offers two distinct examples of humour practice, one for 
the nobility and one for the peasantry. Amongst the ruling classes there was the 
concept of the Rex Facetus, or the king who laughs.196 The laughing king was a 
theoretical construct made in light of the idea that humans should be understood 
as homo risibilis, or the man who laughs.197 In elite circles, laughter was deemed 
either moral or immoral based on the status of the one who was laughing and the 
one who was generating the laughter.198 Laughter, in general, was considered 
ethically risky since it was a loss of control in the face of subservience to God.199 
The Rex Facetus was entitled to joke, and thus laugh, because they were in a 
position of authority relative to all other humans. The king sought to generate 
laughter, and by laughing his subjects demonstrated their social relation (of 
inferiority and servitude) to the king. Subjects were not permitted to joke to the 
king. In peasant circles, humour played a similar role in social structure, but 
amongst equals. Specifically, there was the practice of the “gab,” which is a 
trading of banter and tall stories for the sake of generating laughter.200 While the 
laughter of the king was his special prerogative, owing to his status, peasants 
were of equal status and so would be laughing together. Accordingly, the gab 
pursued laughter similarly to the Rex Facetus with the key difference being that 
one practice used laughter to signal a stratified hierarchy — between king and 
subjects — whereas the other one used laughter to signal a flat hierarchy — 
between equals. 
 
 
195 Bremmer, 13. 
196 Jacques LeGoff, “Laughter in the Middle Ages” in A Cultural History of Humour, eds. Jan 
Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, 40-53 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997). 
197 LeGoff, 43. 
198 Ibid, 44. 
199 Ibid, 44-45. 
200 Ibid, 49. 
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 Early-modern Italy featured the practice of the beffa, a sort of practical 
joke.201 The goal of the beffa was to lure someone into a vulnerable position and 
take advantage of them, usually in a way that involved covering the victim in 
bodily fluids of some sort.202 Beffe worked as a sort of competition between 
nominal equals in a civilian society with the goal being the schadenfreude the 
executor of the joke would feel at the suffering of the victim.203 In this sense, the 
beffa has a kinship with the laughter of medieval Europe in that both are keenly 
interested in structuring the social order. However, whereas the gab and Rex 
Facetus were justified along already-existing social lines, the beffa worked as an 
exercise in creating social power by the joker over her victim. 
 
 While these different humour practices are quite varied — varied in form 
and varied in social role — what they have in common is that they pursue the 
reaction of laughter. The gelotopoios pursued the laughter of the host, the gab 
pursued the laughter of the peer-group, and the beffe pursued the laughter of the 
joker at the expense of the victim. This suggests that the practice of humour, 
varied as it is across time, has been to one degree or another oriented towards 
evoking laughter. Whose laughter is supposed to be evoked may change, but 
laughter in one way or another is always the end goal. Accordingly, a theory of 
humour as social practice should look at humour as a practice or set of practices 
centred around provoking laughter.204  
 
 To be clear, this approach does not contradict internalist accounts. There 
is nothing in an account that holds humour to be a historically-developed social 
 
201 Peter Burke, “Frontiers of the Comic in Early Modern Italy, c.1350-1750” in A Cultural History of 
Humour, eds. Jan Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, 61-75 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997). 
202 Two examples: “In a story told by Sabadino (no.16), a craftsman goes to the barber to be shaved 
and sees that the barber’s shoes are very large. ‘He felt an urge to piss in them’ (li venne voglia de 
urinarli dentro), and he does so. In a story by Bandello (1.35), Madonna Cassandra has an affair 
with a friar, the husband discovers, dresses as the friar, takes laxative pills and shits all over her in 
the bed.” While these are stories, and not accounts, they may be taken as representative of the 
spirit of the beffa even if they may be more extreme than any practical jokes that were actually 
executed. Burke, 67. 
203 Ibid, 66. 
204 It is worth noting that Jerrold Levinson speculates something similar in an encyclopedia entry, 
but only as a refinement to the incongruity theory. It does not seem to have caught on, only being 
mentioned and then quickly dismissed by Noel Carroll. Jerrold Levinson, “Humour,” in The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998): 3713. 
 96 
practice aimed at producing laughter that makes an internalist account impossible 
— it is possible that there is a unifying mental process or unifying phenomenology 
that all instances of humour have in common. All the current internalist accounts 
allow that humour is something that tends to be expressed in laughter, which fits 
with a historic development of humour centred around provoking laughter. I 
argue, however, that this historically-minded account gives a reason to strongly 
doubt the efficacy of internalist accounts. Remember that internalist accounts 
involve a distinction between humour-appropriate and humour-inappropriate 
laughter. This may follow the distinction between Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
laughter, as it does with Hurley et al, though both Morreall and Carroll do not 
invoke the Duchenne distinction. What the historical account suggests is that 
humour developed by pursuing laughter simpliciter. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the laughter of the beffa, the gab, or the Lenaean mockery was 
evaluated to be specifically humour-appropriate by the standards of the 
internalists.  
 
I speculate that the pursuit of laughter simpliciter should be predicted in a 
historically-minded theory of humour. This is because humourists seeking an 
audience, irrespective of whether their audience is themselves, peers, or patrons, 
would not have any complex internal theory by which to judge the laughter of 
others. They would simply evaluate their practice by whether or not it generated 
laughter. This is speculative, but can find evidence in the contemporary practice 
of stand-up comedy. Comedians evaluate and develop their performances, and 
central to this development is recording and listening back to how the audience 
reacted. Laughter is taken as a sign that a performance is funny, lack of laughter 
is taken as sign that something needs to be corrected or improved.  
 
 Altogether, then, I argue for the following. Humour is a social practice that 
has developed across different historical and cultural contexts. The constant 
across these eras, in practice, is that humour has been oriented towards provoking 
laughter. The conditions for the success of humour have been varied and have 
included both the quality of the humour — as in the case of the gelotopoios — and 
the social positions of humourist and audience — as in the case of the Rex 
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Facetus. Since humour practice has been oriented towards provoking laughter, 
and the social positions of the humourist or audience may determine whether or 
not laughter is an appropriate reaction, humour is best understood and evaluated 
as a social practice. An instance of humour is funny if it merits laughter, and it 
fails to be funny if it does not merit laughter. Whether or not some piece of 
humour merits a reaction depends on standards specific to the context of the 
humour-practice. These standards may be various and could include, among other 
things, the content of the humourist’s performance, the skill with which it is 
executed, or the social position of people involved in the humour. 
  
1.2.4 Two Standards of Humour 
While particular instances of humour may have any number of particular 
standards, I believe that the social account gives rise to two particular standards. 
I will term these the standard of comprehensibility and the standard of 
participation. On the social account of humour, if an attempted humour act is to 
succeed, it will have to satisfy both these standards. If an attempt at humour is 
properly funny, then it must be both comprehensible and merit participation.  
 
 To say that an act of humour is comprehensible is to say that all necessary 
parties (usually the humourist and the audience) are able to recognize the act as 
an attempted act of humour, recognize that act’s component parts, and how 
those component parts function. The act’s component parts are just the different 
parts of a humour act, like the set-up and punchline of a joke. As was established 
in chapter 1, the audience should be understood normally so that the evaluative 
focus is properly on the attempted act of humour. So to say that the normative 
audience recognizes the act as an attempt at humour is to say that the act is 
recognizable as humour to a sufficiently and appropriately informed audience.  
 
 The standard of participation is what is probably most often thought of 
when an attempt is humour is thought of as funny or not funny. The participation 
in question is that of the audience, which is standardly but not necessarily in the 
form of laughter. Laughter is not necessary because while humour developed as a 
practice centred around the provocation of laughter, it has diversified in such a 
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way that not all humour practices pursue laughter. If the humour act pursues the 
reaction of laughter, then the audience participates by laughing (in the 
appropriate way, if the humour act in question carries such a standard). If the 
audience does not laugh, or give another endorsing reaction, then they have not 
participated. Again, the audience is considered normatively, so that the object of 
analysis is the act of attempted humour — the joke, the story, the beffa — rather 
than the proclivities of some particular audience. 
 
 It is worth underlining that both comprehensibility and participation are 
not all-or-nothing. Humour may be more or less comprehensible without being 
totally comprehensible or totally incomprehensible. It may encourage or repel 
participation by degrees. In this way, it is possible to discuss humour as more or 
less funny without having to commit to some flaw making a humour act not funny 
at all. The virtues and vices of an attempted act of humour may coexist.  
 
Of the two standards, participation is the more important of the two. It is 
through the standard of participation that humour may be evaluated as a social 
phenomenon. In describing why a failure in comprehensibility hurt a piece of 
humour, it will often be described in terms of participation: the lack of 
comprehension led to the lack of laughter. Funniness is no longer just the result 
of some synapses in the brain that either do or do not fire, but the outcome of the 
way that people interact. This will prove particularly relevant in chapter 5, when 
the standard of participation allows for a whole new way of ethically evaluating 
humour. 
 
1.2.5 Found Humour 
Accounting for humour as a social practice immediately suggests one very 
significant lacuna. There are many things that are funny, or amusing, that occur 
outside of any obvious social practice. These are instances where there is no 
joker, festival, or other person or ritual to situate what is happening within what 
would intuitively be called a practice or institution. Rather, there is just the 
oddly-shaped potato, mistake in speaking, or person falling down a manhole and 
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dying. I will call these instances of “found humour,” to mirror the term “found 
art.”205  
 
 Found humour, like found art, becomes humour because it is engaged as 
humour. It is not strictly analogous to found art, since found art requires a change 
in institutional context, moving something from its original context into an art-
institutional one. Engaging objects or situations as instances of humour is probably 
best analogous to engaging instances of noise or sounds as music. Sonic 
phenomena, intentionally created or not, get engaged as music whether or not 
they are re-contextualized in an art-institutional context. Such engaged-as-music 
sounds may range from bird or humpback whale songs (the latter of which often 
get recontextualized into art-institutional contexts206), to the churn of the 
industrial city, to everyday human speech. Reacting to these phenomena as music 
does not just mean that one has had a particular emotional response to them, but 
that they are engaged in certain ways; people (consciously or unconsciously) listen 
for rhythm, melody, and so on. They engage the sounds in the same way they 
engage music, and they are able to engage the sounds in this way because they 
have socially learned ways to engage music. 
 
 Similar to music and sonic phenomena, the way we engage with different 
humour practices are socially learned.207 The sorts of things that are responded to 
with laughter, and the ways one does and ought to laugh are, in part at least, 
learned through formative interactions with parents, peers, and media. All that is 
necessary for something to be funny in the wild is for it to conform to the 
standards of or be similar to humour practice. A potato shaped like Richard Nixon 
may merit amused laughter because it conforms to the practices of recognition-
based humour. Mistakes may be funny if they are sufficiently similar to humour 
practices that trade in schadenfreude and degradation. 
 
205 By this comparison I do not mean to argue that both music and humour are engaged in the same 
way. Rather, I just wish to show that what I am proposing for humour — that people may engage 
with non-institutional phenomena through socially-learned ways of acting for appreciating 
institutional practices — is not something I have invented ad hoc.  
206 See, for example, Songs of the Humpback Whale (1970), produced by Roger Payne. 
207 The exact relative contributions of nature and nurture are unclear and, owing to the role that 
laughter plays in parent-infant interactions, probably unclarifiable.  
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 The strength of such an account is that it allows for different things to be 
found funny for different reasons. Just as noise may be engaged as music for its 
timbre (in the case of the industrial city) or its melody (in the case of a human 
voice), some instance may be engaged as humour because it is familiar, strange, 
disgusting, anxiety-inducing, or humiliating. In turn, just as some naturally 
occurring noise’s being rhythmic and melodious may allow that noise to be 
referred to as beautiful, so to could some situation offering the right mix of 
reassurance and someone else’s misfortunate allow that situation to rightly be 
called funny. 
 
 It is worth noting that the having the category of found humour should not 
be considered costly to a social account, since a similar idea exists for internalist 
accounts. Reviewing classical and contemporary accounts of humour in The 
Psychology of Humour, Rod A. Martin and Thomas E. Ford note the importance of 
what they call the “humour mindset.”208 Invoking empirical research, both from 
themselves and from others, they show that there is a difference in subjects 
reporting a stimulus as humorous depending on the subjects’ state of mind.209 If 
the subject engages a stimulus as something that is the class of thing that could 
be funny (either a conventional humour object like a joke, or a found event 
paired with the prompt that this event could be conventionally considered 
humorous), they were found to more readily identify the stimulus as funny.210 This 
is important for the social account, since it means that my account of found 
humour does not require any commitments that radically differ from those of 
internalist theories. I may have to describe found humour separately, but I am not 
inventing any new phenomena. 
 
2. The Humour that Makes Satire 
 
 
208 Ford and Martin, 64. 
209 Ibid. The specific research which they invoke is Dolf Zillmann and Jennings Bryant, 
“Misattribution Theory of Tendentious Humour,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 16, 
no.2 (1980); and Thomas E. Ford, “Effects of Sexist Humor in Tolerance of Sexist Events,” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26, no.9 (2000). 
210 Ibid. 
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In the previous chapter, I established that for a misrepresentation to be a satirical 
misrepresentation, it must merit amusement. In keeping with the stipulated 
definitions offered at the start of this chapter, amusement is simply taken to be 
the reaction appropriate to humour, and not a specific emotional reaction. The 
purpose of this section is to articulate, in light of the account of humour given in 
the previous section, just what it is for a satirical misrepresentation to be 
amusing. This will constitute the final individual piece of my definition of satire, 
and I will bring them all together in the next chapter. While the account of what 
it is for a misrepresentation to be humorous is short, this should not be taken to 
understate its importance in satire. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, a 
failure of clarity with respect to the humour in a would-be satirical 
misrepresentation is a common way that satire fails, and perhaps the most 
difficult part of creating satire. 
 
 This section makes use of the difference between prescribed and merited 
responses. A prescribed response is the response that a work attempts to bring 
about in its audience. A merited response is the response either that the audience 
ought to have or may not be faulted for having. This distinction most commonly 
occurs in lay discussions surrounding narrative works of horror and comedy. Bad 
horror movies are condemned as being “not scary” if their offerings of horror are 
particularly tepid. Similarly, comedies that fail to amuse are condemned as “not 
funny.” In each case, the lay critics are following a distinction between the 
reaction that the work is trying to bring about in the audience and the reaction 
the audience either ought to or may rightly have.  
 
 The first important thing upon which to focus is that a misrepresentation, 
to be a satirical misrepresentation, must specifically merit amusement.211 This is 
to say that what is in question is not whether or not any particular audience finds 
some misrepresentation funny, but whether they ought to find it funny. Since 
amusement in this context is just the humour-appropriate response, and not the 
specific emotional reaction, no appeal to emotional response theories like 
 
211 The next chapter will feature an in-depth discussion of how a satirical misrepresentation may 
fail to merit amusement. 
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fittingness theories or dispositional theories needs to be made. Rather, in 
following from humour being looked at as a practice, all that is necessary is that a 
misrepresentation adhere to and be consistent with humour practice, and, 
importantly, that it succeed in meriting the humour-appropriate response of 
amusement. Such a standard is extremely permissive with respect to the style of 
humour but that is a virtue — since satire is standardly thought of as a comedic 
practice it will capture standard satirical techniques without proscribing any 
frequently used techniques.  
 
 That a satirical misrepresentation must merely merit amusement, and not 
prescribe a response of amusement, is important for catching satirical 
misrepresentations that occur in a work’s premise. Many satirical 
misrepresentations will prescribe amusement, which is to say that they will occur 
in a work at a point where the audience is encouraged to respond with 
amusement. For example, in the satirical action-comedy Spy (2015), the audience 
is encouraged to laugh at Rick Ford’s boast that “during the threat of an 
assassination, I appeared convincingly in front of congress as Barack Obama.” This 
is part of a series of increasingly ludicrous boasts played for comedy, and through 
a mix of framing, timing, and the actors’212 performances the audience is 
encouraged to laugh. However, in works where there is satire inherent in the 
premise, there is often no such prescription because the premise, while operated 
within, is not something that the audience is invited to respond to as such. An 
example of this can be found in the Neill Blomkamp film CHAPPiE (2015), which is 
in part a satire of the technology industry. Central to the film, and its satire, is 
that all the human characters completely lack imagination — when faced with the 
concept of superhuman artificial intelligence they cannot imagine it doing 
anything more than providing a slightly better service than what they already 
receive. This misrepresentation is amusing — the technology industry appoints 
themselves as the visionaries of humankind’s future but here they are shown as 
fundamentally dull-witted and trapped within their narrow worldview — but there 
is no point at which the work itself prescribes amusement. To say that amusement 
 
212 Rick Ford is played by Jason Statham, and in this scene he is talking to a character played by 
Melissa McCarthy. 
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is still merited is to say that were the audience to react to this, amusement would 
be a proper response. For example, were one to reflect upon the setting of 
CHAPPiE, laughing at how the technology industry is misrepresented as dull-witted 
would be acceptable, even if there is at no point an actual gag to draw attention 
to this fact. 
 
3. Other Humour in Satire 
 
Humour plays several roles in satire beyond its definitional one within the satirical 
misrepresentation. In this section, I will explore two of humours frequent non-
definitional roles within satire: of identifying the satire as either Horatian or 
Juvenalian satire, and as helping the audience identify a work as satirical more 
generally. 
 
3.1 Horace and Juvenal 
 
One of the main taxonomies of satire is that of Horatian and Juvenalian satire. 
Roughly corresponding to the satiric traditions drawing back to Horace and 
Juvenal respectively, the distinction has been conceptualized in a few different 
ways over time.213 Horace worked more in verse and prose, whereas Juvenal 
would present oratorical diatribes in the public square.214 One of the distinctions 
between Horatian and Juvenalian satire focuses on this distinction of form, where 
the satire of Horatian satire is more embedded in a work of art that is a work in 
its own sake, whereas the Juvenalian satire is the diatribe that stands alone.215 
Another conceptualization of the Horatian-Juvenalian distinction is in the tone of 
the work.216 Horatian satire is much more jocular, and the focus of the work is on 
entertaining the audience. Juvenalian satire, on the other hand, is vicious and 
mean-spirited with the primary focus being on the attacks against the satiric 
target. 
 
213 For examples, see Dustin Griffin’s historical overview of satiric theory in the first chapter of 
Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 
1994). 
214 Griffin, 7-8, 43-45. 
215 Ibid, 43-45. 
216 Ibid. 
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 Works of satire are now rarely thought to be wholly Horatian or wholly 
Juvenalian.217 Horatian and Juvenalian satire were never the sorts of categories to 
which a satirist had to wholly adhere, and they were never the sorts of categories 
that determined whether or not a work was satirical or not. Rather, they are 
traditions that have influenced satirists who have come later. This means that 
works will often contain both Horatian and Juvenalian elements. Moreover, as 
satirists became conscious of these influences, they would experiment with them. 
And not only would they experiment with the influences of Horace and Juvenal, 
but they would also experiment with different artistic modes. Altogether, this 
means that in applying the concepts of Horatian and Juvenalian satire to any 
particular work of art, the goal is not to determine to which category some work 
of art belongs, but rather to identify and understand just how some particular 
work functions as satire. 
 
 I propose that one way of navigating the distinction between Horatian and 
Juvenalian satire is by invoking the concept of affiliative and disaffiliative 
laughter. Research shows that laughter, as a social signal, may be either 
affiliative or disaffiliative.218 In lay terms, this is the difference between laughing 
with and laughing at. In technical terms, affiliative and disaffiliative laughter may 
be spelled out as follows: laughter is fundamentally a social signal.219 As a social 
signal, it may be used to identify and negotiate group memberships and power 
dynamics.220 Affiliative laughter is laughter that either represents or attempts to 
create an aligned group amongst the people laughing.221 Disaffiliative laughter is 
laughter that either represents or attempts to create multiple groups with 
boundaries such that one or more people or targets are excluded.222 Instances of 
laughter include a “laughable,” which is the target of the laughter.223 Laughing at 
something identifies it as a laughable. The most common pattern of affiliative and 
 
217 This is part of a general trend where the older, stricter literary theories of satire are no longer 
seen to be necessarily true. Griffin, 2. 
218 Glenn, 29-31. 
219 Ibid, 26. 
220 Ibid, 29. 
221 Ibid, 29-30. 
222 Ibid, 31. 
223 Ibid, 48-49. 
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disaffiliative laughter is the initiator of laughter affiliating themselves with other 
members of an ingroup and disaffiliating the laughable.224  It is important to 
recognize that the designated laughable does not have to be a target for 
disaffiliation. Two paradigmatic cases where the laughable is treated affiliatively 
are in roast situations — like at a wedding or retirement — where guests make 
jokes at the expense of an honoured person, or certain sorts of self-deprecating 
humour where someone makes himself the laughable for the purposes of 
ingratiating himself to a group. 
 
 Since I have defined humour in terms of laughter, the 
affiliative/disaffiliative distinction can be extended to humour as well. Humour is 
a social practice that is centred around provoking laughter. Borrowing the 
sociological language of laughter studies, humour identifies things as laughable. 
The laughter that humour prescribes may be, although it is not necessarily, 
affiliative or disaffiliative. Whether humour is affilaitive or disaffiliative is 
determined by the attitude evinced towards the laughable in the joke.225 How 
that attitude is determined is managed by the interpretive strategy set out in 
chapter 1, where the joke is regarded as a sort of utterance and is understood in 
terms of its content and context, where the attitude motivating the joke is a 
crucial part of context.  
 
 In practice, the difference between affiliative and disaffiliative humour will 
often be difficult to distinguish. A good example of two similar cases that manage 
to evince different attitudes are the films Borat (2006) and Bad Grandpa (2013). 
Both films follow the pattern of the film’s star putting on the disguise of a 
nominally subaltern outsider (an immigrant in the case of Borat, an elder in the 
case of Bad Grandpa) and drawing humour from the reactions of unsuspecting 
targets. In Borat, Sasha Baron Cohen takes on the character of Borat, a racist 
tourist from Kazakhstan. Using the pretense of making a travel documentary, he 
interviews a random assortment of Americans from mostly Midwestern states. By 
initiating with racist comments, the character draws out of the targets similarly 
 
224 Ibid. 
225 I use “joke” here as a shorthand for all the potential modes of humour and do not want to 
commit to all humour being in the mode of a joke. 
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racist (or sexist, or otherwise bigoted) statements. In Bad Grandpa, Johnny 
Knoxville takes on the character of Irving Zisman, an octogenarian trying to escort 
his grandson across the United States to his absent father. Zisman similarly draws 
humour out of the response to his outlandish behaviour, like trying to mail his 
grandson in a cardboard box. While both films take the humour from the reactions 
of unwitting onlookers, I argue that Bad Grandpa is affiliative, while Borat is 
disaffiliative. In the case of Borat, the targets are presented as people who are 
ignorant, venal, or vicious. These are people who have morally failed in some 
deep and fundamental way and are accordingly seen as lesser human beings.226 
The humour is in the targets showing themselves as they really are when they 
think they can get away with it. The targets are held up as something that the 
audience is not. In Bad Grandpa, on the other hand, the humour comes from the 
difficulty of the targets to manage the balance between respect for their elders 
and the absurd behaviour of Zisman. While the stunts pulled in the film are 
extreme, this helps to bring out that the difficulties that people are having with 
Zisman are not from their moral failures, but from their attempts at moral 
decency. While the humour is prank-based, it is fundamentally sympathetic — it 
trades on common difficulties the audience faces in trying to be morally good 
people. The humour is affiliative. Perhaps tellingly, the end credits of Bad 
Grandpa show the cast bringing together all of the targets for a barbecue, 
celebration, and viewing of the film. Despite having been taken advantage of in 
the initial filming, the targets are willing to come together with the filmmakers 
and laugh at their own failures. I doubt such an event would have been possible 
for Borat. 
 
In the context of satire, the satirist is presenting the satiric target (or 
something about the satiric target) as laughable and inviting the audience to 
laugh at that.227 Following from my argument in this section, the humour of the 
satire may be either affiliative or disaffiliative. This may be in the humour that is 
 
226 It is probably worth putting Borat in the context of the Bush-era United States, where citizens of 
flyover states were often presented as backwards degenerates who were perverting the course of 
progress. 
227 As Griffin notes, and as I cover in chapter 1, the relationship between satirist, audience, and 
target is quite complicated in practice. The satirist, audience, and target are not necessarily three 
discrete people — the same person may, for instance, be both audience and target. 
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core to the satire — this is to say the humour of the satirical misrepresentation 
— but it does not have to be. It simply needs to be directed at the satiric target. I 
contend that if the humour is affiliative, this is reason to think of the satire as 
Horatian, and if the humour is disaffiliative, this is reason to think of the satire as 
Juvenalian. This tracks the second distinction between Horatian and Juvenalian 
satire, where Juvenalian satire is considered to be more focused on attacking its 
target, whereas Horatian satire is considered to be more focused on jocularity and 
enjoyment.   
 
Works of satire will often contain both Horatian and Juvenalian elements, 
and at times it will be unclear which way a work leans. For example, a 2011 study 
found that viewers of the satirical television show The Colbert Report would tend 
to attribute the underlying attitude of the show as aligned with whatever were 
the personal politics of the viewer in question.228 While most all viewers were 
able to identify that the show was satirical, and it was a satire of right-wing 
pundit and newscaster Bill O’Reilly, liberals would identify the ultimate political 
point of The Colbert Report as being liberal, whereas conservatives would identify 
its point as being conservative.229 
 
3.2 This Is Satire 
   
It is necessary for any work of satire to contain some signal to let the audience 
know that the work they are engaging with is satirical. The use of humour can be 
very effective for this, as it can force the audience to reevaluate the thing with 
which they are engaging. It can be used to break the flow of narrative and draw 
attention to some feature. This is in some way similar to the way that laughter 
can show that one is just joking, or a carefully inserted joke in a conversation can 
show that the speaker is not serious. John Morreall proposes something similar to 
 
228 Heather LaMarre, Kristen Landreville, and Michael Beam, “The Irony of Satire: Political Ideology 
and the Motivation to See What You Want to See in The Colbert Report,” The International Journal 
of Press/Politics 14, no.2 (2009): 212-231. 
229 This is probably how Stephen Colbert ended up getting hired to perform at the White House 
Press Correspondents Dinner for George W. Bush.  
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this in his account of play theory, where humour altogether developed out of 
enacting fake threats to trigger false alarm laughter.230 
 
 One artist who often makes use of this sort of identifying humour is the 
filmmaker Neill Blomkamp. In his debut feature, District 9 (2009), he seeks to do 
this in action scenes with gore that he finds funny.231 This is particularly pointed 
during the climactic action scene, which could otherwise be engaged as nothing 
more than a simple fight between heroes and villains. The humour is used to draw 
attention to certain features of the scene, which are part of the thematic core of 
the satire. For example, one humorous gore explosion is inflicted upon a 
mercenary soldier who climbed a watchtower set up by the Nigerian gang. The 
soldier taking the watchtower unifies two themes running throughout the movie. 
The first is the dual role of, on one hand, government, military, and rational 
administration, and, on the other, crime, religion, and superstition, in 
maintaining the oppression of subaltern people. The second is control of 
technology. Throughout the film, the two antagonists — the international 
corporation that employs the mercenaries and the Nigerian gang — have vied for 
control and the ability to operate alien technology. In the scene with the 
watchtower, then, these two themes coincide. One oppressive side seamlessly 
takes control of the other’s technology and uses it to continue the oppressive 
mission against the aliens. All this could easily pass without notice in a normal 
action scene — the humour helps draw attention to the fact that something is 
happening that deserves further consideration.  
 
 Blomkamp pulls a similar trick in his next film, Elysium (2013). Early in this 
film, the protagonist, Max, is brutalized by robotic police officers. He is then sent 
to talk to a robotic processing drone. When Max gets irritated, the processing 
drone humorously offers him calming medication, literal chill pills. This joke 
makes clear that the interaction between Max and the robotic police force is 
important, and indeed the film will go on to interrogate the role of technology in 
enforcing justice. Without the humorous interaction with the processing drone — 
 
230 Morreall, 43. 
231 Neill Blomkamp, “Commentary: Neill Blomkamp,” District 9, DVD, directed by Neill Blomkamp 
(Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2009). 
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for example, if the film had just had the interaction with the police force — it 
would be easier for the audience to miss that the robotic police force is playing 
the role of intentional object in a satiric misrepresentation. 
 
 The use of humour to engender a change in tone can work the other way 
too, with the sudden absence of humour being used to emphasize that something 
is satire. Many satires are heavily comedic, so a well-timed drop into seriousness 
can help to make clear to the audience that a work is not just a comedy but one 
with a satiric edge. One film that does this particularly well is Michael Bay’s Pain 
and Gain (2013). The film, based on a true story, follows a gang of body builders 
as they kidnap and torture a rich client for the sake of stealing all his material 
wealth. The true story is famous for the Sun Gym Gang’s plan being so utterly 
stupid that the victim could not get the police to believe him, and the gang 
consequently got away with it. The film is thoroughly comedic, emphasizing the 
Sun Gym Gang as a bunch of bumbling and sexually insecure gasheads. The film 
could easily pass with the audience missing not necessarily the venality and 
malice of the gang, but that this venality and malice are bad things that the film 
is seeking to criticize. Accordingly, the film inserts a number of scenes where the 
humour drops, such as when Daniel Lugo, leader of the Sun Gym Gang, pushes the 
kidnapped Victor Kershaw to the floor and roars directly into the camera, “I don’t 
just want what you have, I want you not to have it.” The scene is a sudden shock, 
breaking the comedic tone of the movie, and confronting the audience with 
something deeply uncomfortable. 
  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to present an account of humour in satire. I have 
provided that in three sections. First was an account of humour itself, focusing on 
humour as a social practice oriented around provoking laughter. Second was an 
account of what is meant by holding that satirical misrepresentation must be 
humourous. I gave a very permissive account of humour in satirical 
misrepresentation, allowing that for a satiric misrepresentation to be funny all it 
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must do is adhere to the conventions of humour and succeed in meriting a positive 
response. Lastly, I gave an account of frequent, practical uses of humour in satire. 
These uses help the audience engage the satire of the work, but are not 
definitional.  
 
 At this point, I have provided the basic points of a definition of satire 
— about humour, criticism, and audience engagement. In the next chapter, I will 
draw all these elements together and provide a unified definition of satire. I will 
also properly engage the existing literary theory on satire to show that both my 
theory and the arguments I have provided so far are copacetic with the existing 
understanding of satire.    
  
 111
Chapter 4: An Account of Satire 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the material of the first three 
chapters and offer a coherent theory of satire. To achieve this, this chapter will 
contain four sections. The first section will be a short collation of the first three 
chapters, arranging what I have written about interpretation, misrepresentation, 
and humour. The second section will cover the literary theory on satire. I will not 
be challenging the literary theory – rather, my goal will be to show that the 
philosophy I have written about satire does in fact track satire as it is generally 
understood. In the third section I will engage the two existing analytic accounts of 
satire: Nicholas Diehl’s “Satire, Analogy, and Moral Philosophy,” and Dieter 
DeClerq’s “A Definition of Satire (And Why A Definition Matters).” In the fourth 
section I will draw out clarity as a virtue of good satiric work, as made evident by 
my theory of satire. 
 
1.1 A Theory of Satire 
 
The theory of satire that I present will be the following: “a work is satirical, in 
part or in whole, insofar as it criticizes a target by way of a funny 
misrepresentation.” The first part of the definition I will focus on is “in part or in 
whole,” since this does not draw from any of the previous chapters.  This clause 
simply has the effect that it is possible both for a work as a whole to be satirical 
— a work of satire, so to speak — or for elements within an otherwise unsatirical 
work to be satirical. An example of a work that may be called a work of satire 
would be the film Dr. Strangelove, which tells the story of the United States 
careening towards an apocalyptic war due to a mix of stupidity and incompetence. 
An example of the latter — satire within an otherwise unsatirical work — would be 
the character of Dr. Bigbee in the novel The Watch that Ends the Night. The story 
of The Watch is a loosely autobiographical account of the author Hugh MacLennan 
as he reflects on the failed radicalism of his youth, and reconciles his feelings for 
his recently deceased wife, Dorothy MacLennan, and his best friend Dr. Norman 
Bethune. At one stage of the novel the lead character, George, goes to work at a 
boarding school outside of Montreal run by Englishman and Anglophile Dr. Bigbee. 
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Bigbee is a satire of the Anglophile tendency in English Canada — he is obsessed 
with representing and teaching English history, and knows very little about Canada 
at all. He returns to England at each opportunity, and spends his time in Canada 
insulating himself in a room thoroughly ordained with pictures and relics of English 
history. The character of Dr. Bigbee, and the themes and ideas which surround his 
character, appear in little more than one chapter of the book. Altogether, while 
the book as a whole is not satirical, the character of Dr. Bigbee is. A work may 
contain satire without being entirely a satire. 
 
 The effects of the chapter on trust and interpretation will be drawn out 
more fully in the final section of this chapter, where I focus on the value of clarity. 
As it effects the definition of satire, what is important is that the satire must in 
some way be evident in the finished product of the work itself, and cannot solely 
depend on the intentions of the work’s makers. This shows in the theory of satire 
as I write “…it criticizes a target…” — it is not sufficient for a work’s maker to 
imagine themselves to be making a criticism, or for them to be believing 
themselves to be using a funny misrepresentation, they have to achieve that in the 
work. This is largely just a continuation of the common approach to interpretation 
where, since what is being interpreted is the work itself, for the intentions of the 
artist to be relevant they must be manifest in the work. 
 
 There are not many high-profile instances of works that completely fail to 
be satirical because the artist does not succeed in making his intentions manifest 
in the work. This is because if an artist has failed to make his intentions manifest 
at all he likely lacks the basic aptitudes and competencies to make a work of any 
relevance by any merit. (There are more ambiguous cases which I will engage in 
the final section of this chapter on clarity.) The best example is probably the film 
Score! A Hockey Musical. The film is a musical that tells the story of a teenaged 
hockey prospect trying to make it as a serious player despite not fighting.232 In 
terms of substance, the film is full of the sort of trite, “aw shucks” self-denying 
nationalism that permeates Canada and can turn into a vicious xenophobia without 
 
232 Fighting and violence in general has a privileged place in Canadian hockey culture. 
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much prompting.233 The film is also, according to director Michael McGowan and a 
handful of reviews, a satire, although just how it is a satire goes unmentioned.234 It 
cannot be a satire of hockey stories, since the story it tells is straightforward and 
conventional.235 It cannot be a satire of musicals since there is no way that the 
conventions of musicals are misrepresented or criticized — the film simply is a 
musical. Altogether, if the intentions of the filmmakers were to make a satire, 
none of that is manifest in the film itself. 
 
 The two remaining chapters to be discussed are those on misrepresentation 
and humour, and their respective relationships to satire have already been 
discussed within their respective chapters. Misrepresentation first distinguishes 
satire from mere invective. Works of satire criticize a target. However, plenty of 
other works also criticize targets. It is the use of misrepresentation that makes the 
criticism distinctly satiric — otherwise the work is merely criticizing its target 
directly. The misrepresented target of satiric criticism is referred to as the 
“intentional object,” which, along with the “model” (the target outwith the work 
and the basis of the intentional object), composes the “double object.” Since 
satire does not just misrepresent the model but specifically criticizes the model 
through the way it is misrepresented, it is either in or through the features that 
make the intentional object a misrepresentation of the model that the model is 
criticized. Holding that the criticism happens “by way” of the misrepresentation 
allows for two possibilities. One is where the misrepresentation itself constitutes 
the criticism. This is a staple of political cartoons where a politician may be 
misrepresented as being pig-like (they are greedy or gluttonous), having a long 
nose (they lie), or being dressed like a Nazi (they are a Nazi). The other is that the 
misrepresentation may form the basis of the criticism so that while the 
misrepresentation may not itself constitute the criticism, it is still essential for the 
 
233 The reason this film was able to poke its head out of obscurity is its trite nationalism, which led 
to it opening the otherwise-prestigious Toronto International Film Festival in 2010. 
234 Michael Rechtshaffen, “Score: A Hockey Musical -- Film Review,” Hollywood Reporter, October 
14, 2010, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/score-hockey-musical-film-review-29970; 
Stephen Cole, “Score: A Hockey Musical: It’s Love on Skates,” The Globe and Mail, March 26, 2017, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/film/score-a-hockey-musical-its-love-on-
skates/article4329798/; Greig Dymond, “Review: Score: A Hockey Musical,” CBC, October 21, 2010, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/entertainment/review-score-a-hockey-musical-1.923048.  
235 In fact, its story is nearly identical to the popular and unsatirical 1986 film Youngblood. 
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satiric criticism. This is common in dystopian satires. For example, in the film 
Brazil the perennial Christmas is the basis of the criticism that commercialism has 
undermined the authentic meaning of holidays and other social rituals. 
 
 There are two points to make about the requirement that the 
misrepresentation be funny. The first point is that “funny” plays a normative role 
here — it must be the case that the audience ought to find the misrepresentation 
funny whether or not any particular audience actually does. The second point is 
that requiring the misrepresentation serves as a guarantor of the connection 
between the model and intentional objects. It is essential to the humour of the 
misrepresentation that it applies to the model. If the criticism does not apply then 
then humour will fail, and so the satire will fail. Humour may also fail for ethical 
reasons (which will be the subject of the next chapter), in which case the satire 
will fail. In cases such as these the attack on the model is considered to be simply 
cruel, and as such fails to be an actual criticism. 
 
 This last point draws attention to something that is relevant but not fully 
articulated in any of the previous chapters: that satire specifically criticizes its 
target. To say that satire criticizes its target is to say that it identifies in its target 
something that it considers to be negative, and identifies it as negative. 
Accordingly, criticism is more specific than merely attacking a target, it is 
attacking a target for some particular quality the target possesses. If all a work 
manages to manifest is a distaste of the target, and not a distaste for some 
particular feature of the target, then the work is not satirical. I choose criticism 
rather than attack also because there are some satiric criticisms that are made 
with such conviviality that it seems inappropriate to consider them attacks. While 
a negative feature of the target is identified, there is no real attempt at injuring 
or insulting the target. Instances of such may not be too common, but they do 
exist and will typically be found in the most tepid of Horatian satire. Such an 
instance may be found in a skit from the 2004 White House Correspondents’ Dinner 
where then President George W. Bush fruitlessly searched for nuclear and chemical 
weapons in the Oval Office. While there was a real criticism behind the sketch — 
concerning the superficial, inept, and unsuccessful search for so-termed weapons 
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of mass destruction in Iraq — the toothless nature and setting of the skit makes it 
difficult to consider it a real attack on Bush. 
 
 Altogether, I offer the theory that a work is satirical, in part or in whole, 
insofar as it criticizes a target by way of a funny misrepresentation. The rest of the 
chapter is devoted to three things. The first thing is putting my theory in the 
context of existing literary theory on satire. While I believe that my theory is of a 
different sort than literary theories, I believe it is important to invoke the literary 
theories to show that what I am discussing does in fact track what is considered to 
be satire, and I have not wandered off following some philosophical chimera. The 
second thing is to examine the existing philosophical theories of satire and show 
them to be inadequate. In the final section of the chapter I will articulate and 
defend clarity as a particularly important value of satire. 
 
2. Literary Work on Satire 
 
So far I have attempted to give a philosophical account of satire. One important 
ingredient is to show that what I have provided meaningfully tracks what is 
commonly understood to be satire. For that reason, I now turn my attention to 
literary theory that has been written on the topic of satire. My goal is not to 
challenge their writing, but just to show that what I have provided follows what 
they describe. In this section, then, I will cover three areas. First I will examine 
current work on the state of satiric theory. As I will show, overarching theories of 
satire are largely out of favour, and writers prefer to focus on particular periods or 
stylistic elements. Accordingly, I will also look at theory that emerged out of the 
mid-20th Century, when overarching theories were more in favour. Since I am 
merely seeking to show that my theory follows what is considered to be satire, it is 
sufficient to look to these mid-Century theories without needing them to be wholly 
correct. Lastly, I will review my account in light of the literary theory and show 
that I am writing about what is commonly accepted to be satire. 
 
 The central modern text on satire is Dustin Griffin’s 1993 Satire: A Critical 
Reintroduction. Griffin situates his work as coming after a relative lull in the study 
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of satire, and focuses on an overview of 20th Century theorizing. This makes his 
work particularly useful for establishing a baseline of theory since Satire is as 
much about writing about satire as it is about satire. Griffin identifies satiric 
theory as existing along two axes. The first he terms “inquiry and provocation,” 
which can be taken to mean the critical end of satire.236 This is the part of satire 
that is focused on making a point. The second he terms “display and play,” and 
this has more to do with the sorts of techniques that make satire popular and 
enjoyable to the audience.237 He presents the history of theorizing over satire as 
being focused on the former, the inquiry and provocation that gives cognitive 
value to satire. The conventional theorizing, according to Griffin, would often hold 
the following four point assumption: (1) that satire revolved around a “bipolar”238 
pattern of praise and blame; (2) at the thematic centre of each satire is a moral 
standard; (3) the satirist appeals to that standard, and assumes that it is shared; 
and (4) the satirist works as a preacher, seeking to persuade.239 That such an 
account is common lends weight to the idea that satire is at heart a moral 
technique — even if particular theorists may be more or less precise, more or less 
right or wrong, there is nevertheless a consensus that satire has a point and that 
point is some sort of moral education. However, Griffin complicates this with an 
important insight. Defences of satire as morally valuable, he argues, tend to arise 
when satire is being criticized for being indulgent and vicious.240 For example John 
Dryden’s “Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire,” published at 
the end of the 17th Century, was in part motivated by the beginning of a moralistic 
backlash against satire.241 While being published after Dryden’s “Discourse,” 
Griffin cites Richard Blackmore’s Satyr against Wit as an example of such a piece. 
As Griffin writes: 
Dryden’s theory of satire… needs to be situated in its fullest 
rhetorical context as an attempt to reshape contemporary thinking 
 
236 Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1994), 35. 
237 Ibid, 71. 
238 I understand this to mean that satire divides the world into the virtuous and the vicious, and is 
interested in assigning particulars into one or the other camp. 
239 Ibid, 37. 
240 Griffin, 29. 
241 Ibid, 24. 
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about satire, to justify Dryden’s own practice (especially in “fine 
raillery”), and to influence its reception. It remains to note, in 
summary fashion, that Dryden’s theory is of limited value for present-
day theorists seeking any comprehensive account of the genre and of 
limited value even for explaining the practice of satire in Dryden’s 
own day. Although it has been shown that Dryden’s “Discourse” was 
widely known in the eighteenth century and that commentators on 
satire commonly quote it approvingly, his theory represents not so 
much what satire was and had been as what Dryden and his followers 
wanted it to be.242 
Theory as a “defence” of satire would become common in the 18th Century, and 
Griffin notes that theory written by people like Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope, 
and Francis Bacon was motivated by the need to defend satire as morally valuable, 
rather than just a cruel indulgence.243 Although Griffin does not fully frame the 
writing as such, the classical theorizing of Horace may also be read as such a 
defence, where Horace seeks to situate himself in a tradition of outspoken moral 
criticism. 
 
 The scepticism of the moral defences of satire (which is not the same as a 
scepticism of the potential moral value of satire) leads Griffin to focus on satire as 
a literary technique. This means a focus on satire as a thing through which the 
author demonstrates skill, satire as something written with particular regular 
techniques, and satires as particular works that are written in particular 
contexts.244 This leads to a focus on investigating satire where the goal is not to 
figure out what satire is, but how it is created and received. The focus is on 
writer, text, and audience. This approach to satire is also evident in other, more 
recent, contemporary theoretical works on satire. Charles Knight’s 2004 The 
Literature of Satire, for instance, focuses on how literature works as a 
performance of satire, and what that means for classifying satire as a genre.245 
Fredric Bogel’s 2001 The Difference Satire Makes argues for understanding satire 
 
242 Griffin, 21. 
243 Ibid, 24. 
244 It is worth noting that Griffin focuses on literary satire. 
245 Charles A Knight, The Literature of Satire (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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by way of a “triangle,” involving reader, artist, and object.246 Paul Simpson’s 2003 
On the Discourse of Satire examines satire as a media phenomenon that is created 
in a discursive context of conventions which support a triadic structure of satirist, 
satiree, and target.247 Given the repeated invocation of ideas concerning roles 
resembling utterer, audience, and utterance, it is unsurprising that Simpson and 
Knight invoke Austin and Grice respectively.248 Bogel does not invoke any names, 
but does refer to “speech acts.”249 
 
 While contemporary writers eschew overarching theories of satire, writers 
from the middle of the twentieth century did not. They wrote in a context where 
there was more optimism about offering a unified theory of satire. Of these 
writers, the most prominent is Northrop Frye, who offered an analysis in Anatomy 
of Criticism (1957). In a subsection of the third essay titled “The Mythos of Winter: 
Irony and Satire” Frye first offers a definition of satire as “militant irony.”250 Its 
militancy is identified with a clear set of moral norms, and it takes a clear set of 
standards against which its target is measured.251 As Knight identifies, Frye is 
largely just returning to Dryden’s old definition, and consequently it faces the 
same weaknesses: norms are not always so clear, and works of satire do not always 
take such a clear position.252 As with Dryden, such an account is as much about 
what makes satire good (by Frye’s standards) as what makes satire satire. Later, 
Frye provides this refined account of satire: “Two things, then, are essential to 
satire: one is wit or humour founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or 
absurd, the other is an object of attack.”253 This account merges both technical 
requirements and stylistic preferences. The requirement of fantasy, for example, 
play two roles. As a technical requirement, it distinguishes satire from “pure 
denunciation.”254 While the boundary is unclear, the side of pure denunciation is 
an attack that is just insult. It expresses personal distaste, but nothing much 
 
246 Frederic V Bogel, The Difference Satire Makes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 2. 
247 Paul Simpson, On the Discourse of Satire (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
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248 Knight, 39; Simpson, 70. 
249 Bogel, 34. 
250 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 223. 
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253 Frye, 224. 
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beyond that. As stylistic preference, Frye notes that the fantasy is needed to make 
some topics approachable. About A Modest Proposal by Jonathan Swift he writes:  
When in another passage Swift suddenly says, discussing the poverty 
of Ireland, "But my Heart is too heavy to continue this Irony longer," 
he is speaking of satire, which breaks down when its content is too 
oppressively real to permit the maintaining of the fantastic or 
hypothetical tone.255 
The need for distance between the fantasy of the work and the brutality of the 
reality is not definitional for satire, but in particular cases, such as A Modest 
Proposal, it may prove necessary to the success of the particular work. 
 
 Frye’s Anatomy manages to serve as an ur-text for the mid-20th Century 
with respect to satire, so even though there are other writers their works mostly 
serve as footnotes to him. Ronald Paulson’s The Fictions of Satire begins by taking 
up Frye’s definition with the point of refining and improving it.256 He makes the 
point of differentiating between what defines a work as satire, and the 
conventions to which works tend to adhere. Works that are satire have what 
Paulson refers to as a “central image,” which summarizes the point of the 
satire.257 For an example Paulson cites A Modest Proposal, and the central image is 
the cooking and eating of children.258 A modern example of a central image would 
be that of Judge Dredd where the image is that of the faceless, unaccountable, 
executioner-lawman. The central image contains all the elements essential to the 
satire, and then the conventions of satire have to do with how that central image 
is expressed (Paulson focuses on the Juvenalian and Horatian traditions as the two 
ways of expressing the central image). With respect to the target within the 
central image, Paulson refers to there being a “dualism of subject,” which is to say 
that there are two parts to the subject — the subject as it is within the work and 
the subject as it is outwith the work.259  
 
 
255 Frye, 224. 
256 Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press), 3. 
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 Alvin Kernan’s The Plot of Satire explicitly excavates Dryden’s old 
approach, and presents satire as a work where the author tries to make manifest a 
personality conducting the satirical attack.260 In support of this Kernan notes that 
satiric works often use the first-person in launching their attacks, although this 
may just be a preference of the historical era that he’s investigating.261 
Importantly, the personality may be but is not necessarily that of the actual author 
— the personality is constructed through the work and the author may seek to have 
the satire speak in their own voice or create a new voice for the work. According 
to Kernan, the satiric attack makes use of what he calls morality and wit.262 
Morality provides the standard against which the target is being measured, and the 
justification for finding the target lacking. The wit is meant to establish the 
superiority of the satiric personality, and properly belittle the target. This allows 
Kernan to contrast satire with what he terms invective, diatribe, and lampoon.263 
Each of the three alternatives lack an essential ingredient of satire. Invective lacks 
wit, and as such is just an attack against a target. Diatribe may be morally loaded 
and humorous, but it lacks a distinct target. Lampoon may have a target, but it 
does not seek to seriously degrade or attack the target, making in a more playful 
sort of engagement.  
 
2.1 Crosschecking the Account 
 
The account of satire that I have provided is “a work is satirical, in part or in 
whole, insofar as it criticizes a target by way of a funny misrepresentation.” This 
fits comfortably alongside the literary accounts of satire. The two most common 
elements in the literary accounts also form the basis of my account, which is that 
satire has an attack, and that this attack involves humour in some essential way. 
Moreover, following Frye and especially Kernan, it is not just that the attack is 
funny, but the humour in some way essentially shapes and informs the attack. 
Frye’s use of the term “militant irony” presents an image of the humour itself 
being turned into a weapon, and Kernan notes that in successful satire both the 
 
260 Alvin B Kernan, The Plot of Satire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 6-9. 
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morality and the wit will inform each other.264 Placing misrepresentation at the 
core of satire captures both what Kernan refers to as the “dualism of subject,” and 
also what Paulson calls the “central image.” Not only does the misreprentation 
form the double object — the target of attack both within and outwith the work — 
but it stands at the centre of the satire because it is being attacked. My account 
also follows Griffin’s looser, non-definitional tendencies of satire. Griffin pointedly 
uses the terms “inquiry and provocation,” in contrast to the more classical 
approach where satire is considered to specifically be an attack. Similarly, as I use 
the term “criticize,” rather than the stronger “attack,” I merely mean to capture 
that satire identifies something particular as being bad for some reason. This 
allows for satire to be playful, friendly, or non-threatening in a way that is 
excluded by definitions which put an emphasis on attack and use words like 
“wound,” “maim,” or “eviscerate.” Similarly, the role of humour follows what 
Griffin refers to as the tendency to “display and play.”  I believe that my account 
also follows Griffin inasmuch that the humour of satire often features in a way that 
is not definitional to satire, but rather follows either generic concerns (such as 
sorting Horatian and Juvenalian satire) or showcasing the skill or virtue of the 
satirist. On this point, Griffin and Kernan come close together, as each put an 
emphasis on the personality behind the satire. Even though they do it in different 
ways — Kernan ties the role of personality much more thoroughly to the meaning 
of the work whereas Griffin puts greater emphasis on the self-promotion of the 
author — each gives a role to some sort of authorial voice. This element shows up 
more in the work underpinning my account than my account itself. In the previous 
section I included that by requiring that the satire must be evident in the finished 
work itself. The author must succeed in creating the voice that underlies the satire 
— Kernan’s satiric personality, whether that of the real author or generated by the 
work. 
 
 The point of this exercise is not to either evaluate the literary works on 
satire or to evaluate my work by the standards of the literary works. Rather, all I 
mean to show is that what I have written is within the same area as the literary 
works, and it picks up on the same phenomena which the literary works deem 
 
264 Frye, 223; Kernan, 7-8. 
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important to a work being satirical. There is the centrality of the double object, 
the importance of humour, and need to create some sort of voice for the point of 
criticism and attack; all of these elements are present in both the literary theories 
and my account. These parallels do not ensure the correctness of my account, but 
they do provide the assurance that what I have been writing about does reasonably 
track the artistic phenomenon of satire, and I have not just wandered off on my 
own philosophical tangent. 
 
3. Philosophical Work on Satire 
 
Very little on satire has been written in the realm of analytic philosophy, and what 
of it exists is not preoccupied with the question of what satire is. There is a brief 
mention of satire in Berys Gaut’s Art, Emotion and Ethics (2007) but the focus is 
on whether satire poses any special problems for the ethical evaluation of art.265 
Eva Dadlez invokes satire in her 2011 article “Truly Funny: Humor, Irony, and 
Satire as Moral Criticism” but this is again just as a way to get at questions to do 
with ethical evaluation.266 More Recently there is “Satire, Analogy, and Moral 
Philosophy” (2013) by Nicholas Diehl. While the argument of the article concerns 
whether or not it is possible to practice analytic philosophy through satire, he 
begins the article by offering a partial account of satire. It is with this account 
which I will now concern myself. 
 
 Diehl takes the work of Griffin as his base in two ways. The first is that he 
accepts Griffin’s characterization of the mid-Century consensus on satire.267 The 
second is that he also accepts Griffin’s characterization of current work on satire 
as taking the mid-Century consensus as a starting point and seeking to improve or 
refine the consensus without necessarily putting one’s account forward as a 
complete account.268 This second point is methodologically important, since it 
means that while Diehl will be providing an account of what he takes to be typical 
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of satire, this does not mean he takes what he provides to be essential to satire. 
This means that his account is not susceptible to simple counter-examples, since 
such examples may simply belong to a different approach to satire. Accordingly, in 
arguing against his account of satire, I will show that he mislocates the defining 
features of satire. 
 
 Diehl understands the mid-Century consensus of satire as entailing the 
following: satire is a polemical attack, made using wit and ridicule.269 The goal is 
to combine the wit with some sort of exaggeration, with the end of persuading an 
audience.270 Satire is separated from comedy by the fact that it tends to be darker 
in tone and content, and the target of the satire is drawn from the real world.271 
Accepting Griffin’s criticism of the mid-Century consensus, Diehl speculates but 
does not defend the idea that a family resemblance account of satire is ultimately 
correct.272 
 
 Diehl’s own contribution is that satire commonly, but not necessarily, 
advances argument through analogy. The majority of his paper is concerned with 
the argument that this lets satire be a tool for practicing analytic philosophy but 
my concern is just with his claim about how analogy fits in satire. His account of 
analogy in satire has two steps. The first is that satire has a fictional 
representation of a real world object, and that both the representation and the 
object possess the properties of p1-pn.273 The second is that, following from the 
analogy, since the fictional representation receives some moral criticism, the real 
world object merits that same moral criticism.274 Diehl supports this account by 
way of using Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal as an example. The first step is 
an analogy between the tract and the tract’s author, and real world authors with 
their real world publications. These were tracts concerning a solution to poverty in 
Ireland that made use of a morally detached arithmetic, referred to the Irish and 
beasts or savages, displayed prejudices against Irish Catholics, and were “afflicted 
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with an unjustified, self-congratulatory hubris.” Given the analogy, both fictional 
and real authors are deserving of moral criticism for some reason R.275 
 
 There are two interpretations of Diehl’s formulation of argument by analogy 
within satire. One can be set aside, because it has little to do with satire as satire, 
but rather just describes something commonly found in satires. The other is to 
take his formulation as not just concerning the argument by analogy, but satiric 
representation more broadly. It is with this interpretation which I will concern 
myself. The first, less important interpretation, is that the argument by analogy 
which he attributes to many satires is simply a common feature within satire, and 
not definitional. The analogy is just a common way of rendering satiric criticism. It 
is possible to still talk sensibly about analogy within satire just like it is easy to 
talk sensibly about exaggeration within satire. Exaggeration is a common form of 
satiric misrepresentation — quite possibly the most common — and there is much 
that can be gleaned from discussing exaggeration in satire, but it is not 
definitional to satire. Accordingly, I can leave this interpretation of Diehl’s 
account since it does not challenge mine.  
 
The second interpretation is that what Diehl is offering is an account of 
essentially satiric misrepresentation, and how that misrepresentation serves to 
launch the satiric criticism.276 By this interpretation, the analogy is not just a way 
that satires often make a criticism, but it is a way that satiric works make a 
criticism such that if they did not do this they would not be satirical. Under this 
interpretation, his account falls short of being able to distinguish satirical works 
from non-satirical works. His problem is twofold. The first is that while he stresses 
the similarities between the representation and the real world object, he does not 
require there be a difference between the two. This means that there may be no 
double object. As I argued in the second chapter, without a double object there is 
no satire because the model object277 is just directly criticized. Accordingly, the 
 
275 Diehl,313. 
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277 I move here from his term (“real world object”) to my term (“model object”), as I believe it is 
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for example, fictional objects, ideas and concepts are all things that may be a satiric model but, in 
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model object must be misrepresented which means that not only must the 
intentional object and model have properties in common, but the intentional 
object must also have additional properties that intentionally misrepresent of the 
model. The second problem is that Diehl offers no connection between the 
(mis)representation and the criticism. He writes that the analogy between the 
representation and the real world object means that the criticism of the 
representation will apply to the real world object, but this is not necessarily the 
case.278 Consider the following example from Charles Dickens’ Little Dorrit (1855-
7). The story is not wholly satirical, but it is satirical in part. One of the instances 
of satire can be found in the characters of the Barnacles.279 As their name 
suggests, they attach themselves to the hull of the state and feed off its detritus 
while contributing nothing. One particular Barnacle, named Frederick, is 
encountered by the protagonist Arthur Clennam in the circumlocution office, and 
during the encounter Frederick’s monocle keeps falling out, and he keeps trying 
(unsuccessfully) to replace it. There are satire-relevant criticisms that can be 
drawn from this encounter. For example, one such criticism would be that the 
British ruling class — the model for the Barnacles — desperately affect the cultural 
mannerisms of authority as a kind of performance, while knowing the mannerisms 
as nothing but performance and not even being particularly good at it. However, 
there are also satire-irrelevant criticisms that could be drawn, such as Frederick 
Barnacle being bad at wearing monocles, or having too-large eyes. On my account 
of satire, the difference between the relevant and irrelevant criticisms can be 
navigated through the use of misrepresentation. Barnacle’s flaws are properties 
attributed to him through misrepresentation, and it is those properties that are 
used to criticize the model. What is important, qua satire, is not that Barnacle is 
deserving of moral criticism, but that he has some property that is deserving of 
criticism. Irrelevant properties, such as Barnacle’s too-large eyes, are not 
misrepresentative properties, because they are not meant to intentionally 
misrepresent the model object. This means that criticism drawing from these 
 
one way or another, only dubiously “real world” objects. However, I do not believe that these 
variations present anything that Diehl could not accommodate with the appropriate hedging or 
rephrasing. 
278 Diehl, 313. 
279 Dickens has a particular gift in naming characters. I feel like many could accept characters 
named Mr. Meagles and Tite Barnacle as satirical knowing nothing but the characters’ names. 
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properties does not in turn apply to the model object. By simply using the 
similarities that make up analogy and representation, Diehl does not have access 
to this argumentative resource. Diehl’s account cannot distinguish between satiric 
criticism, non-satiric criticism, and criticism that, while within a satire, is 
irrelevant to the satire.  
 
I now move to the one philosophical attempt to provide an account of 
satire, Dieter DeClerq’s 2018 article “A Definition of Satire (And Why a Definition 
Matters).” He offers the following definition of satire, which may be taken in a 
strong form or a weak one: satire is “a genre which since Roman times has guided 
the interpretation and evaluation of works on the ground of their purpose to 
critique and entertain.”280 On the weak definition he defends “critique” and 
“entertainment” as necessary conditions for satire. On the strong definition he 
holds those conditions to be sufficient. On each account, there is a third condition 
that critique and entertainment must interact though neither is “wholly 
instrumental” to the other.281 He advances his definition with a negative case 
against a cluster account of satire, and a positive argument in favour of his own 
account. Since my goal is simply to show that my account is preferable to his, I will 
skip over his negative account and focus on the positive one. To reject his 
definition, I will target the first two conditions in turn. I will show that his 
condition of critique is too narrow, and his condition of entertainment is 
inaccurate.282 The result is that his definition of satire misidentifies paradigmatic 
satirical works as unsatirical, and unsatirical works as satirical. While he predicts 
the latter, I believe the problem is far more extensive than he acknowledges. 
 
 DeClerq defines critique as a “committed moral opposition against a target, 
sustained by an analysis of that target,” often centred around a perceived social 
wrongness.283 This moral opposition must be the “emotional drive” of the 
opposition against the target, and this emotional drive is crucial to distinguishing 
 
280 Dieter DeClerq, “A Definition of Satire (And Why A Definition Matters),” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 76, no.3 (2018): 319. 
281 DeClerq, 319. 
282 I believe that the problems with his account extend well beyond the points I will make, but my 
argument in this section is sufficient for showing my account to be preferable. 
283 Ibid, 323. 
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satirical works from unsatirical works.284 Importantly, the work must seek to 
actually resolve or ameliorate the social wrongness, instead of settling for merely 
articulating disapproval.  
 
 While the moral centre that DeClerq claims is commonly thought of as a 
central piece of satire, that claim is also incorrect. To recur Griffin’s point from 
the previous section, while defences of satire have often foregrounded its moral 
purpose, those defences occurred in particular historical contexts where satire was 
under attack. The morality of satire was only stressed as a defence against the 
accusation that it was either immoral or amoral. Making such a moral interest 
actually definitional to satire has the ill-effect of being unable to account for a 
number of foundational and paradigmatic works of satire. As Griffin notes, 
satirists, especially literary satirists, targeted each other with some frequency. 
Foremost is Alexander Pope’s The Dunciad, a mock epic whose target is not 
anyone’s moral failings, or even any moral problem at all.285 Rather, the target of 
The Dunciad is the poor writing of the day, especially that of Colley Cibber.286 
White the characters of The Dunciad may be variously stupid or inept, their models 
are not real world people but the characters within Cibber’s writing. The target 
for criticism is not anyone’s moral failures, but Cibber for writing such dim 
characters. Similarly, a big part of contemporary satiric practice is genre satire, 
where a work takes as its target a genre’s standards. Consider the horror satire 
Tucker and Dale vs Evil, where two innocent rednecks, Tucker and Dale, are 
mystified by the terrified actions of a bunch urban teenagers who see Tucker and 
Dale as horror stock characters. Satires may even be specific to particular shows, 
as Galaxy Quest satirized Star Trek and its fandom. Mel Brooks made a career off 
of genre satires, with Space Balls (targeting late-1970s space adventures), Blazing 
Saddles (targeting Hollywood Westerns), and Robin Hood: Men in Tights (targeting 
the Robin Hood mythology). 
 
 The critique condition puts DeClerq’s definition of satire at odds with the 
actual practice of satire. While many works of satire centre on moral criticism, 
 
284 DeClerq, 323. 
285 Griffin, 36. 
286 Ibid. 
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many also do not. A further problem can be identified with DeClerq’s definition of 
critique by his requirement that satire’s moral criticism must not settle for merely 
articulating a problem but must seek to resolve it. Seeking to resolve such a 
problem may be understood as weekly as seeking to resolve it by way of raising 
awareness of it. This demand by DeClerq is strange, as it is simultaneously very 
strong and very weak. That a satire must seek to attack and resolve a social 
problem is a very strong condition, and I argue an implausibly strong one. As 
Griffin notes, many satires have been interested in merely exploring a topic.287 He 
notes the tendency of satire to be described (and so-described by the satirists 
themselves) as sermons, dialogues, farragoes, and anatomies. He takes all of these 
terms to suggest open-ended inquiry.288 Moreover, DeClerq has committed himself 
to the position that each and every work of satire, to be satire, must be fully 
committed to resolving the social problem which it identifies. To attribute such a 
practical and concrete intention to each and every satire is implausible. On such 
an account, works that otherwise would be considered satirical, works that have 
been considered paradigmatically satirical, would not count as satirical because 
their focus was on mockery rather than amelioration. DeClerq’s addendum that 
seeking to resolve a problem may be pursued by simply bringing attention to that 
problem is too weak to save the condition. If drawing attention to a problem is 
enough to qualify as seeking to resolve that problem, then each and every would-
be satire would meet such a standard since attention would be drawn to any 
problem by mere virtue of that problem being within the work. The criticism itself 
would constitute the attempt to solve the problem since the criticism would 
instantiate the problem within the work, thus bringing attention to it. 
 
 Altogether, DeClerq’s requirement that satire is morally centred is too 
strong and unreflective of satiric practice. Critically, the demand that satire 
centre on moral criticism excludes paradigmatic works of satire like The Dunciad. 
If a definition of satire excludes the paradigmatic works that have guided criticism 
and practice for 250 years, then it is a poor definition. 
 
 
287 Griffin, 39. 
288 Ibid, 41. 
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 DeClerq’s second condition, that of entertainment, also fares poorly. He 
defines a work as entertaining insofar as it provides an aesthetic experience that is 
fun and divertive.289 An aesthetic experience is understood as divertive inasmuch 
that in experiencing it, the subject focuses primarily on that experience.290 The 
subject is “absorbed” in the experience, and it draws them away from everyday 
life as a pastime does.291 A work succeeds at being entertaining if it creates in the 
audience the divertive experiences it seeks to create.292 
 
 The problem with the entertainment condition is that it does not 
meaningfully track anything related to satire. While DeClerq provides quotations 
from a number of literary and media theorists who refer to satire as typically 
entertaining, this is just a function of satire having to be oriented towards the 
consumption of either a patron or paying audience. It is entertaining the way that 
any work is entertaining and for the purposes that any work is entertaining: the 
need to create, retain, or otherwise satisfy an audience. This is evident, too, in 
how DeClerq formulates the entertainment condition. For an experience to be 
divertive, it just has to be the case that the subject is focusing on the experience. 
This is not describing satire, this is just describing aesthetic appreciation. The 
entertainment condition does not track whether or not a work is satirical, just 
whether a work of art is a work of art that can be evaluated aesthetically.  
 
 Altogether, DeClerq offers a definition of satire centred around two 
necessary conditions, critique and entertainment. Critique is too narrow, as it 
centres moral criticism when satiric criticism does not in fact need any moral 
element. Entertainment is inaccurate, since it makes the mistake of confusing a 
nearly universal feature of art — that it is made to appeal to an audience or patron 
— as a defining feature of one particular genre. Since each condition fails 
individually, the weak version of his definition fails. And since the weak version 
fails, so too does the strong version.  
 
 
289 DeClerq, 323. 
290 Ibid, 324. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
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4. Clarity 
 
I would now like to return to a point which I mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter, which is that it is frequently the case that it is ambiguous to what extent, 
or whether or not altogether, a work of art is satirical. This is particularly acute 
with respect to the possibly-satiric elements to do with misrepresentation 
— whether some element within a work is a misrepresentation, and whether that 
misrepresentation conveys criticism — but it is also possible with respect to the 
question of whether or not something is an attempt at humour. For this reason, I 
would like to defend clarity as an essential value of satire. I will begin with some 
slight hedging and three paradigm examples, which will serve to bring the issue 
into relief. I will then argue that since a work’s meaning depends on the intentions 
behind it293, a work may be better or worse depending on how well or poorly those 
intentions are actualized in the work. This is of particular concern in satire, as 
satires may contain more complicated or morally dubious content, and satires 
simply tend to be talked about in such a way that the real intentions behind a 
work are given particular prominence. 
 
 Discussing clarity as an artistic value requires some short account of artistic 
value. Artistic value comes with its own large and unsettled discourse so what I 
would like to provide is not so much a thorough account of artistic value but rather 
a way of talking sensibly about artistic value without committing to a particular 
account. I propose to talk about artistic value as something that contributes to the 
value of a work of art qua art. I am taking my cue from the account that Berys 
Gaut gives in Art, Emotion and Ethics but I do not mean to present the full account 
that he does.294 He bases his account in the practice of artistic criticism. Following 
Frank Sibley’s work on aesthetic properties, he argues that the evaluative terms of 
 
293 Following from my discussion in the first chapter, I take “intentions” to cover not just literally-
existing intentions, but whatever input or other element plays the role of intentions in the 
interpretive approach to a work.  
294 Gaut has a second half to his account to deal with the attribution of aesthetic properties to 
things that are not works of art. As I am dealing with satire, that is not a concern for me. He also 
appeals to an account of art to justify his account as non-circular. I do not believe that the charge 
of circularity is any problem for me here; the relative contentlessness of my account should make it 
copacetic with whichever full account of aesthetic value the reader would like to plug in. 
 131
art-critical practice can be taken to indicate aesthetic values.295 Terms like 
“beautiful,” “dainty,” or “oppressive” are used to not just describe a work, but 
evaluate it as good or bad. Accordingly, one of the things that I must show in this 
section is that a work may be described as clear or unclear in such a way that it is 
being evaluated as better or worse as a work of art.  
 
 As a clarifying point, it is worth making explicit that there are ways of 
evaluating a work that are not relevant to a work’s value qua art. Examples of 
such instances of value might be a work being too expensive, or an installation too 
difficult to present (maybe it’s too large or difficult to transport), or perhaps a 
statue being better or worse as a weapon to be used as self-defence in the case of 
a home invasion. One of my tasks in this section will be to argue against the 
challenge that clarity is merely of this latter class, an evaluation of the work that 
does not bear of its value qua art. 
 
 It is further important to clarify the scope of clarity, since “clarity” is used 
in different ways in conversation. When I speak of clarity, what I am considering 
how clearly the making intentions (or whatever plays the analogous meaning-
making or otherwise content-determining role in an interpretive theory) are 
presented in the work. It may be the case that the work is unclear in other ways. 
For example, many works are purposefully ambiguous as to their meaning. A film 
like Mother (2009) by Bong Joon-Ho may make a point of a key character’s state of 
mind being beyond the reach of the audience. A horror novel like House of Leaves 
(2000) may make a point of the reader being unsure of what’s going on at all. 
James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) makes a point of writing in difficult to parse 
dialect. All of these works are unclear in the sense of everyday parlance, but all 
are clear in the sense that I am using the term, such that they successfully and 
clearly present the making intentions. For the sake of clarity,296 I will refer to this 
former kind of purposeful unclarity as ambiguity. 
  
4.1 Examples 
 
295 Gaut, 34-36. 
296 I regret nothing. 
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I would now like to bring forwards some examples that will serve as paradigm 
cases for elucidating the concept of clarity. The first examples two concern the 
question of whether or not a work is satirical at all. The second two show how a 
work may be better or worse by virtue of being more or less clear. 
Snowpiercer (2013): Bong Joon-Ho’s Snowpiercer is a dystopian 
satire, a common sort of satire where the intentional object is the 
whole society in which the story takes place. The model is often some 
feature of political society or political society as a whole, although 
that is not necessarily the case. For Snowpiercer the model object is 
a hierarchical, arguably capitalistic society. This model is 
misrepresented as existing entirely within an ordered train where the 
poor live in squalor at the back of the train, the professional classes 
live in the middle of the train, and the hedonistic rich live in first 
class by the front of the train. The plot of the film follows a 
revolution from the tail section to capture the engine room at the 
front of the train. 
 
 The film uses multiple techniques to get across its point, many of 
which rely on there being close real-world analogues that the 
audience will readily recognize. That the story involves the political 
ordering of the fictional society primes the audience to look for, or at 
least recognize, analogies to real-world political society. To keep the 
satire from fading into the background, the film uses several scenes 
to foreground particular satirical points. The first of these is towards 
the end of the first act when Minister Mason, a representative from 
the front, lectures the tail-end denizens on their place in the “sacred 
order” of the train. Mason, bearing a conspicuous visual resemblance 
to Ayn Rand, gives a comical speech about how everyone is kept alive 
through order and the tail-enders, by failing to remain passive and 
supplicant, threaten to destroy the whole train. The talk itself is 
absurd, and the film draws attention to the absurdity by two tonal 
breaks of the sort that I described in chapter 3. First, at the start of 
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the speech, someone drops a tray with a great clatter and then Mason 
has to cut off her two translators because there is not enough time 
for them to translate everything she says. This quickly undermines 
the seriousness of Mason and ensures that she is seen as a ridiculous 
character. The second tonal break is at the end of her speech where 
she awkwardly checks to see that she has more time and, to try and 
fill the remaining time, calls the train’s conductor Wilford over the 
loudspeaker. (He, of course, does not respond.) The satiric point is 
concluded by a third tonal break, this time a sharp return to violence. 
Andy, who has been having his arm frozen while Mason is speaking, is 
brought in front of the rest of the tail-enders and has his arm 
shattered with a hammer. The quick transition between the hapless 
Mason and the violence to Andy makes clear the tie between the 
absurd system and the real violence it inflicts. 
 
 A second focal point occurs towards the middle of the film where the 
surviving revolutionaries, about six in number, reach the car where 
young school children are being taught by a very pristine- and 
pregnant-looking teacher. The bright colours of the room contrast 
with the rest of the film, which makes the scene immediately stand 
out. The revolutionaries watch as the teacher leads the class in song. 
The song, similar to Mason’s speech earlier in the film, is absurd and 
transparent propaganda.297 This is evident not only in the song’s 
lyrics, but also how the camera focuses on the teacher’s comically 
contorting face as she sings. As with Mason’s speech, there are two 
important tonal shifts in this scene. The first is when the teacher 
ushers the children to the window to show them the frozen corpses of 
nine people who had previously tried to leave the train. She presents 
them as proof that it is only the tightly-controlled order of the train 
that keeps everyone alive. While this is happening, Namgoong Minsoo 
is also explaining the frozen corpses to his daughter Yona. Unlike 
Mason, however, he is explaining the personal history of the leader of 
 
297 “What happens if the engine stops? // We all freeze and die” 
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the nine, and why she chose to leave the train. This serves to 
underline that not just is what the teacher saying propaganda, but it 
is also less than completely true. The second tonal break is towards 
the end of the scene when, during the distribution of boiled eggs, the 
teacher pulls a sub-machine gun from the basket of Easter eggs and 
begins firing. As with the speech scene, this tonal break makes 
explicit the taught propaganda as a method of enforced control. 
 
Taken (2008): I have chosen Taken as an example for a film that was 
intended to be a satire, but so far as I can tell has absolutely no 
evidence of its being satirical. In fact, I am extremely confident that 
Taken is not at all meant to be satirical. However, I have had 
someone argue that it is (and that it is successfully a satire) so it is 
probably as good a choice as there will be for an example of a film 
that has no clear satire at all.  
 
 The story of Taken can be thought of as a modern Western for the 
context of the United States’ post-9/11 trauma and xenophobia.298 
Liam Neeson plays a down-on-his-luck former CIA agent named Bryan 
Mills who is dealing with the dissolution of his nuclear family because 
he could not get over his military past. When his daughter is 
kidnapped by ethnically-ambiguous Albanians while on a trip to Paris, 
Mills flies to Paris to save her. Over the rest of the film Mills hunts, 
tortures, and kills each and every antagonist until he saves his 
daughter, reunites his family, and earns his daughter’s undying love 
by getting her singing lessons with a pop star. 
 
 The argument in favour of Taken being a satire rests on two central 
points. The first point is that the story is overly simplistic. There is 
very little depth to the story’s protagonist, Mills, and even less to 
 
298 Susan Faludi’s The Terror Dream (2007) provides a good overview about the repopularization of 
the mythological Western in the United States after 9/11. While published a year before Taken, 
what Faludi provides so well predicts Taken that the film might be rightly considered a successful 
prediction made by Faludi’s argument. 
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everyone else. The antagonists are formless and exist only to die. The 
plot is a mix of the time’s paranoid fantasties — a mix of France, 
crime, and Muslims — and is resolved by naked fantasy. The second 
point is that the violence is exaggerated. This is not just in the 
individual violence that Mills commits against the characters but also 
the outsized role of violence in the narrative. The simplistic narrative 
and exaggerated violence together indicate that the work is satirical.  
 
 The arguments that the narrative is simplistic and the violence is 
exaggerated each earn different responses. I will begin with the 
former because I believe that there is something particularly 
interesting about the latter. That the narrative is simplistic is not 
necessarily something to indicate that a work is satirical, especially if 
there is nothing to draw attention to the simplicity of the narrative. 
Many stories may be reduced to one or another archetype, and some 
stories will more closely adhere to archetypes than others just as a 
matter of course. Moreover, such that Taken may be understood as a 
primal revenge fantasy where the United States reasserts its 
masculinity, the simplicity of the narrative coheres quite well with 
the basicness of the story.  
 
The claim that the violence is exaggerated depends on a 
suppressed premise concerning what level of violence ought to be 
considered normal for such a film. As I asserted in the previous 
paragraph, Taken tells a story of revenge that comes from a place of 
felt emasculation. Through his violence, Mills not only vanquishes his 
enemies in a straightforward sense but he also reaffirms his 
masculinity not just as a father but specifically as a father who is a 
protector figure. The violence within Taken, while extreme, is not 
out of line with the rest of the story. There is nothing that suggests 
that the violence is a misrepresentation of some other, more basic 
type of violence, and the violence is certainly not played for laughs. 
What makes the claim that Taken’s violence is exaggerated 
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particularly interesting is that it highlights the role that background 
expectations play in identifying misrepresentations.299 Exaggeration, 
after all, is relative. It is accordingly incumbent upon the maker of a 
would-be work of satire to either correctly identify and understand 
what would be the usual baseline for the sort of work they are 
creating, or to create a work that manages to shape the audience’s 
expectations before violating them. 
 
Pain and Gain (2013): Pain and Gain faces two particular challenges 
as a satire. The first is that it faces the challenge of satirizing 
attitudes towards masculinity and consumerism by showing these 
attitudes actualized in all their excess. This is especially difficult 
because many people will look at that excess as something to be 
celebrated — Wall Street traders cheered when Wolf of Wall Street’s 
Jordan Belfort beat his pregnant wife so he could get at his 
emergency stash of cocaine.300 The second is that the film is directed 
by Michael Bay, who has a reputation for extremely shallow and 
indulgent active movies.301 Accordingly, it is a priority for Pain and 
Gain to make clear to the audience that it is a satire. The movie may 
nevertheless be considered satirical without the additional clarifying 
points, but it will be worse for it because the satire will be easily 
muddied. 
 
 The basic satire of Pain and Gain takes its aim at American macho 
culture, ties American hyper-masculinity to both sexism and 
consumerism, and presents consumerism as the essence of the United 
States. The plot derives from the true story of the Sun Gym Gang, a 
group of personal trainers who kidnapped, tortured, and stole the 
 
299 A close cousin of this sort of analysis has to do with the violation of moral standards. A work may 
be misidentified as satirical if a critic takes some particular immoral feature of a work to be so far 
beyond what is believable that it must be a joke or at least an exaggeration, when that immoral 
feature may trade upon a moral belief that is in fact quite common or widely held. 
300 Stephen Perlberg, “We Saw ‘Wolf of Wall Street’ on Wall Street with a Bunch of Wall Street 
Dudes and It Was Disturbing,” Business Insider, December 19, 2013, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/banker-pros-cheer-wolf-of-wall-street-2013-12?IR=T. 
301 This reputation is inaccurate but widely held. 
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property of one of their wealthy clients. Their plan was so stupid and 
poorly executed that the police would not believe the victim, 
allowing them to get away with their crime. In the film, each main 
character represents some or other articulation of the American 
dream: Daniel Lugo, the leader, wants a large house and to be a 
community leader; Adrian Doorbal wants treatment for his erectile 
dysfunction (pointedly a result of using steroids) and to have a settled 
domestic life; Paul Doyle is at first the prisoner who redeemed 
himself through religion, and then the shopping-addicted cokehead; 
Victor Kershaw, the victim, is simultaneously the immigrant success 
story and the cut-throat businessman. The satire is often articulated 
in one of two ways. The first is by contrasting a character’s words 
— usually Lugo’s — with an American flag, tying the character’s 
absurd pontifications about greatness and dessert to the idea of 
America itself. The second is by having Lugo greatly overestimate the 
gang’s abilities, such as when he states that his team should be able 
to infiltrate Kershaw’s mansion in half the time that special forces 
could, because of their “superior fitness.” There are also other, more 
subtle points of satire such as when detective Ed DuBois proclaims 
that all one needs in life are the simple things, but says this while 
sitting on the pier of his multi-million dollar waterfront property. This 
is enough to establish Pain and Gain as a satire, but it is still 
important that the satire is clear to the audience so as to reduce the 
potential for misunderstanding. 
 
 What makes Pain and Gain a satire could easily be taken as 
straightforward points of comedy and be celebrated. The triumph of 
the delusional halfwit is a genre in itself. Accordingly, Pain and Gain 
includes numerous moments that do not necessarily contribute to the 
satire directly — this is to say they do not help constitute the double 
object or contribute to the funny misrepresentation — but they help 
make clear that the film is satirical. These are achieved with tonal 
switches where the film, a comedy throughout, not only stops being 
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funny but does so in a way that confronts the audience directly. The 
two most prominent examples happen during the torture of Kershaw. 
The first happens when Lugo’s poor attempt at a Scarface imitation 
fails and Kershaw successfully identifies him. At this point Lugo 
throws Kershaw to the floor, unmasks him, and shouts into his face 
(and the camera), “I don’t just want everything you have, I want you 
not to have it.” The moment presents a sharp tonal break from the 
rest of the film thus far. It achieves this not just by Lugo threatening 
Kershaw, but also by Lugo threatening the audience through the 
camera. It not only changes the tone of the film, but it challenges the 
audience identifying with the gang and forces them to identify with 
Kershaw instead. A few scenes later, the second tonal switch happens 
when the gang retrieves Kershaw from the couch where they have 
been leaving him. He is bound, blindfolded, and has been lying in a 
pile of his own urine and faeces, which is shown sloughing off of him 
as he gets up. This scene is disgusting in a way that confronts the 
audience. Importantly, it is also shortly after the audience is forced 
to identify with Kershaw. This means that Kershaw’s humiliation is 
not presented to the audience as a triumph that affirms the 
superiority of the gang, but rather something horrible that has 
happened to Kershaw to which the audience should sympathize. 
 
 These two scenes, the confrontation by Lugo and the abjection of 
Kershaw, help make Pain and Gain more clear. Without them, it could 
be the case that it is unclear whether the film is a satire or a 
celebration, or just what the satirical point of the film was. The 
disjoint that the scenes present both challenge the audience to re-
evaluate what is happening in the film, and force them to identify in 
a particular way with respect to the protagonists (in this case, against 
them).  
 
Transformers 2: Revenge of the Fallen (2009): RotF is a particularly 
useful example because it was produced during a Hollywood writer’s 
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strike. This means that it is skeletal: the ideas are unrefined and easy 
to see. The Transformers series of movies follow a war between two 
factions of giant killer robots, one nominally good and the other 
nominally evil. The movie is layered with minor satirical elements 
— the one I would like to focus on is the two minor characters Skids 
and Mudflap. The best way to describe the characterization of these 
two comic relief characters is that they are heavily racialized as black 
through use of stereotypes (dialect and gold teeth primary among 
them) and act something like a modern-day minstrel show. They are a 
couple of bumbling idiots who fall over, screw up, and make a deal 
about how they do not know how to read. Another feature of the 
movie is that all of the robots learned how to act by absorbing 
broadcasts of American popular culture. Given these two pieces of 
information, the satire that Skids and Mudflap present is quite 
straightforward — they are a funny misrepresentation of an 
essentialization of popular culture that brings forward that popular 
culture is, in some fundamental way, deeply racist.  
 
 While the putative satire of RotF can be easily reconstructed, it is 
unclear within the work itself. The reference to how the robots learn 
to act is made in passing, and never dwelt upon. More importantly, 
Skids and Mudflap are only ever presented in the context of 
straightforward comedy. Their actions are never identified as 
racialized within the film, and there is no jarring tone switch of the 
sort that I mentioned in chapter 3, the sort that signals to the 
audience that what is being presented should not be taken at face 
value. Rather, as Skids and Mudflap appear in the film, they succeed 
in coming across as little more than extremely racist comic relief 
characters. A typical scene containing Skids and Mudflap has them 
flanking and following one of the lead characters while bickering. The 
bickering will escalate into physical violence that culminates in one 
knocking the other down, occasionally scattering the loser’s gold 
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rings. There is no critical edge to the humour, with the joke of the 
scene being entirely the robots’ (racialized) incompetence. 
 
 What makes RotF such a good example is that it presents an element 
of a work that is at least attempted satire, contains pieces that can 
be identified as supporting it being a satire, and yet on at least an 
intuitive level fails to be satirical. I argue that this is because RotF is 
a film, and its satirical elements fail to be put across filmicly. 
Accordingly, even if the film does contain everything needed for Skids 
and Mudflap to be satirical, it does not present them in such a way 
that the audience will standardly engage with these audience (they 
are not primarily in what is called the language of film) and so the 
satire is not clear. 
 
4.2 Summary and the Reintroduction of Trust 
 
The four examples I have provided elucidate the concept of clarity by showing how 
it is essential to understanding the articulation of satire within a work. The first 
two examples make apparent how clarity is important as to whether or not a work 
is satirical. The different components of the satire — the misrepresentation and 
the criticism — must be articulated within the work. It is the work itself that is 
satirical, not whether some particular audience member takes a work to be 
satirical, so in showing that a work is satire it is necessary to appeal to what 
appears in the work itself. Nevertheless, audience members do have beliefs and 
expectations that form a baseline of experience, so even if a work is satirical, its 
point may be more or less clear depending on how well its satire is articulated. 
This is what the latter two examples show. Clarity may matter in two different 
ways as a value of a work. The first way is that it can be more or less clear that a 
work is satirical at all. As with the example of Return of the Fallen, a weak 
articulation of the satire may leave it unclear just to what degree a work actually 
is satirical. This affects the way a work is received and how it ought to be 
received, and therefore affects its value as a work of art. For two works of art, the 
one that is clearly satirical will be, all else being equal, the superior work. The 
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second way is that the satirical point may be more or less clear. Satires have 
critical points as part of what makes them satirical. If that point is articulated 
more clearly, the work will be better. If that point is articulated less clearly, the 
work will be worse. 
 
 Clarity makes way for the reintroduction of the idea of trust as articulated 
in the first chapter. As I argued, to the extent that interpretation involves the 
sussing out of an artwork’s making intentions (or relevant analogue) the 
interpreter will also have to consider what those intentions could be, and in the 
process of considering what those intentions could be they must consider the 
character of the work’s maker or makers (or relevant analogue). I now supplement 
that by arguing that the degree to which a work may be more or less clear 
depends, in part, on the degree to which the work’s authors are trusted. The more 
the author is trusted, the easier it is for her intentions to be clear within the work. 
If she is less trusted it is not impossible for her work to be clear, but it is more 
difficult. This is evident in the latter two examples I provided, both of which are 
directed by Michael Bay.302  Rightly or wrongly303, Bay has a reputation as a film 
maker who deals in superficial, contentless filmic indulgence for 13-year-old boys. 
This means a mix of violence, explosions, and sexualized images of women with no 
meaning beyond their surface expression. Both Pain and Gain and Revenge of the 
Fallen involve attempted subversions of violent and sexualized imagery. From an 
interpretive approach that takes a work’s real author into account, Bay is not 
trusted. This means that a viewer interpreting the spectacular or violent imagery 
of the films has reason to doubt a subversive purpose to Bay’s filmmaking. A 
similar story can be told with respect to the racialized robots Skids and Mudflap 
from Revenge of the Fallen. Since Bay has in the past used racist stereotypes of 
black people for no reason other than the comedy of the stereotype304, when faced 
with the stereotypes of Skids and Mudflap it is difficult to trust that Bay has anti-
racist intentions. And even if it can be sussed out that Bay has anti-racist 
 
302 Film-making is a collaborative venture but Bay has a reputation as an auteur, and it just makes 
things simpler to, in this case, talk about Pain and Gain and Revenge of the Fallen as if he was the 
sole author. 
303 Wrongly 
304 The introduction to Armageddon (1998) is likely the most straightforward example of this. 
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intentions, and the robots are an anti-racist statement, there is still the question 
of just to what degree Bay is only articulating an anti-racist statement. It may be 
suspected, for instance, that even if there is some anti-racist purpose to the 
robots that the stereotype they embody is still being held up as an object of 
mockery. In lay terms, even if it can be identified that Bay intends to make an 
anti-racist statement, there may still be doubt over his ability to “mean it that 
way.” 
 
 For the sake of explicitness I would like to re-underline that interpretation 
is normative. This means that what is in question is not what one would 
understand of Pain and Gain but what one ought to understand of Pain and Gain. 
When a work’s meaning is more or less clear, that refers to a sort of unclarity 
within the work itself. Similarly, to say that a work’s author is untrustworthy, or 
may not be trusted with respect to some particular topic, this is a comment about 
the character of the author (real or hypothetical). In the first chapter, I argued 
that trust is rarely absolute — it is rare that a person is either trusted completely, 
or not at all. I took this to mean that there is always a level of unclarity with 
respect to meaning in communication. That argument applies no less to works of 
satire. The remove of the authors’ mental states and the distance of the industrial 
process mean that there will always be some degree of unclarity with respect to 
satire. This may apply to whether or not a work is satirical, to what degree a work 
is satirical, and what the point of a satirical work may be.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have offered and defended the following account of satire: a work 
is satirical, in part or in whole, insofar as it criticizes a target by way of a funny 
misrepresentation. I focused on what may be called the coherence of satire 
— what satire is, whether a work is satirical, and what the satirical point may be. 
This involved bringing together the necessary elements of a satire, and arguing 
that they must exist in such a way that they may be accessed and understood by 
the audience. In the next two chapters I will show some of the analysis that this 
account of satire makes possible. In chapter 5 I will focus on what is probably the 
 143
natural extension of the last section of this chapter, which is extending the 
analysis of clarity and trust into dealing with humour. Given the social account of 
humour I presented in chapter 3, clarity and trust give a new way of engaging the 
ethics of humour. Since satire both readily uses humour and depends upon the 
misrepresentation being funny, a work failing to be funny may damage or 
completely undermine the satire.  
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Chapter Five: Ethical Failings of Satire and Humour 
 
In the last chapter I brought together my prior work to present a theory of satire 
and concluded by beginning to look at satiric failure. In this chapter I will continue 
to look into the ways that satire can fail. Specifically, I will look at cases where 
satire may fail because the humour is unethical. I choose to focus on these cases 
because I believe they play an outsized role in the public discourse about satire in 
two different but related ways. The first is in the discussion about putative works 
of satire. Mainstream examples would be shows like South Park and, before them, 
the Simpsons which attracted criticism for immoral humour. The second is as a 
subspecies of the “just joking” defence, where someone defends something that 
they have said or otherwise presented on the grounds that they were just being 
satirical. One such example is the case of a Florida school teacher insisting that 
her Neo-Nazi podcast was just a work of satire.305 (It is worth noting that these 
second sorts of cases often fail in multiple ways, but for this chapter we will 
charitably accept that they are genuine attempts at satire and examine how they 
fail with respect to the ethics of their humour.) 
 
 The theory of satire that I have presented is that a work is satirical, in part 
or in whole, insofar as it makes a criticism by way of a funny misrepresentation. If 
the misrepresentation fails to be funny, then the satire fails in turn. If it is possible 
for humour to fail because it is unethical, then it is possible for satire to fail 
because its necessary humour is unethical.306 That humour may fail for ethical 
reasons is a contested position, and so I must argue for it. Accordingly, this 
chapter will have two sections: the first where I argue that humour can fail for 
ethical reasons, and the second where I give a discussion of cases where satire fails 
due to ethical humour failings. Both sections will build to a discussion of trust, and 
the role of trust in ethical failings of humour. This is because I believe that the 
issue of trust, and the issues that emerge out of the discussion of trust and 
humour, are the most important to how ethically difficult humour and satire are 
 
305 Matt Stevens, “Florida Teacher Says Her Racist Podcast Was ‘Satire’,” New York Times, March 7, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/florida-teacher-racism.html. 
306 As discussed within chapters 3 and 4, not all humour within a satire is essential to that work 
being satirical. 
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both used and engaged. A result of this is that this chapter does not so much 
provide a definite guide for decoding which humour is ethically good or bad, but 
rather a prediction for when and where people will disagree over the acceptability 
of some satire or humour, and what underlies that disagreement. 
 
 The full structure of the chapter is as follows: the first section will be 
subdivided into three subsections. The first subsection will provide as background 
existing approaches to the ethical evaluation of humour. This includes a look at 
two sorts of theories — feeling-centred theories, that concern how a person reacts 
to a piece of potential humour, and “attitude endorsement” theories that concern 
whether finding a joke funny entails some kind of endorsement of the humour’s 
content. Since I provide a non-standard account of humour (a social account, in 
contrast to the standard internalist accounts), I will position my account as 
drawing elements from both feeling-centred and attitude endorsement theories. 
The second subsection will adopt the work of Ted Cohen to propose a way of 
evaluating humour acts like speech acts. This will establish a standard by which 
humour acts can fail. The third subsection will present the argument that humour 
acts can fail on ethical grounds. This will draw to a focus on ethically ambiguous 
humour, and the importance of clarity. The second section of the chapter will 
focus on satiric failures and it will comprise four subsections. The first subsection 
will give an overview of how satire may suffer either partial or full failures based 
on its essential humour being unethical. The next two subsections will focus on full 
and partial failures respectively. Subsection two will focus on cases where the 
humour completely fails, thus rendering the misrepresentation “simply cruel.” 
Subsection three will focus on cases where the humour is merely ethically 
ambiguous, leading to partial failures. The fourth subsection will focus on satire in 
the context of mass culture, and argue that the political and economic dynamics of 
mass culture work as a sort of millstone around satire’s neck, burdening mass-
produced or mass-marketed satire with a permanent unclarity. 
 
1.1 Ethics of Humour 
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The purpose of this section is to give an account of how humour may be harmed or 
helped by its ethical content. I will use as a base the social account of humour that 
I presented in chapter 3. This will be built into a small account of humour acts 
and, recurring the argument on trust and interpretation from chapter 1, how such 
acts can fail. Central to my account is how confident the audience may be that the 
possible humourist is in fact joking and, if they are, how and in what way. The 
trusting of intentions is especially important for making ethical evaluations of 
humour, since a lot of ethically-dubious humour is acceptable in some 
circumstances but not in others. The usual paradigm of ethically-dubious humour is 
group-based humour, which is to say humour that trades on group identities, such 
as racism, gender, and disability. I will argue that the reason group-based humour 
is (limitedly) accepted from members of the ingroup but seen as unethical from 
members of the outgroup is because of the ability of the audience to trust that the 
humourist has the right sets of intentions with respect to the members of the 
ingroup, and what defines their ingroup. This means that ethically-dubious humour 
substantially depends on the ability of the humourist to present themselves as 
trustworthy, which in turn means that group-based humour is not out of bounds for 
members of the outgroup, but it is more difficult. 
 
I begin with a brief overview of existing theories, although I will not make 
much use of them. This is because existing theories of the ethical evaluation of 
humour, be they feeling-centred or attitude-endorsement theories, trade on 
internalist conceptions of humour. As when I presented the internalist theories in 
chapter 3, my goal is not to either affirm or refute these theories. I just mean to 
present them to show what the discourse is on the ethical evaluation of humour, 
and to contextualize what I propose later. 
 
1.2 Existing Theories 
 
Most theories about the ethical evaluation of humour may be categorized as either 
attitude endorsement theories or feeling-centred theories. I begin by addressing 
attitude endorsement theories since, in the contemporary literature, they come 
first chronologically. They take as their starting point an argument put forwards by 
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Ronald de Sousa in The Rationality of Emotion (1987). The central idea of de 
Sousa’s theory is that there exist jokes that depend upon the audience endorsing 
some particular attitude.307 Some attitudes should not be endorsed because they 
are unethical and false.308 Therefore jokes may be subject to ethical evaluation in 
certain circumstances. It is worth noting that de Sousa’s conclusions are not meant 
to be particular to humour, rather he is using humour as a case study to sketch a 
way that emotions play a role in an ethically good life.309  
 
 De Sousa’s theory holds the position of a bugaboo in the discourse — it is 
frequently invoked, but only as a foil. The most frequent target of de Sousa’s 
theory is the contention that endorsing an attitude may be required for getting a 
piece of humour. For example, Aaron Smuts isolates the endorsement condition by 
characterizing de Sousa’s argument as follows310: 
1. Understanding a joke requires understanding the propositions upon which 
the joke relies 
2. Understanding or “getting”311 the joke is insufficient for finding it funny. 
3. If one has a negative attitude towards certain key propositions, then a joke 
will fail. 
4. It is impossible to hypothetically endorse these propositions in such a way 
that will revivify the joke. 
5. This means that there exist jokes where a positive attitude towards certain 
key propositions is necessary to find the jokes funny. 
6. From this, the attitude endorsement theory follows. 
Smuts accepts premises 1-4 so that he can focus on point 5.312 Against de Sousa’s 
contention, Smuts argues that premise 5 is simply unsupported.313 He writes that 
premise 5 is in effect an empirical claim, and that de Sousa should present 
 
307 Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 290. 
308 de Sousa, 295. 
309 de Sousa, 275. 
310 Aaron Smuts, “The Ethics of Humor: Can Your Sense of Humor Be Wrong?” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 13, no.3 (2010): 336. 
311 “Getting the joke” is a colloquial term, and so the different ways in which it is used by different 
theorists should not be understood as meaning the same thing.  
312 Smuts, 337. 
313 Ibid. 
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empirical evidence in support of it.314 Absent that empirical evidence, Smuts puts 
forward his intuition, that mere familiarity with attitudes is sufficient.315 
 
 Noel Carroll similarly attacks premise 5, arguing that there is no good 
reason to believe that attitudes underlying jokes must be endorsed.316 He puts 
forward that it is possible to imagine believing the attitudes that underlie a joke, 
as opposed to necessarily endorsing them.317 He also pushes farther than Smuts by 
arguing that exactly what a necessary belief might be is too unclear.318 He takes 
the following joke as an example: “M leaves a hockey dressing room and claims she 
was gangraped. She wishes.”319 Carroll suggests “rape is just a variant of sexual 
intercourse” as the sort of morally bad belief that this joke may rely on.320 Against 
that, Carroll writes, that he found the joke perfectly funny but instead believed 
that M, as a stand in for a famous actress, was simply lying about being raped to 
hide her promiscuity.321 The force of this objection is that while endorsing some 
particular attitude may be sufficient for a joke succeeding, that does not mean it 
is necessary. 
 
 David Benatar similarly attacks the necessity of some particular attitude, 
and adds a challenge to the workability of evaluations made under an attitude 
endorsement framework.322 He argues that introspection is not reliable for 
identifying what attitudes are actually relevant, which makes theorizing over 
possible necessary attitudes difficult at best, and hopelessly obscure most of the 
time.323 This supports a distinction between the “contextual” and “non-
contextual,” evaluation of a joke.324 Jokes, or humour, are considered 
 
314 Smuts, 337. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Noel Carroll, Humour: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98. 
317 Carroll (Humour), 99-100. 
318 Ibid, 94-95. 
319 Ibid, 93. 
320 Ibid. 
321 While I do not mean to evaluate the arguments here, this example really does Carroll no 
favours.  
322 David Benatar, “Taking Humour (Ethics) Seriously But Not Too Seriously,” Journal of Practical 
Ethics 2, no.1 (2014): 29. 
323 Benatar, 29. 
324Ibid, 27.  
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contextualized insofar as they are instantiated in a particular context.325 There are 
concrete tellers, a concrete audience, and the joke or humour is actually 
happening. Non-contextual evaluation involves evaluating the joke on its own, 
without appeal to teller, audience, or other features of context.326 In context, it is 
possible that a joke may “arise from” some particular attitude.327 This is to say 
that the teller of the joke may be motivated by some endorsed attitude, and that 
attitude may be unethical. If that attitude is expressed by the joke, then the 
audience may be offended.328 If the audience’s offence is merited — if they belong 
to a group in a context where they are entitled to be offended — then the joke is 
unethical.329 
 
 The other major group of theories are what I will call feeling-centred 
theories. These theories take humour to have some associated feeling-centred 
response (usually some form of amusement) that is definitional to humour, and 
that this response may or may not be blocked by a joke’s ethical content. I situate 
Berys Gaut’s ethicism at the centre of such theories although, as with de Sousa, he 
is short of allies. Ethicism rests on top of a deeper theory, called the merited 
response theory. MRT holds that emotional responses may be evaluated 
normatively, which is to say that there are circumstances where they are merited 
(features of circumstance in some way legitimate the response), or unmerited 
(features of circumstance either do not legitimate or illegitimate the response).330 
He supports MRT using lay talk about comedy and horror: comedies are considered 
to fail to be funny and horrors to fail to be scary, but the content of those works is 
readily understood as attempting to be funny or scary.331 Ethicism adds that it is 
possible for a joke’s unethical content to obstruct a joke’s humour.332 This does 
not mean that the joke is wholly unfunny, just that it is less funny insofar as it is 
 
325 Benatar, 27. 
326 Noel Carroll presents a similar classification of joke types and tokens, although he does not 
invoke it in this debate. Carroll, 90-92. 
327 Benatar, 30. 
328 Ibid, 38. 
329 Ibid, 41. 
330 Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 231. 
331 Gaut (2007), 231. 
332 Berys Gaut, “Just Joking: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Humor,” Philosophy and Literature 22, 
no.1 (1998): 65-6. 
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unethical.333 As with attitude endorsement cases, the content of the joke that may 
be ethical or unethical is the attitude which the joke evinces.334 According to 
Gaut, some of these attitudes are morally wrong, and so may count as a reason to 
find the joke not funny.335 Since these attitudes are not the whole of the joke, 
they do not exhaustively determine the funniness of the joke.336 Furthermore, 
certain unethical attitudes may be more or less relevant socially relevant.337 To 
support this point, he gives the example of dead baby jokes.338 These jokes trade 
on attitudes that are putatively immoral — that dead babies are in some way 
enjoyable.339 However, he notes, there is no widespread social problem of 
infanticide, so there is no reason to take serious umbrage at such jokes.340 
Accordingly, the ethical cost is low, and so the immorality does little to harm the 
funniness of the joke.341 Racist humour that occurs in a racist society, on the other 
hand, comes with a high ethical cost and so the immorality greatly restricts the 
joke’s humour.342 Note that the joke may still be on balance funny, but insofar as 
it is unethical it is worse. 
 
 Ethicism has a number of foils. On the side of autonomism, which holds that 
humour cannot be harmed by immorality, there is Ted Cohen. Cohen accepts that 
there may be social reasons to not laugh, but that does not bear on the humour 
itself.343 Holding a position that is in some ways similar and in other ways radically 
different is Daniel Jacobson, who holds that while a joke may be helped or harmed 
by its moral content, there is no systematic connection between the two.344 This 
means that there are occasions where a joke may fail for ethical reasons and there 
are occasions where a joke’s ethical content may be irrelevant, but there is no 
 
333Gaut (1998), 65-6.  
334 Ibid, 54. 
335 Ibid, 64. 
336 Ibid, 55. 
337 Ibid, 56. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ted Cohen, Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997), 82. 
344 Daniel Jacobson, “Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation,” in Contemporary Debates in 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 351-2. 
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way to give a systematic account of what ethical features of a joke are going to 
matter in which circumstances. Jacobson will often get classified as a 
contextualist or immoralist, with the implication of the latter being that there are 
situations where a joke may be more funny on account of its immoral content.345  
 
 The two most prominent opponents to Gaut, as with de Sousa, are Carroll 
and Smuts. Carroll advances what he calls “moderate moralism.”346 While Carroll 
does tacitly leave room for humour that works because it is immoral, his main 
disagreement with Gaut is over the merited response theory. Carroll argues against 
the merited response theory, arguing in its place that views humour as trading on 
imagining attitudes.347 If an attitude is sufficiently immoral, this may trigger a 
subject’s imaginative resistance and cause the joke to fail.348 While Carroll does 
not uses these terms directly, a critical point seems to be that instead of Gaut’s 
normative approach to what is funny he substitutes a more descriptive one. 
Humour fails when imaginative resistance kicks in, rather than a joke merely being 
less funny because imaginative resistance ought to kick in. Smuts’ approach is 
similar to Carroll’s, though he focuses more explicitly on normativity. The key 
failing of Gaut’s normative approach is that it is what he calls “unilateral 
normativity,” meaning that Gaut provides a theory of when jokes fail to be funny, 
but never when ethical content makes an otherwise-unfunny joke funny.349 Smuts 
adds to this that the merited response theory holds that in cases of ethically-failed 
jokes, Gaut’s theory has to give an account of what other emotions subjects should 
feel and when.350 
 
 Attitude endorsement theories and feeling-centred theories are not the only 
two theories for ethically evaluating humour, but they are the central two.351 What 
 
345 For more in depth on the point of immoralism specifically, see Nannicelli (2014) and Dean 
(2018). Immoralism specifically has not received the same focus as moralistic ethical evaluation for 
reasons that are probably interesting but also not relevant to my project. 
346 Noel Carroll, “Ethics and Comic Amusement,” British Journal of Aesthetics 42, no.2 (2014): 251. 
347 Carroll (Ethics), 249. 
348 Ibid, 251. 
349 Carroll makes a similar point but does so more as an aside. Smuts makes it central to his 
criticism. Smuts, 341. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Smuts begins to sketch a sort of character responsibility view in “The Ethics of Humour,” but 
does not give a thorough account so much as show that there is dialectic space for it to exist. Ibid, 
344. 
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I would like to highlight of the two of them is that they focus on internal 
phenomena, much like the theories of humour which underlie them. Both theories 
also fundamentally only interrogate individuals. The questions are about what an 
individual believes, and what state of mind that individual must have to find a joke 
funny. They’re about how an individual feels in response to a joke. While these 
theories have useful resources, they are ultimately not usable for my social 
account, which regards humour as a social phenomenon that must be evaluated as 
such. I will now turn to building an account of how the ethical evaluation of 
humour would work under the social account. 
 
1.3 The Act of Humour 
 
The purpose of this section is to present a way of talking about humour under the 
social account of humour. It will provide the framework for discussing the ethical 
evaluation of humour in the section after. The goal is to establish a way to sensibly 
write about humour acts failing, which is necessary to discuss how humour acts 
may fail for ethical reasons.  
 
1.3.1 Review: Trust, Interpretation, and Constraints on Speech Acts 
 
At this point I would like to re-establish some ideas from earlier in the dissertation 
which will be again relevant in this section. In the first chapter I argued that 
listeners or other audience members to a speech act can be understood as trusting 
(or distrusting) a speaker (or other utterer) with respect to the intentions behind 
the speaker’s speech act. I based this in an approach that used speech acts as a 
model for interaction between utterer and audience, and I used a reflexive 
intentions model for understanding how utterer and audience engage. A speech act 
may be standard speech, but it may also be used as a model for works of art and 
artistic meaning. Understood this way, works of art are utterance-like in that they 
involve an artist, artists, or other authorial character articulating some idea 
through an artistic medium, which the audience in turn understands through 
engaging with the artistic medium. This is not exhaustive of how works are created 
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or engaged but, since the concern of my thesis is satire, it is sufficient.352 As I 
surveyed in chapter 1, there are multiple approaches to understanding a work’s 
meaning based on the importance that is given to a work’s actual authors and 
those authors’ actual intentions. All of these approaches, however, may be 
understood as working through an approach of reflexive intentions.353 I choose to 
use the Gricean approach to reflexive intentions.354 This means that the meaning 
of a work of art is understood by the audience understanding the work’s author’s 
intentions, the audience understanding that the work’s author meant for these 
intentions to be understood, and the audience understanding the work’s author’s 
intentions by way of understanding that the work’s author meant for these 
intentions to be understood. Since the audience is engaging the author’s 
intentions, it is important what the audience considers it possible for the author’s 
intentions to be. This gives way to what I articulated as trust. For some facet of an 
artwork to convey meaning, the audience must trust the artist to be sufficiently 
capable of constructing that facet. To believe that a work has some particular 
meaning, the audience must trust the character of the author in that they believe 
that the author is the sort of person who could or would mean what they, the 
audience, are considering that the work might mean. Trust is not necessarily 
absolutely present or absolutely absent. The audience may trust the author a fair 
bit if they consider the author to be talented, or only a little bit if they consider 
the author to be incompetent. They may trust an author to have a subtle point if 
they believe the author to be intelligent, or mistrust an author if they believe he’s 
just a boor. 
 
 It is important to underline that this account of interpretation is normative, 
not descriptive. This means that it describes how a hypothetical or idealized 
audience ought to react, and it does not predict how a real audience will. Under 
this account, if the audience trusts the author that is because the author is 
 
352 This sort of meaning-centred account would not capture, for instance, the articulation or 
enjoyment of colour in painting or rhythm in music. 
353 For simplicity I will present my analyses using the language of there being an actual author, but 
as I present in chapter 1 this approach does not necessitate there being an actual author. 
354 As I note in chapter 1, this is not the only approach. There is also, for example, the relevance 
theory of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. I choose to use the Gricean approach just because it is 
formulaic, and it is common among philosophers of art. I do not believe that any of the claims I 
advance depend on the preference of the Gricean approach to reflexive intentions over others.  
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genuinely trustworthy, rather than a real audience being gullible or overly-
suspicious.355  
 
 This model applies easily to cases of humour. Humour acts are often 
straightforwardly speech acts, with short narrative jokes being a paradigmatic 
example. Humour acts may also be more closely analogous to works of art, such as 
short comic vignettes in a newspaper. In this chapter I will use “humour act” to 
refer to an act that is meant to be funny, whether it succeeds or not. Humour acts 
do not encompass all humour — I discuss found humour in chapter 3 — but they are 
a sufficient focus for this chapter.  
 
1.3.2 Ted Cohen and “Getting It” 
 
This subsection concerns the epistemological constraints on a humour act 
succeeding. In Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters, Ted Cohen 
describes jokes as being more or less “hermetic.”356 The degree to which a joke is 
hermetic is determined by how much background knowledge is necessary to “get” 
a joke, where getting a joke involves not just a level of understanding of the 
content of the joke, but also engaging with it in such a way as to find it funny.357 
This second characteristic — engagement — is why explaining a joke to someone is 
not necessarily sufficient for him to get it. While Cohen specifically writes about 
jokes, it is not a stretch to apply this model to humour acts in general.358 
 
 Every joke is more or less hermetic, since even the most accessible jokes 
require some baseline level of competence to get.359 These standards could be as 
basic as linguistic understanding or simple pattern recognition, but they are still 
standards and they are still present. Even though all jokes are to some degree 
hermetic, it is still sensible to consider “hermetic jokes” as a separate class. The 
 
355 This is not circular. As I write in chapter 1, the audience in question is a normative audience, 
and not a real one. Accordingly, to say that the audience only trusts the author if the author is 
trustworthy is only to say that what is in question are the characteristics of the author and not the 
gullibilities of the audience. 
356 Cohen, 12. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Cohen acknowledges as much. Ibid, 1. 
359 Ibid, 12. 
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standards of knowledge or understanding to get these jokes are particularly high, 
and the communities that get these jokes may be particularly restrictive.360 Two 
common sorts of hermetic jokes are in-group professional and ethnic jokes. These 
are jokes that are told amongst in-group members, and depend upon knowledge of 
or familiarity with a common set of defining experiences. Cohen notes that 
hermetic jokes are particularly good at creating what he calls a “community of 
appreciation,” an in-group held together with a particular level of emotional 
intimacy.361 This maps on well to the understanding of affiliative humour that I 
offered in chapter 3. Similarly, I argue that Cohen’s account gives a good base for 
understanding disaffiliative humour through hermetic jokes. If a joke is uttered in 
a particular social setting where most participants get the joke, but others do not, 
then the humour can work disaffiliatively by way of excluding the people who do 
not get the joke from the community of appreciation. I will give a further account 
of this sort of disaffiliation in the next subsection on how humour may fail for 
ethical reasons. 
 
 If humour may depend a set of common knowledge or experiences being 
understood (or otherwise “got”), then there will also be humour acts which 
depend on the joke-teller or humourist being able to evince that they also 
understand or are familiar with some in-group knowledge or some in-group 
experiences. Accordingly, there will be humour acts where it is essential for the 
humourist to put some aspect of themselves at the forefront if the humour act is 
to succeed. This happens often with major stand-up comedy specials. For example, 
in Laugh at my Pain, Kevin Hart offers a lot of jokes that depend on him having 
money troubles, despite his at present being a multi-millionaire. To support the 
character that Hart wants to put forward during the show, the show begins with 
Hart leading a tour around impoverished North Philadelphia where he grew up. 
This makes clear to the audience that when he is talking about being short of 
money, he is talking about being short of money in a way which they understand 
and to which they can relate. This helps build Cohen’s community of appreciation. 
 
360 The best analogy I can think of for classing some jokes as hermetic jokes while holding that all 
jokes more or less hermetic is accepting that all people hold some racist beliefs but only a limited 
number of people qualify specifically as racists. 
361 Cohen, 28. 
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1.3.3 Humour Acts Failing 
 
The Cohenist scheme suggests two ways that humour acts can fail on the social 
account of humour. It may fail to be comprehensible, and it may fail to engender 
participation. Each of these failures are not necessarily absolute — humour may be 
better or worse on these accounts without being either wholly successful or wholly 
failed. Humour may fail on account of being incomprehensible for two reasons, 
and both are straightforward. The first is that some attempt at humour may not 
clearly be an attempt at humour. If the person attempting the putative humour 
act did intend for the act to be a humour act, then it may be thought of as a sort 
of failed utterance since the would-be humourist failed to articulate an utterance 
that embodies their intentions. Since humans will usually have some sort of 
familiarity with humour — Michael Billig points out that play, laughter, and teasing 
are found in infant-raising practices — total failures are extremely rare.362 More 
common is a partial failure because it is unclear just how much the act in question 
is supposed to be humorous. Consider the following example of how a new 
neighbor, Howard, introduced himself to my family several years back. We had 
met his wife so we knew who he was and that he was coming but we had not met 
him personally. At some point he knocked on our door and, upon being answered, 
said, “I’m here to talk to you about Jesus. Have you planned for after you die?” 
This joke was unevenly received because we were just meeting Howard and, at 
that moment of engaging the utterance, were unsure of just to what degree he 
was joking. The situation suggests that it is at least in some part a humorous 
utterance, but we did not know him well enough to know just how much of a joke 
it was. For example: is he religious? Is this a topic he cares about deeply or not at 
all? It was even not instantly obvious that we were talking to Howard, as opposed 
to a door-to-door evangelist. Altogether, the humour act was not entirely clear. 
 
 The second way that a piece of humour may fail on terms of 
comprehensibility is that it is too obscure. There exists humour that has hermetic 
 
362 Michael Billig, Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd., 2005), 205. 
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conditions: conditions of knowledge or expertise necessary to render the humour 
comprehensible. If some hermetic conditions are not met, then the humour will be 
less funny. If the hermetic conditions are unmeetable, then the joke will fail 
completely. Again, it is rare for a joke to fail completely; more often they will be 
partially hurt by obscurity, and less funny for it. A total failure might be an 
attempt at a linguistic pun for a language that none of the audience speak, like a 
play on the linguistic similarity between grandmother (“bobe”) and the legendary 
medieval knight Bevis (“Bovo”) to an audience that is unfamiliar with Yiddish. A 
common sort of hermetic joke that suffers for its hermeticity is one based on 
mutual past experience. This could either be in the form of a story of some 
event — the nonplussed audience given the explanation of “you just had to be 
there at the time” — or a reference to that event. Such references are particularly 
common in serialized or other brand-conscious television that seek to reward long-
time viewers with references to older shows.  
 
Since failures are partial, highly hermetic jokes may still be funny by other 
means. For example, hermetic jokes, if presented in the right context, may be 
very strong at creating participation. This manages the intuition that some may 
have about highly hermetic humour being among the best. 
 
Hermeticity is also central to humour that fails because it does not succeed 
in — or possibly actively repels — engendering the participation of the audience. 
Elements of this are present in some of the examples I’ve presented so far: 
Howard’s attempt at a joke suffered because we were not sufficiently aligned with 
him, and we could not fully participate because we were unsure of his character. 
Referential humour from television shows often plays on the viewer’s identity as a 
fan, and the humour may work better or worse depending on how strongly a show’s 
viewers identify specifically as fans. These examples show how comprehensibility 
and participation are often related, but participation may be better isolated, and 
there are situations where the failure of some piece of humour is best understood 
by its failing to engender participation. 
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Examining participation foregrounds humour’s social element. Of the 
examples in chapter 3, humour practices like the gab (the sharing of stories in a 
social environment) and the Rex Facetus (the practice holding that the King was 
privileged in initiating humour) had social criteria which may be understood from 
the perspective of participation. In each case, the humour practices attempt to 
put members in a particular social position, and have them act in a way according 
to that position. Common ways of understanding humour like “laughing with” and 
“laughing at” also foreground audience members participating in a particular 
manner. “With” and “at” suggest that they are participating with either the 
humourist or other audience members in their laughter. Since there is humour that 
relies on participation, there exists humour which may be worse due to lack of 
participation. As with comprehensibility, partial failures are more common than 
total failures, but total failures do exist and, in some cases, may be somewhat 
common. Consider a person trying to ingratiate themselves into a group by telling 
a joke at the expense of someone outside of the group. If the joke-teller is not a 
member of the group, there are many circumstances in which it will be difficult 
for the group to laugh along with the joke-teller. This is because they are not fully 
aligned with the joke-teller, and perhaps have no reason to align themselves 
against the joke’s target. Many people also have some time in their life where they 
tried to relate a humorous story to an audience who did not react. This is the sort 
of situation where the story-teller might append, after the non-reaction, some 
version of “I guess you had to be there at the time.” What is happening, on my 
analysis, is that the ability to participate is mediated by the connection to the 
original event in question. We can adjust the example to sidestep 
comprehensibility concerns by considering cases where the story is well-known 
— the story-teller has told this story many times — but never garners much of a 
reaction except from those who were “there at the time.” 
 
Total failures of participation happen when humour is not just poor at 
attracting participation but actively repels it. Examples might include an attempt 
at a humorous story that includes far too many or too specific personal details, or 
someone’s attempt to ingratiate themselves to an audience with a self-
aggrandizing joke at the expense of the audience. A particularly interesting 
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example of encouraging (and failing to encourage) participation is found in 
Mo’Nique’s 2007 stand up set I Coulda Been Your Cellmate. The set is delivered to 
the people imprisoned in Ohio Reformatory for Women. Some of the humour 
succeeds strongly, especially when Mo’Nique displays familiarity with the dynamics 
of prison life — for one bit she looks for the “baddest bitch here” and playfully 
dismisses one woman for not being a maximum security concern — or talks about 
common experiences like masturbation and trying to find sexual pleasure without a 
partner. Some of the humour also fails completely. When Mo’Nique tries to offer 
life advance — on how to act morally and how to succeed — the audience grows 
quiet and there is even a slight feeling of hostility. The spots highlight Mo’Nique’s 
position as highly successful comedian and actress, and so set her against the 
audience. The humour alienates the audience. That they, prisoners and performer, 
share some background may even make the alienation more acute as the humour, 
far from encouraging the audience, underlines to them that their lot in life is 
determined as much by luck as just desserts. The audience cannot participate, and 
so the humour fails. 
 
1.4 Humour Acts Can Fail on Ethical Grounds 
 
Having set up how humour acts can fail, I will now turn my attention to how 
humour acts can fail on ethical grounds. Part of this requires supplementing the 
story of how humour fails with one about how humour can be immoral. This will 
involve focusing on the humour act as a way of exercising power within a social 
context. Since the humour can be used to exercise power, this renders humour 
acts subject to ethical evaluation. In humour there are ways that humour acts can 
be unethical such that the audience ought not participate363, then humour can fail 
on ethical grounds. As with all humour, failures are rarely total and what is at 
question is not whether some humour is funny or not but whether it is more or less 
funny. Importantly, there are two ways that humour may be more or less funny on 
ethical grounds. Not only is there the question of the severity of the ethical 
infraction (and its role in the humour) but there is also the question of the clarity 
 
363 Participation usually but not necessarily takes the form of laughter. I elaborate on this in 
chapter 3.  
 160 
of the ethical infraction. This is to say that it may be ambiguous whether or not 
the humour is unethical. On this point I will brush by de Sousa’s attitude 
endorsement theory that I presented earlier. However, rather than focusing on 
what attitude the humourist may have in initiating the humour act I will instead 
foreground the act and what attitudes or other intentions are apparent to the act’s 
audience. I will conclude by returning to a point that I made in my chapter 4 
account of satire, which is that the virtue of this account is not so much that it will 
allow one to confidently declare jokes more or less funny but rather that it will 
accurately predict where and how disagreements over a joke’s funniness will take 
place. 
 
1.4.1 Not Participating in Unethical Humour  
 
In section 1.2.3 I argued that humour can suffer by either failing to merit or even 
outright repelling audience participation. The humourist cannot bring the audience 
onside, and so the audience does not laugh. In some such cases, the reason the 
audience cannot get onside is an ethical one. This is to say that there exist 
attempts at humour where the audience ought not participate for ethical reasons. 
There are two sets of ethical reasons why an audience ought not to participate in a 
humour instance, which I will refer to as ingroup- and outgroup-related reasons. 
Outgroup-related reasons are more common with disaffiliative humour (humour 
that deals in “laughing at”), while ingroup-related reasons are more common with 
affiliative humour (humour that deals in “laughing with”). 
 
 In chapter 3 I outlined that one of the things that humour does as a social 
act is negotiate group dynamics. It helps determine who is in the group, and who is 
out. By targeting someone with disaffiliative humour, you exclude them from the 
group by having the in-group “laugh at” them. “Laughing with” can similarly be a 
way to include someone in a group.364 Since humour can be used to manage group 
 
364 Initiating laughter is a technique used by anthropologists to present themselves as friendly. It is 
used when the anthropologist does not share a language with the people she is joining for study. 
Henk Driessen, “Humour, Laughter and the Field: Reflections from Anthropology,” in A Cultural 
History of Humour, eds. Jan Bremmer and Herman Rodenburg, 222-241 (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1997). 
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membership, humour acts may therefore be exercises of power. Exercises of power 
by one person — or group of people — over another are morally evaluable. This 
means that there are cases where it is wrong to participate in a humour act (that 
is: laugh) because it is immoral. Since bringing about participation is part of how a 
humour act succeeds, and therefore part of how such an act is judged as superior 
or inferior, if a humour act repels participation because participating would be 
unethical it is then worse for being unethical. Similarly, humour may be stronger 
for being ethical if there is an ethical reason in favour of participation. All of this 
is normative and not descriptive, so I am making theoretical claims about the 
nature of humour and not descriptive claims about anthropological groups. 
 
 The most frequently invoked examples of unethical humour are bigoted 
jokes, usually racist. One such example, used in the debate surrounding attitude 
endorsement theory, involves throwing a basketball to distract a group of black 
men from committing a gang rape.365 The joke is presented as an example as it 
potentially relies on unethical beliefs for its humour — stereotypes surrounding 
black criminality and obsession with basketball. Another set of examples, 
unrelated to attitude endorsement theory, can be found in Michael Phillips’ 1984 
“Racist Acts and Racist Humour.” The first example he uses is that of cutting a 
Chinese man’s queue.366 There is no real attitude expressed by such a prank but it 
is still racist because it is ostracizing.367 The prank attacks a feature that 
putatively defines the target as Chinese, and then makes the target the subject of 
disaffiliative laughter because of what identifies him as Chinese. Phillips notes 
that the prank works not by targeting the Chinese man for wearing a queue, but by 
using the queue as a way of attacking the man for being Chinese.368 While it is only 
the hair that is cut, it is the person who is the target. This extends to racist 
mockery more broadly: the feature being made fun of is incidental to the targeting 
 
365 Both Cohen and Carroll use this joke as an example. 
366 Phillips’ use of the Chinese queue may date his paper but the style of racist humour still exists. 
A recent example of the same can be found in Calgary, Alberta, where an 11-year-old Kainai boy 
had his braid cut at school. Lauren Krugel, “Son’s Braid Cut at Calgary School: Indigenous Mother 
Hopes for Teaching Moment,”CBC, June 3, 2018,  https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/sons-
braid-cut-at-calgary-school-1.4689811; Michael Phillips, “Racist Acts and Racist Humour,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 14, no.1 (1984): 88. 
367 Phillips, 88. 
368 Ibid. 
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of the racialized person.  The second example he uses is that of caricatures and 
insults that trade that work by describing the target. He invokes schoolyard jibes 
where describing the target — “She has black skin!” or, “His eyes look different!” 
— is the entirety of the joke. There are also jokes that trade on statistical truths, 
like a racialized minority having lower levels of literacy or lower health 
expectancy. A pointed example of the strength of this sort of racist humour is how 
the watermelon went from being a symbol of black self-sufficiency in the American 
South, after the civil war, to a symbol invoked by racists against black Americans. 
William R Black identifies the beginning of this move with a newspaper cartoon 
from 1869 which does no more than show some black children eating watermelon 
while carrying a caption about a particularly-black “fondness for watermelons.”369 
It is racist humour by description. 
 
 While bigoted humour is often the focus for studies of unethical humour, 
the account given generalizes easily. Phillips’ account of racist humour, especially, 
easily generalizes to explain how humour may be unethical even if it is not 
bigoted. This sort of exclusionary humour, for example, is typical of bullying. 
Margaret Atwood describes this sort of schoolyard bullying in her semi-
autobiographical novel Cat’s Eye where the protagonist Elaine Risley is bullied by 
her supposed friends. One of the regular forms this bullying takes is that they 
follow behind her and describe her as she walks. Cyberbullying and other forms of 
internet-organized harassment also fit into the model of humour centred around 
attacking and mocking people. Members of websites like 4chan and Kiwifarms 
justify bullying — ranging from anonymous mocking to real life attempts to get 
people fired — as being “for the lulz.”370 While bullying can fall along bigoted lines 
it does not do so necessarily, and does not have to be bigoted to be immoral.371 It 
 
369 William R. Black, “How Watermelons Became a Racist Trope,” The Atlantic, December 8, 2014, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/how-watermelons-became-a-racist-
trope/383529/. 
370 Members of websites like 4chan and Kiwifarms are often described as “trolls.” I think a good 
definition of trolling would be something along the lines of “a form of comedy centred around 
provoking a reaction from an unwilling target.” Understood as such, it is easy to see how trolling 
and bullying coincide. 
371 Phillips provides a discussion of how to think of situations where the bullying does fall along 
bigoted lines. Since racism is (among other things) an ideology, bullying along racist lines can serve 
to buttress ideological racism irrespective of the intentions of any of the participants. Phillips, 96. 
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is humour that works to exclude the target, and this exclusion can be sufficiently 
serious that participating in it is a serious moral offence. 
 
 There is also humour that is unethical without it fitting in to any broader 
classification. This is humour that harms. Consider a playful exchange between 
friends, when one friend goes too far — one person mocking another for their best 
friend dying young: “it’s good that you were both so young, that means you didn’t 
really appreciate the friendship.” This is a hurtful and alienating jibe. The humour 
is substantially at the target’s expense, and so to participate in the jibe is to 
participate in hurting the target.  
 
 It is important to note that not all moral offences are of the same 
magnitude. Participating in the bullying of a vulnerable minority is not the same as 
overstepping common respect in banter between friends. There will be plenty of 
instances where humour will have some moral component, but that component will 
be so small as to be irrelevant to the judgement of the humour. Hiding a friend’s 
beer at the pub will cause them some small distress, but the ethical wrongness of 
such an action is microscopic. Altogether, this means that humour suffers more for 
more serious moral infractions, and less for less serious moral infraction. This does 
mean that humour at the expense of vulnerable populations stands to suffer more, 
but that is ethically intuitive. Definitional to a population being vulnerable is that 
members of that population are disproportionately subject to violence, and in a 
worse position to withstand violence. Jokes at the expense of the systematically 
disenfranchised are capable of hurting more because there is a whole system 
(ideological or concrete) magnifying that harm. 
 
 The discussion of humour so far in this subsection has concerned outgroup-
targeted humour. It has been about “laughing at,” and people who may be harmed 
by being laughed at. Something briefly has to be said about ingroup-oriented 
humour, where people are laughing together and the target, if there is one, is not 
present. It’s the sort of humour defended with some version of “well it’s just me 
and my friends here, so I don’t think we’re hurting anyone.” Phillips’ discussion of 
racist humour is instructive here because he situates particular racist acts within a 
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broader ideological structure of racism.372 Racist humour, even if only among 
friends, works not just to solidify the ingroup but to solidify the ingroup along 
racist lines.373 Phillips evidences this with a counterfactual, noting that were one 
to pointedly not laugh along with a racist joke, even among good friends, one 
would find themselves at least partially alienated from that group. He writes: 
Those among us who fail to laugh — or who object to laughter — are 
immediate outsiders, perhaps even traitors. In general, the price of 
objecting is a small exile. By participating, however, one accepts 
membership in a racist association (albeit a temporary one). The 
seriousness of so doing, of course, is far less than, e.g., the 
seriousness of joining an official white supremacist organization. But 
notice that the difference in seriousness diminishes the greater one’s 
participation in such informal communities of feeling.374 
Racist humour helps form racist groups, and in turn those groups help compose 
society.375 Accordingly, the things that define these groups are never completely 
separate from their broader social outcome. Phillips notes with reference to 
bigotries that systems like racism are ideological and widespread.376 This means 
that racism in a racist society spreads easily, and so there are more of these 
“informal communities of feeling.”377 It is unethical to participate is buttressing 
racism, even in a racist society. Accordingly, racist jokes, even in the case where 
it is a small group of friends laughing along, are less funny for being racist. 
 
 The framework I have provided so far to discuss humour that is worse for 
being unethical also works for humour that is better for being ethically virtuous. 
Just as humour can suffer if there is an ethical reason to not participate, it can 
benefit if there is an ethical reason to participate. Just as humour can be used to 
foster groups based upon unethical lines (such as the racist ingroups described by 
Phillips), it can be used to foster ethically meritorious groups. Humour at the 
 
372 Phillips, 96. 
373 Ibid, 91. 
374 Ibid, 91. 
375 Ibid, 90. 
376 Ibid, 96. 
377 Ibid. 
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expense of a racist outgroup can affirm antiracism within the ingroup.378 Similarly, 
humour can be ethically meritorious if the target of the humour, for one reason or 
another, is a just target for the power that humour can exercise. This is humour 
that conforms to the lay idea of “punching up.” Real instances of this sort of 
humour where the target is present are rare since if the target really does hold 
that power then the would-be humourist and potential audience are probably not 
in much of a position to actually get away with any kind of direct humorous attack.  
 
 So far I have discussed how humour may be more or less funny by way of its 
ethical content. To achieve this, I have assumed cases where the ethical content 
of the humour act is clear. However, this is rarely actually the case. Humour is 
often unclear for one reason or another. This could be a feature of the humourist 
not being well known to the audience, or the humourist just not being very good. 
In the following subsection I will engage unclear humour and, recurring the 
discussion on trust from earlier in the chapter, and provide an account of how to 
deal with ethically ambiguous humour. 
 
1.4.2 Ethically Ambiguous Humour 
 
The ethical content of humour is often unclear. In this subsection I will engage the 
two different ways that this ethical content may be unclear. The first is that the 
ethical content of the humour might not be well articulated. The second is that 
the humourist’s intentions and motivations might be dubious. In each case, I argue 
that what is at issue is humourist failing to earn the audience’s trust, and failing to 
be clear in their humour. This means that ethically dubious humour is less funny to 
the extent that its ethical content is unclear. 
 
 I have previously defended evaluating works of art by clarity. I defended 
clarity with respect to works of art, but it is applicable to humour for the same 
reason. Humour cannot succeed without the audience “getting it.” Humour that is 
unclear is, from the perspective of the audience, more or less obscure, which in 
 
378 There are, of course, many reasons to be suspicious of hollow protestations of one’s goodness, 
especially when these originate from corporate advertisements. There is more to opposing racism 
than mocking racists. 
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turn hinders their ability to get it. Accordingly, one of the tasks of the humourist is 
to make sure their works are clear.379 
 
A work being ethically unclear interferes with the audience getting it. While 
all humour suffers from the audience not completely getting it, this is more 
pronounced in the case of ethical evaluation. This is because the ethical 
evaluation of humour under the social account emphasizes humour as a way that 
power may be exercised. If the audience cannot be sure of the ethical content of 
some humour, then they have an additional reason to not (fully) participate 
because they have reason to be cautious of exercising power over someone or 
some group in a vulnerable position. 
 
 In cases where the ethical content of humour is poorly articulated, it is 
mostly clear that the humour has some ethical content, but exactly what that 
content is is unclear. The audience knows what the topic is, but is unsure just 
what point the humourist is trying to make. This is usually clumsy, inexpert 
humour between acquaintances when the would-be humourist overestimates their 
own ability, but there are examples from professionals. Many can be found in the 
world of political cartooning, where professionals are on a tight deadline, and so 
must scribble whatever they can as quickly as they can. Consider a 2014 cartoon by 
Michael Ramirez. The subject is a WWII-era bomber with the campaign logo of 
Barack Obama on the tail. The nose bears the writing “Ebola Gay” and it is 
dropping a bomb labeled “Ebola.” There is no other detail or labeling. From the 
cartoon’s context as a political cartoon, and its invocation of Obama and Ebola, it 
is evident that there is some moral content to this cartoon. What that content is, 
however, remains a mystery. Another example can be found in a 2003 cartoon by 
Ted Rall. In it a Palestinian terrorist reacts to George W Bush saying “they hate us 
for our freedom” by soliloquizing about how well Bush understands him and how 
well-to-do his friends are before blowing himself up. In each case, the cartoon is 
not very funny to begin with, but that is to be expected. A failure of clarity is 
fundamentally a failure of competence, and if a professional humourist is not 
 
379 As I noted in chapter 4, a work being “clear” means that it is clear what the audience’s response 
ought to be. Works that are purposefully obscure may still in this sense be clear. 
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particularly good at getting across the humour of their work, they are likely poor 
at other aspects of their work as well. In each case, though, the works are 
nevertheless still worse for ambiguity surrounding their ethical content. The 
Ramirez cartoon is total nonsense, unclear whether or not it is even lampooning 
Obama. It is unclear who is being laughed at and who the prospective audience 
would be laughing with, and this repels participation. The Rall cartoon is a little 
more clear. Bush is definitely the target, and there appears to be at least some 
sympathy for the Palestinian figure. However, the exact ethical content of the 
cartoon is still unclear. Specifically, the attitude towards Palestine and 
Palestinians is unclear, and it is unclear how much of the humour is at their 
expense. The prospective audience may be confident that they are aligning against 
Bush, but it is unclear whether the audience is aligned with or against (or have no 
particular position with respect to) the Palestinians. With both cartoons, unclarity 
surrounding the humour’s ethical content damages the humour because the 
audience cannot be sure with whom they would be participating. If humour only 
brings about reluctant or half-hearted participation, then it is inferior. 
 
 Humour that suffers from poorly articulated ethical content is often not 
much of an issue because it is usually otherwise bad. When humour is between 
“not particularly funny” and “completely unfunny” its particular gradations are 
rarely the subject of debate. Humour with unclear intentions or motivations is 
much more contentious. In some way, all unclear humour suffers from unclear 
intentions. My criticism of Ramirez and Rall can be read as the problem with their 
work being that what they intended was unclear. Accordingly I must clarify that 
when I write of unclear intentions in humour I am writing about something more 
specific. To explicate this sort of humour, I want to recur the examples of 
unethical humour from the previous subsection. There is group-based humour that 
may be affiliative or disaffiliative. Disaffiliative humour may be used to exercise 
power. Disaffiliative humour that targets vulnerable groups is ethically dubious. 
Common and severe examples of unethical disaffiliative humour include racist 
humour, sexist humour, and bullying. Where “unclear intentions and motivations” 
comes in is that humour does not always announce itself as clearly racist. From the 
audience’s perspective it is often unclear whether a piece of humour is affiliative 
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or disaffiliative, and for group-based humour with ethical content that is 
significant.  
 
 There are two ways in which the affiliative or disaffiliative nature of group-
based humour may be ambiguous. The first is that it may be ambiguous as to 
whether the humourist is trying to be affiliative or disaffiliative. The second is that 
even if the humourist is trying to be affiliative, they may nevertheless have a 
conception of the group(s) in question such that the humour is nevertheless 
unethical. Both are similar, although the second requires an additional degree of 
argumentative finesse to set out. In each case the humourist must be able to make 
clear that their intentions are of the right sort: either that they do not mean to 
target a vulnerable minority, or that they are affirming an ingroup that includes 
the humourist and audience as equals. In cases of ambiguous humour, it is 
important that the humourist earn the trust of the audience. Recall the analysis of 
trust and humour that I gave surrounding Kevin Hart’s Laugh at my Pain: jokes 
about him being short of money require that he situate himself as someone who 
knows what being short of money is really like, so he begins his show by 
establishing his childhood in a poor area of Philadelphia.  Ethically dubious humour 
requires a similar feat from the humourist — for them to make clear, in one way or 
another, that they intend their humour affiliatively or disaffiliatively as 
appropriate. 
 
 An additional level of finesse is necessary to make sense of cases where the 
humourist is trying to be appropriately affiliative or disaffiliative but there are 
nevertheless doubts about the way they conceive of the groups in question. This is 
the paradigm case of someone making a joke to a group where that joke is 
normally only told amongst members of that group, but the humourist is not part 
of that group. Recall the way the idea of trust was set up in Chapter 1, part of 
what is in question is not just what the utterer intends, but what the utterer is 
capable of intending. That is very important when dealing with ethically dubious 
humour. If a white humourist makes a joke surrounding racialized blackness, then 
even if the humourist intends the joke to be affiliative the degree to which the 
humour actually is affiliative will depend, in part, on how the humourist conceives 
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of blackness. The content of the humour depends on what “black” is taken to 
mean, and what “black” is taken to mean in the mouth of the humourist. What 
“black” can mean depends on what can be successfully uttered into an utterance 
in such a way that the audience can believe the utterer to intend. Accordingly, if a 
humourist wants to make a joke that trades on the concept of blackness, they 
must make sufficiently clear that they do not take being black to be something 
pejorative. Note that this does not mean that a conception of a group identity 
cannot be negative. Plenty of affiliative humour by oppressed groups trades on the 
oppression that their identity confers. But the humour still succeeds because it 
manages to convey a sense of camaraderie or solidarity. 
 
 Humour that trades on group identities requires the humourist to evince an 
understanding of that group identity, and what it is like to be a member of that 
group. This makes sense of why group-oriented humour is often more readily 
accepted from members of a group than from someone who is not a member of a 
group. If a white humourist wants to make a joke that trades on blackness, then 
they must make clear a sufficient familiarity to or understanding of the experience 
of being black. The advantage of such a framework is that it does not just allow 
for non-group members to make jokes that are normally reserved for group 
members, but it helps explain when and why they succeed. Consider the following 
cases. 
Russell Peters — Peters is an Indo-Canadian stand-up comedian who 
deals in ethnic humour. He makes jokes concerning the behaviour of 
ethnic minorities, immigrants, and people of colour. (These groups 
are often coextensive in his comedy.) Peters is also extremely popular 
with people of colour. For example, in his shows he will ask if there 
are any Mexicans in the audience. He will then single out the 
respondents and make jokes concerning Mexican stereotypes and 
affect a stereotypical Mexican accent. This sort of humour could 
easily be considered unacceptably racist, but it is accepted and 
specifically accepted by members of the target communities. Peters 
succeeds, I suggest, because he often focuses on his own upbringing 
as a racialized immigrant and how that set him apart in Canadian 
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society. His most famous line concerns his heavily-accented father 
threatening to beat him, often in relation to Peters trying to follow 
the lead of a white friend. Peters gains the audience’s trust by 
showing deep familiarity with the experience of being marginalized 
for being a racialized immigrant. 
 The Infidel — This is a 2010 film starring Omid Djalili as Mahmud 
Nasir. Nasir has lived his life as an average middle-class Muslim in 
London’s East End. When clearing out the house of his recently-
deceased mother he discovers that he was adopted and is in fact 
Jewish. The plot of the film the follows Nasir trying to balance 
learning to be Jewish enough to satisfy a persnickety rabbi while also 
being Muslim enough to fool a caricature of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 
Part of Nasir learning to be Jewish is learning to embody various 
stereotypes, and at one point he goes through a dream sequence 
dressed as a prisoner in a Nazi concentration camp. These jokes work 
because the film manages to evince a sufficiently strong and nuanced 
sympathy of being Jewish (one which even situates ‘authentic’ 
Jewishness opposite paper-official Judaism). The sympathetic 
portrayal of Jewishness allows the film’s humour to work affiliatively, 
successfully working off an in-group of both Jews and Muslims. One of 
the more subtle jokes to reinforce this is characters’ continual use of 
“Jesus,” as an expletive, reinforcing both Jewish and Muslim mutual 
distance from an English culture that is baseline Christian. 
Team America: World Police — The 2004 movie provides an example 
of where humour suffers from the humourists not earning the 
necessary trust. The film is a putative satire of American imperialism, 
featuring a photogenic380 American special operations team that 
combats terrorism. The film aspires to be an exaggeration and 
according takedown of American attitudes towards the rest of the 
world. However, its humour suffers because its portrayal of Arab 
Muslims fails to rise above simple racism. The Arab Muslim puppets 
 
380 As photogenic as marionettes can be. 
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are all dressed stereotypically and speak a nonsense language 
consisting mostly of “durka durka.” They live in the country of 
Durkastan. The film fails to afford the characters of even the voice 
and place that Rall provides his Palestinian character. Since the film 
has nothing to elevate the characters above flat stereotypes, the 
film’s humour suffers. Even if it manages to identify Arab Muslims as 
victims of American imperialism, the impoverished conception of the 
Arab Muslim identity leaves the impression that the humour is still 
disaffiliative towards Arab Muslims. Participation is repelled for an 
audience that is cautious of participating in racism against Arab 
Muslims. 
As the examples show, an implication of the trust argument is that no topic of 
humour is ever completely off limits due to being unethical. The reason these 
topics appear to be off limits is because they require the humourist to be highly 
trusted by the audience. Creating that level of trust is difficult, and beyond the 
skill of many.  
 
 In sum, ethically dubious humour requires the audience’s trust of the 
humourist. They must trust that the humourist is acting appropriately affiliatively 
or disaffiliatively, and they must trust that the humourist is the sort of person who 
is capable of having the appropriate intentions. As I noted in Chapter 1, this trust 
is rarely absolute or completely absent. Rather, it works in degrees. It is a 
question of the audience trusting the humourist more or less. As the examples 
show, giving particular evaluations in terms of humour is quite difficult. What 
makes a humourist seem trustworthy might be quite ephemeral. The strength of 
my theory is not in providing concrete judgements in concrete cases, but in 
predicting where disagreements will happen. 
 
 Under the social account of humour, humour is better or worse by how it 
merits or repels participation (in the form of laughter). Humour acts have ethical 
content that can affect participation. Humour will most often repel participation if 
it targets a vulnerable group. There is much humour where it is unclear the extent 
(or in what way) a vulnerable group may be targeted. In these cases, humour will 
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stand and fall by how much the audience trusts the humourist. Consequently, it is 
one of the tasks of the serious humourist to earn the audience’s trust. Since trust 
is never absolute, ethically dubious humour will always be dubious, and will always 
suffer a bit but not necessarily a lot. I now return to satire, and how what I have 
provided so far this chapter interacts with my account of satire. 
 
2. How Unethical Humour Can Harm Satire 
 
This section will provide an account of how satire suffers for its humour being 
unethical. It will take a similar structure to the previous section. First, I will show 
how satire can fail if the humour fails for ethical reasons. As with ethically dubious 
humour, total failures are rare. The account of full failure serves mostly to support 
the second subsection, where I engage partial failures of satire. As with humour, 
satire depends upon the audience trusting the satirist. Ethically dubious humour 
requires the satirist have a considerable degree of trust from the audience.  I 
conclude with a third section on how the mass media context can serve as a 
millstone for satire with respect to humour. Professionally produced satire has 
many authors and is produced in a more or less opaque industrial context. In this 
subsection I will discuss how it affects the humour in satire and set up a transition 
to Chapter 6 where I will more fully discuss satire in a mass media context. 
 
 Some notes on what I am focusing on in this section. The topics are humour 
and satiric failure. I am focusing on how humour can fail, and how this affects 
whether or not a work is satirical. I do not want to focus on judgements of 
whether a work of satire is better or worse as a work of art, although some of that 
will necessarily feature in the subsection on partial failures. As was the case in the 
first section of this chapter, and in previous chapters of this thesis, I believe that 
the virtue of the account I provide here is not so much that it will allow someone 
to readily pinpoint whether or not some work is satirical, but rather that it 
predicts where and how people will disagree over a work being satirical. 
 
2.1 Full Failures and “Simply Cruel” 
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I have argued that a work is satirical, in part or in whole, insofar as it makes a 
criticism by way of a funny misrepresentation. This account centres the satirical 
misrepresentation, otherwise known as the “double object.” The double object 
comprises the model — the target of the satire beyond the work — and the 
intentional object — the misrepresentation of the model within the work. The way 
the model is misrepresented in the intentional object either embodies or conducts 
the satiric criticism. As I argued in chapter 2, that the misrepresentation is funny 
serves to guarantee the criticism of the model by way of its misrepresentation. I 
presented the example of Michael Crichton writing one of his critics into his novel 
Next as a pedophile and argued that since this misrepresentation is “simply cruel,” 
the humour fails along with the satire. I promised to complete the argument in this 
chapter, which I will now do using the tools provided in the first section. 
 
 The term “simply cruel” is explained easily with the tools from this chapter. 
The cruelty is in the real or potential harm of the humour, which repels 
participation. “Simply” connotes that there is nothing more to the attempted 
humour than this cruelty. Not only does the cruelty snuff out the potential 
humour, but it means that there is nothing of substance for a criticism. Similar to 
how, on Phillips’ analysis, the cutting of the Chinese queue does not trade on any 
concrete attitude but is just an act of alienation, so too does simply cruel humour 
fail to convey any real criticism. There is merely distaste or a brute exercise of 
power, and without actual criticism the double object fails. The satirist may 
convey their attitude towards the model, but there is nothing in how the model is 
misrepresented in the intentional object that constitutes a criticism of the model. 
 
 Total satiric failures are rare, and I suspect that Crighton’s Crowley is a 
model for the majority of them. The distaste of the author for target is too strong, 
and so any criticism disarticulates. There is no reason for Crowley to be a 
pedophile other than that is the heaviest slur that came to Crighton’s mind. Most 
satiric failures are partial, and they will be explored in the next subsection. There 
are also other ways that satire may suffer from unethical humour. As I wrote in 
chapter 3, satirists often make heavy use of humour beyond just using it to make a 
work satirical in the first place. Satire where this secondary humour is unethical 
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will likely be worse as a whole work, but that will have no bearing on whether or 
not it is satirical. 
 
2.2 Partial Failures and Unclarity 
 
As I argued in subsection 1.3.2, most ethical failures of humour are partial, and 
not total. This is because humour is frequently ethically ambiguous, rather than 
being entirely and straightforwardly unethical. The two main ways that I identified 
for humour to be ethically ambiguous were for the humour to be poorly 
articulated, and for the intentions behind the humour to be unclear. With respect 
to satire, and whether or not a work is satirical, both of these potential 
ambiguities may be treated as the same. This is because in the context of 
interpreting a work of art, they are the same: the audience is trying to identify 
and understand the work by way of its authors’ intentions.381 They are faced with 
prescribed humour, and the question of whether or not they ought to participate. 
Since interpretation requires engaging intentions, poor articulation and unclear 
intentions are one and the same. 
 
  Ethically dubious humour in satire is quite common, and works of satire are 
executed with more or less competence. Works that suffer from ethically dubious 
humour because they are generally poorly made are not very philosophically 
interesting. If the humour is ethically dubious then the work will not clearly be 
satirical. If the work is not clearly satirical, then it will likely be worse overall as a 
work of art. Not necessarily so, but probably. The more philosophically interesting 
cases are the ones that more centrally feature questions about trusting the author.  
 
 Trust features centrally in both understanding art and engaging humour. 
Since satire uses humour to both determine and inform satiric criticism, the 
audience’s trust of the author is important in two simultaneous ways: the humour 
must be understood as either affiliative or disaffiliative with regard to both the 
model and the intentional object. Satiric humour targets both the model and 
 
381 Or whatever plays the role of authorial intentions in the interpretive scheme being used. I give a 
full account in chapter 1.   
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intentional object. Humour is ethically evaluated by how it relates to the groups it 
affiliates with and disaffiliates from. Since satiric humour has two targets, satiric 
humour has two sets of group relations to be evaluated. Humour could be ethical 
with respect to model but unethical with respect to the intentional object, and 
vice versa. If both the model and intentional object are important, then the 
humour will in part depend upon the clarity of the misrepresentation; if it is not 
clear what the model is, for instance, then the humour dynamics of affiliation and 
disaffiliation will be less clear. I engaged with clarity and misrepresentation in the 
previous chapter, so I will not fully review the argument and examples here, but I 
do recommend revisiting the Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen example after 
finishing this chapter. 
 
 The complexity of satiric humour provides more opportunities for the 
humour to be ethically dubious. The humour may be dubious in how the intentional 
object or model are characterized, since either may be characterized as a 
vulnerable group and targeted with harmful, disrespectful, or otherwise unethical 
humour. This requires the satirist to make clear their position with respect to all 
morally relevant groups in the satire; which groups are treated affiliatively and 
which groups are treated disaffiliatively. As I noted in section 1.3.2, a significant 
part of this is articulating how the groups are conceived. A satirist may make clear 
they consider themselves to be acting affiliatively, but if they cannot evince that 
affiliation, there will be a level of distrust and that distrust will render the satire 
at least partially ambiguous. Consider the following example: 
Chappelle’s Show — Dave Chappelle presents what I consider to be 
the most prominent example of satire suffering for being unclear. He 
famously aborted his highly successful show and sent himself into 
exile because he did not feel his show’s anti-racist message was being 
sufficiently received as an anti-racist message. He decided to stop 
the show when filming a sketch concerning a black fairy in blackface 
that convinced black people to act in stereotypical ways. While 
filming he felt that one of the spectators, a white man, was laughing 
in the wrong way. He took that laugh to mean that he was reinforcing 
stereotypes instead of undermining them. On my analysis, this can be 
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understood as Chappelle deeming his work insufficiently clear. The 
abject conceptions of racialized blackness that he used were received 
such that the disaffiliation was targeted not just towards the 
abjectness, but to the racialized blackness itself.  
Note that the evaluation does not involve the topics of race and racialized 
blackness being in any way “off limits.” But they are complicated topics, and they 
require high degrees of skill to be effectively broached satirically. The popularity 
and endurance of Chappelle’s Show suggest that he was frequently successful, but 
not in this case.  
 
3 Conclusion and Transition — Mass Culture and Trust 
 
The Chappelle’s Show example suggests a subject that I will engage more fully 
next chapter. The show was a piece of mass media with many authors, and was 
distributed to a wide audience. This posed two difficulties for the audience and 
the audience’s trust. The first is that the show was an industrial product, and so 
had multiple authors. There were the writers, possibly actors, and possibly studio 
executives. As trust involves a judgement of the authors’ character, this 
multiplicity of authors inhibits trust because the authors are various and unknown. 
Their character is unknown. It is unclear who is being trusted. The second is that 
the industrial process means that all the authors are at an extensive remove from 
the audience. It is difficult for the audience to be able to trust the authors if they 
are not well known. This suggests that mass culture and the industrial process of 
cultural production will always serve as a millstone around the neck of mass-
produced satire. 
 
 In this chapter I have provided an account of how humour may be ethically 
evaluated, and how its ethical content may help or harm it. Of central importance 
are the social dynamics of the humour. Humour is an exercise of social power, so 
the social standing of the affected groups is important. Since satire depends on 
humour, if humour can fail for its ethical content then satire can fail for unethical 
humour. It is rare that humour completely fails due to being unethical, so it is rare 
that satire completely fails for its humour being unethical. However, satire is 
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structurally complex and often engages topics that are morally complex. This 
means that satire often contains ethically dubious humour. The ethical dubiety 
means that the nature and extent of the satire are often to some degree, even if 
not a large one, unclear. This does not mean that ethically dubious satire should 
be off limits, but rather that the skill needed for it to fully succeed is quite high.  
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Chapter Six: Applying the Theory in a Mass Media Context 
 
This Chapter applies the theorizing of the previous five. I have so far given an 
account of satire — a work is satirical, in part or in whole, insofar as it criticizes a 
target by way of a funny misrepresentation — and in this chapter demonstrate 
some of its explanatory value. Specifically, I want to use my account of satire to 
give a story about satire’s political potency. This is an account of what political 
effects mass media satire should be expected to have. In a sense, I am offering 
predictions: if my account of satire is correct, then this will be the case. 
 
I use the word “predictions” guardedly: I would like to bring the theorizing 
of the last five chapters out into the world, but I do not wish to fall into making 
straightforwardly empirical claims. I wish to avoid making empirical claims 
because I do not believe that a philosophical theory of satire is actually well-
positioned to invoke the existing empirical literature, mostly from the domain of 
media studies. This is because different media studies research operates on 
different understandings of satire, sometimes explicitly so but oftentimes only 
implicitly evident in the examples or cases used. To the extent that the studies use 
different understandings of satire, they do not provide evidence in favour of any 
empirical claims I would like to make. Ideally, of course, a virtue of my account of 
satire is that it could provide the sort of theorizing that could organize and orient 
future empirical research, and provide a common base so as to ensure that 
different studies are not talking past each other.  
 
 In this chapter I will split satire into two different types and investigate 
each in turn. The first object of inquiry is what I will call “mock news.” By mock 
news I mean the genre of program that often takes the form of a news 
commentary show and focuses on current events.382 This genre is worth pulling out 
because it explicitly takes politics as its subject matter, often comments directly 
on politics, and there is a common sense idea that these shows are particularly 
politically potent. While the genre of mock news is quite narrow, it still allows for 
 
382 This genre of program has in the past been called “fake news,” but I feel like it is best to move 
on from that term. 
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quite a diversity of approaches. On the one end there is a show like Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver wherein the host, John Oliver, covers the weekly news 
and makes funny comments. Opposite it is something like The Colbert Report, 
hosted by a fictional Stephen Colbert who offers fake and ironic commentary on 
the daily news. Other examples range from Brass Eye’s fake investigative 
journalism, or The Onion’s satire of new media clickbait Clickhole.383 It is worth 
noting that not all mock news is satire, and that which is satire is not equally 
satirical.384 Accordingly, in this chapter, when I refer to mock news I refer to the 
parts of it which are satirical. I will lay out exactly what these parts are in section 
2.  The second object of enquiry is what I will call “ensconced” satire. These are 
works of narrative fiction which may be in part or in whole satirical. Examples of 
ensconced satire may be fully satirical, both in premise and narrative, like Terry 
Gilliam’s Brazil (1985). They may also be pieces of satire in otherwise non-satirical 
works, like with the character Dr. Bigbee in The Watch that Ends the Night.385  
 
 Altogether, this chapter will proceed in the following three sections. In the 
first section I will give an account of mass media. I will follow the account that 
Michael Mulkay provides in On Humour (1988) to describe the pressures on the 
production of mass media satire in an industrial setting. Mulkay’s account will be 
presented in such a way as to make it consistent with the account of trust and 
interpretation which I provided in chapter 1, and this will provide the basis from 
which the analysis of the next two sections follows. In the second section I will 
 
383 It is worth noting that paradigm examples of mock news skew liberal. There is a valuable 
investigation to be had as to (1) the degree to which the mock news genre is more copacetic with 
liberalism, and, more interestingly, (2) the degree to which there is an overattribution of the title 
satire to liberal shows, and an underattribution of the title satire to conservative shows. A case to 
illuminate point (2) would be the structural similarity between The Daily Show, which is often 
taken to be a paradigmatic case of satire, and Infowars with Alex Jones. While there is a large 
difference in the quality of facts each show employs, they keep the same shape of mostly media 
criticism, some interviews, and the occasional entirely-fictional sketch. Each show centres humour, 
and makes humour central to its criticism. If The Daily Show is satire, then there is a good chance 
that Infowars is too. Jones’s conspiracy-mongering often lands him well opposite reality, but no 
part of satire trades on its content being true. 
384 Mock news that is not satirical usually falls into the category of what might be called “news with 
jokes.” These sorts of mock news shows proceed simply, with the host introducing some piece of 
news and then either them or guests making jokes about it. On my account, since there is no 
misrepresentation involved, these shows are not to be considered satire. Accordingly, much of 
shows like Last Week Tonight with John Oliver will be unsatirical. Perhaps less controversially, 
British panel shows like Mock the Week and 8 Out of 10 Cats are unsatirical mock news shows. 
385 See previous comments in ch. 4.  
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engage mock news on two points: how much should it be expected to convince 
those it targets, and how much should it be expected to change the opinions of its 
audience. I argue that mass media mock news should not be expected to convince 
its criticized targets of very much, as its targets will be chosen from those who do 
not watch the shows. There are three aspects to this point that will be addressed: 
how the show creates and maintains an audience, how the show must affirm the 
audience to keep them, and how this affirming of the audience means that the 
show will not seriously criticize the audience. I argue that there is greater hope for 
changing the opinions of the viewers, but that this must be done subtly and can 
probably not be done to great effect. In the third I engage ensconced satire and 
argue that the industrial production of mass media satire acts as a negative 
pressure on satire since it makes the work less trustworthy. I close the chapter 
with a qualified conclusion: satire is not useless, but it should not be expected to 
be the driving force behind political change. To be useful, satire should be put to 
clear ends and used to enhance existing positions.  
 
1.1 Empirical Studies 
 
As I noted in the introduction, using empirical evidence to support my 
argument is tricky. While there are empirical studies on political humour 
and satire, different studies use different understandings of satire so I 
cannot simply use them to show the truth of a theory based upon my 
account of satire. In fact, some theorists use different accounts of satire 
across their own studies. For example, a 2004 study by Dannagal G. Young 
uses Jay Leno and David Letterman’s political humour as the basis of 
studying the effects of satire on the 2000 American election.386 In contrast, 
a 2011 study she conducted with Lindsay H Hoffman makes a point of 
distinguishing between satire and politically-targeted late night comedy, a 
distinction which would exclude most of what was considered satire by 
 
386 Dannagal Goldthwaite Young, “Late-Night Comedy in Election 2000: Its Influence on Candidate 
Trait Ratings and the Moderating Effects of Political Knowledge,” Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media 48, no.1 (2004): 6. 
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Young’s 2004 study.387 Further, since studies are generally interested in 
the broader phenomenon of the effect of satirical shows, rather than my 
narrower concern of how satire influences as satire (based on my account), 
the effects that these studies show could just as easily be the product of 
something other than satire. So when a 2011 study by Jay Hmielowski et al 
finds demographic breakdowns in the consumption of satire, that could 
just as easily track demographic preferences for certain sorts of humour as 
it could track class preferences for political content.388 
 
 An issue of a different sort is how studies carve up the political 
terrain. While studies do appear to be reasonably consistent on this 
matter, the problem is that the political terrain they use is impoverished. 
Specifically, they at least appear to consistently use a liberal-conservative 
dichotomy, occasionally mapping that onto the American dichotomy of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties. The deficiencies of this approach are 
severe. The American mainstream of liberal and conservative excludes 
ample political terrain, and keeping to the mainstream seems ill-suited to 
investigating the effects of at least putatively transgressive comedy. The 
use of specifically American politics may also play a distorting effect to the 
extent that American politics diverge from those of other countries. For 
example, when Amy B Becker produces a study as to the effects of satire 
on the political engagement by Americans, and looks at Democratic and 
Republican party members specifically, those results are going to be 
substantially affected by models of cultural politics and political 
participation particular to the United States.389 Altogether, the limited and 
distorted political terrain that studies use confounds the ability to draw 
 
387 Lindsay H Hoffman and Dannagal G Young, “Satire, Punch Lines, and the Nightly News: 
Untangling Media Effects on Political Participation,” Communication Research Reports 28, no.2 
(2011): 164. 
388 Jay D Hmielsowksi, R Lance Holbert, and Jayeon Lee, “Predicting the Consumption of Political 
TV Satire: Affinity of Political Humor, The Daily Show, and The Colbert Report,” Communication 
Monographs 78, no.1 (2011): 107. 
389 Amy B Becker, “Playing with Politics: Online Political Parody, Affinity for Political Humor, 
Anxiety Reduction, and Implications for Political Efficacy,” Mass Communication and Society 17, 
no.3 (2014): 436; Amy B Becker, “Comedy Types and Political Campaigns: The Differential Influence 
of Other-Directed Hostile Humor and Self-Ridicule on Candidate Evaluations,” Mass Communication 
and Society 15, no.6 (2012): 798-799. 
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reliable conclusions about the political efficacy of satire. The studies are 
not showing the effects of satire so much as they are showing the 
functioning of the United States’ cultural-political media. And while this is 
valuable, it is not the sort of data that I can use to evaluate satire such as I 
have engaged it. 
 
2. Mass Media 
 
I understand mass media as that network of media technologies (mainly television, 
radio, print, and internet) which distributes media products to multiple audiences. 
It is currently typical of mass media that each particular medium is dominated, to 
a greater or lesser degree, by a relatively small number of large companies which 
exercise a great deal of power as to what gets chosen for distribution. In print, 
these would be publishing companies for books and news media companies for 
newspapers. For film and television, these would be studios and production 
houses. Many of these companies are private companies mandated to pursue 
maximizing profit, though there are also publicly held companies like the British 
and Canadian Broadcasting Corporations. The mass production of mass media 
creates an industrial setting: more or less organized sets of institutions and 
standard practices oriented towards creating final products, where those products 
are the movies, shows, and books that audiences consume.  
 
 The immediate implications for my account of satire are twofold. The first 
is that since the meaning of a work of art is determined in part by the intentions 
behind its making, and the industrial context of mass media comprises sets of 
standard practices concerning how works of art are made, works created in an 
industrial context have their meaning affected by that context.390 I will term this 
the ‘procedural implication’. The second is that the industrial process means that 
works, as they are created, are subject to many different inputs which may affect 
a work’s meaning more or less. These inputs may come from people working 
specifically on some particular work, like a film’s director or a book’s author, from 
 
390 See ch. 1 for my full account of the relationship between intentions and work meaning such that 
it is relevant for this analysis. 
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editors who work for the media companies, and even from figures like managers 
and executives who want to make sure that the work conforms to some greater 
standard or goal. The most extreme example of such an input is found in the 1955 
film production of George Orwell’s Animal Farm. The CIA intervened in the film’s 
production, with the desire that the film remake the book into a straight-forwardly 
anti-communist text. The book’s humans, representatives for capital and the 
aristocracy were removed, so that the story had no analog of the predatory 
capitalism that was the allegorical motivation for Orwell’s story.391 The systematic 
possibility of such interventions in industrially produced mass media I will term as 
the input implication. I will discuss these implications in greater detail towards the 
end of the section, in the specific context of satire. Before that, however, I would 
like to engage Michael Mulkay’s account of the mass production of humour and 
satire which will flesh out the nature of the industrial production of mass media. 
 
 Mulkay focuses on what he calls the “mass production of humour,” and 
takes the satirical television show Yes, Minsiter as his case study.392 Yes, Minister 
is an ensconced satire that ran from 1980 to 1982, centring on conniving 
government bureaucrats working to ignore or redirect an incompetent government 
minister. Mulkay identifies two central and related challenges for the mass 
production of televised humour. The first is that the showrunners must create and 
retain an audience.393 Retaining an audience, importantly, requires not doing 
anything to alienate the existing audience. This does not mean that the audience 
must be constantly flattered, but the show must not do anything to permanently 
drive them away. Mulkay identifies this primarily with a show’s premise.394 
Assuming that it is the show’s premise and fundamental dynamics that created the 
show’s current audience, that premise and those dynamics cannot change too 
much. This creates a lot of tension with the second challenge, which is that these 
shows must be created in a very demanding industrial context.395 For television 
 
391 Laurence Zuckerman, “How the C.I.A. Played Dirty Tricks with Culture,” The New York Times, 
March 18, 2000, page B00007.  
392 Michael Mulkay, On Humour: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society (Padstow: Polity Pressm 
1998).  
393 Mulkay, 178. 
394 Ibid, 185. 
395 Ibid, 181. 
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shows like Yes, Minister this means creating a new show every week. The 
showrunners have to do something to give the audience a reason to keep watching 
new shows, which demands frequent novelty. However, novelty is limited because 
whatever novelty there is cannot change the premise or fundamental dynamics of 
the show, lest the audience be alienated.396 
 
 While Mulkay is explicitly focusing on humour rather than satire, and while 
not all mass media satire is created in a week-over-week industrial context, his 
model generalizes well to mass media satire broadly.  This is in part because 
humour plays a large part in satire, both as something that determines what is 
satirical and as something that is just a commonly used feature in satires.397 What 
applies to creating mass media humour will often apply to creating mass media 
satire because in creating a work of satire, a humorous work is typically also 
created. More importantly, however, is that the two challenges identified by 
Mulkay apply to satire as much as humour. In the mass media context, satires are 
created with an audience in mind. Even works that are not weekly productions, 
like films or novels, are vetted by that part of the industrial process that cares 
about marketability and profitability. So a film like Pain and Gain (2013) will be 
vetted for its ability to appeal to audiences for action movies, the actors who 
appear in the film, or the film’s subject matter. There is also the pressure for 
sufficient novelty, at least so far as to gain enough of an audience to justify the 
resources put in to creating the work. 
 
 This account of the mass media context allows me to flesh out the 
procedural and input implications for mass media satire. The context of the 
procedural implication is one of rapid production for the purpose of getting a 
product to an audience.398 This amounts to something that plays the role of an 
intention behind a work’s making. The answer to the question of why some feature 
 
396 Mulkay makes the observation that this can lead to pessimistic satire. If a show’s satire rests in 
its premise, then the target of the satire can never be defeated. In the case of Yes, Minister this 
means that the bureaucracy remains forever intransigent, and the minister forever incompetent. 
Mulkay argues that this creates the impression that the intransigence and incompetence are eternal 
and unchangeable. Mulkay, 190. 
397 I offer a full discussion of humour in satire in Ch. 3.  
398 I offer a full discussion on how I engage intentions and work meaning in Ch. 1.  
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of the work is there may be that it was convenient, that it was consistent with 
standard practice, or just that it was meant to appeal to a broad audience. These 
candidate intentions are going to be constantly present for any mass media work. 
Their candidacy serves to slightly obscure the meaning of any mass media 
distributed work; any feature of the work might be there only for reasons of 
procedural expediency. The input implication also plays an obfuscatory role, since 
it does not just introduce more people as a work’s potential creators but it 
specifically introduces people whose interests in the work are likely to be different 
than the work’s normal creators. A manager or executive is far more likely to be 
motivated by procedural-type reasons: adhering to normal production methods or, 
especially, trying to create a work that is maximally profitable for the company. 
Importantly, from the perspective of an audience engaging and interpreting the 
work, it is often ambiguous to what degree these managerial and executive figures 
were involved with the creation of a work.399 This ambiguity means that 
procedural-type intentions are always candidate intentions for informing a work’s 
meaning, irrespective of whether or not this sort of procedurally-motivated 
interference actually occurred. 
 
 I will demonstrate the effects of the procedural and input implications in 
the upcoming sections of mock news and ensconced satire. A preliminary 
conclusion for this section is that the context of mass media — the industrial 
production and industrial managers — undermines the audience’s ability to trust 
the work. In chapter 1 I argued that one of the domains of trust was the institution 
of the artworld, which is a set of conventions and practices governing the creation 
and appreciation of art. For this domain, the mass media context undermines (but 
does not necessarily violate) the reflexivity condition for trust. The audience is 
uncertain whether and to what degree the work under consideration is being 
guided by intentions that are appropriately responsive to the audience’s optimistic 
attitude towards the making intentions.400 Following my argument in chapter 4, to 
 
399 There is an interesting parallel here between the potential arbitrary involvement of an 
executive and the idea of domination as per republican political philosophy.   
400 I recur that the audience is being discussed in normative terms. This is not a description of real 
life audiences, who may have very particular expectations concerning corporate attitudes towards 
brands, marketing, and fanservice. 
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the extent that the audience’s trust is undermined the work becomes less clear; 
the audience cannot be sure of the relevant art-making intentions. All mass media 
satire, then, suffers a sort of penalty for existing within the context of mass media 
since the context of mass media makes the work less clear.  
 
3. Mock News 
 
In this section I will apply my analysis of mass media to mock news and argue that 
mock news shows should not be expected to influence the beliefs of its targets, 
but it may subtly change the beliefs of its audience. I argue that its ability to 
change beliefs is severely limited because, following from my analysis of mass 
media, its audience should be expected to be composed of people who already 
accept the satirist’s arguments.  
 
 I recur that I am looking at how satire works as satire. This will exclude 
other ways that satire may have political influence. (For instance, research done in 
2004 suggested that while Saturday Night Live coverage of the US election may not 
have directly influenced viewer opinion, it did affect how news media covered the 
candidates and that coverage, in turn, did influence viewer opinion.401) As I argued 
in chapters 2 and 3, satiric criticism is conducted through the humorous 
misrepresentation of the model in the intentional object. Misrepresentation is used 
to add features or characteristics to the intentional object that the model does not 
have. Context makes clear that these misrepresentative features are the basis of a 
criticism of the model. Humour guides the attitude of the criticism and the nature 
of the satire: disaffiliative humour indicates a Juvenalian satire that tends to 
reject of be hostile to the satiric target, while affiliative humour indicates a 
Horatian satire that tends to be more forgiving of the satiric target.402  
  
3.1 The Limits of Mockery 
 
 
401 Young (2004). 
402 More on the Horatian and Juvenalian distinction in satire can be found in chapters 3 and 4. 
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As I set up in the introduction, mock news is not always exactly satire. There is 
also much mock news that is satire adjacent. This will be the sort of mockery that 
does not bother with satiric misrepresentation. Popular examples of such satire-
adjacent shows are British panel shows like Mock the Week and 8 Out of 10 Cats 
where panelists answer questions and make jokes about current events. Accepting 
these satire-adjacent shows as typical of mock news, it is fair to say that mock 
news satire, even when properly satirical, de-emphasizes misrepresentation in 
favour of direct criticism and mockery. If mockery is central then questions of 
affiliative and disaffiliative humour are central, since this is how the satirist guides 
the audience’s attitude towards the target. Disaffiliative humour renders the 
satiric outside the satirist’s or below the group’s standards. Affiliative humour 
accepts the satiric target into the satirist’s group. This is where the analysis of 
mass media becomes important. Since mock news shows are mass media products 
that seek to attract and maintain an audience they must not alienate their 
audience, and in turn one of the shows’ key tasks is to manage their mockery so as 
to keep their audiences. 
 
 Since mass media mock news must be centred on maintaining an audience, 
and mock news theoretically deals in political and moral criticism, this creates a 
strong pressure to affirm the audience. Challenging criticism leveled at the 
audience might alienate them and challenging criticism week after week might 
drive them away entirely. Targets for criticism, then, are typically chosen from 
outside of the group of the audience. If the targets are chosen from outside the 
audience then, by definition, the targets are not people who regularly watch the 
show. The dynamic, then, is that the moral and political criticism that is the stock 
and trade of mock news should be expected to affirm the audience, and target 
people who are not the audience. These two points together mean that mock news 
should not be expected to change many minds. The people who are watching the 
show are not likely to face anything that demands they change their beliefs, and 
the people being criticized are unlikely to be watching the show to receive the 
criticism. 
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 This point can be strengthened by the argument that there is reason to 
expect that the targets of the satire would find the criticism unconvincing, even if 
they received it. Satiric criticism is standardly backed by merely social power. The 
criticism is only as effective as the targets care (or are made to care) about the 
satirist’s standards. If the satiric target does not care about meeting the satirist’s 
standards, then they are free to disregard the satiric criticism. As I argued above, 
in mass media, satiric targets outwith the audience will face disafilliative humour. 
If the audience does not care about being part of the audience’s ingroup, they do 
not have to care about the audience rejecting them. 
 
 I have presented a model of mass media satire that puts at its centre a 
politics of inclusion and exclusion. The audience forms an included ingroup, and 
the satiric targets are drawn from an excluded outgroup. I have argued that 
criticism against the outgroup is ineffective in changing the targets’ beliefs 
because the targets are not going to be part of the show’s audience, and even if 
they were to receive the criticism they would be unmoved if they did not care to 
meet the satirist’s standards. I want to conclude this section of the analysis with a 
case that demonstrates an extreme, where mass media satiric criticism might go 
so far as to reinforce the targets’ beliefs. 
Culture War: “Culture war” is the term that has come about to 
describe a certain cultural dynamic from the US that was dominant 
from roughly the middle of the 1980s through the middle of the 
2000s, although expressions of it still remain. It refers to a sort of 
political bifurcation of class where class is defined by, instead of 
wealth or material realities, cultural preferences and activities.403 
The best expression of this is found in a 2006 advertisement by the 
Club for Growth, attacking Democratic Party Candidate Howard Dean 
by describing him as “latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New 
York Times-reading, body-piercing,” and “Hollywood-loving.”404 These 
 
403 Thomas Frank offers a discussion of the culture war dynamic in the chapter “The Two Nations,” 
in What’s the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2004), 13-27.  
404 Frank, 17. The Club for Growth still has the advertisement up on their youtube page, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4-vEwD_7Hk.  
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characteristics all seem to be clustered around a vague idea of 
someone coastal, urban, and metropolitan, and put in contrast (as 
the imagery of the advertisement suggests) some ambiguous down-
homey, old-timey, common-sensey essence of America. 
 
Understanding the culture war dynamic allows the following 
analysis of mass media satire. Owing to the nature of mass media 
production, major mock news shows are produced in coastal centres 
(Los Angeles and New York in the American context, Toronto in 
Canada, and London in the United Kingdom), and distributed by major 
companies which are in turn coastally based. In a context where 
many viewers buy into the dichotomies of a culture war narrative, the 
satirists that run mock news shows will find themselves squarely in 
one camp: that of the perceived urban elites. The alignment of mock 
news shows will be furthered by the fact that the audiences for these 
shows strongly trend towards young people, either college students or 
college-educated, who are at least vaguely cosmopolitan in their 
outlook.405 
 
In culture war contexts, mock news shows should not only not 
be expected to convince or persuade their satiric targets, but they 
should be expected to solidify their targets’ beliefs. As I argued 
earlier, disaffiliative satire works by setting up a group dichotomy – 
and us and them – and identifying the target as outside of the group. 
In a culture war context, the satiric target accepts the group 
dichotomy, but views the opposite group of the satirist and audience 
as the outgroup whose standards should be eschewed. 
 
I want to put this analysis in the concrete context of former 
Toronto mayor Rob Ford. Ford ran for mayor as a populist, claiming 
that he would “stop the gravy train,” and he gathered his support 
 
405 Hmielowski et al, 107. 
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from the city’s periphery.406 He was also an idiot and a buffoon – 
while video of him smoking crack would not surface until after he was 
elected, even at the time of campaign he was known as a drunken 
idiot prone to falling down, a slob and utterly disrespectable.407 He 
displayed a unity of bigotries, he dealt marijuana, and he skipped 
ethics orientation for city council members because he believed he 
did not need it since his uncle had been a member of provincial 
parliament.408 In other words, for the mock news shows, and anyone 
else who drew their livelihood from the intersection of humour and 
politics, he was manna from heaven.  
 
Much of the humour directed at Ford made it clear that he did 
not belong.409 He lacked the temperament and capabilities to govern. 
He was disreputable – he was not the sort of person that Torontonians 
would want to represent Toronto. Following from my previous 
analysis, I want to argue that this should be understood as satirists 
putting forwards that Rob Ford is ‘not the right sort of person’ and 
that he ‘violates our standards’. He did not have the character that 
the satirists considered to be appropriate for a political elite. To the 
city’s periphery, that he was not the right sort of person for the 
perceived downtown elite was a virtue. Him being satirized by 
someone who Ford supporters viewed as being the opposite side in a 
culture war style dichotomy reaffirmed to them that Ford was on 
‘their’ side.410 
 
 
406 David Topping, “How Toronto Voted for Mayor,” The Torontoist, October 28, 2010, 
https://torontoist.com/2010/10/which_wards_voted_for_who_for_mayor/. 
407 John Cook, “For Sale: A Video of Toronto Mayor Rob Ford Smoking Crack Cocaine,” Gawker, May 
16, 2013, https://gawker.com/for-sale-a-video-of-toronto-mayor-rob-ford-smoking-cra-507736569. 
408 Other highlights include wanting to replace Toronto’s waterfront developments with a ferris 
wheel, suggesting that child molestors were “the main cause of people jumping off bridges,” and 
arguing that women could not get AIDS because it was transmitted exclusively by gay men.  
409 This Hour has 22 Minutes, “The Best of Rob Ford Special,” Episode 311. Directed by Vivieno 
Caldinelli, Michael Lewis and Stephen Reynolds. Written by Mike Allison et al. Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, November 12, 2013. 
410 Andray Domise, who ran against Rob Ford for city council, gives a personal account of Ford’s 
popularity here: https://medium.com/@andraydomise/rob-fords-voters-have-souls-too-
824688d767d.  
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3.2 Sneaking in Beliefs 
 
I have so far focused on the expected effect of mock news satire on the targets of 
the satire, since that tracks the lay belief in the power of satiric attack, and not 
given much reason for optimism. In telling this story, I have treated the audience 
as a fixed variable: they have their preferences and it is through appealing to 
these preferences that they are attracted and kept as an audience. They are, 
however, not so fixed and, I argue, if satire is going to change people’s beliefs it is 
more likely to be those of the audience than those of its targets. 
 
 As with the previous subsection, I am still focusing on how satire works as 
satire, so I will leave to the side other ways that a mock news show might affect 
the beliefs of its audience. In the case of changing the audience’s beliefs, satire 
works through trickery. It does not offer a convincing argument as to why the 
audience ought to believe something, but offers the implication that this is what 
the audience already believes. And it accomplishes this through the same 
mechanisms of affiliation and disaffiliation that I analyzed in the previous 
subsection. 
 
 Mock news satire regularly deals in disaffiliative humour. The satiric target 
is identified as someone or something that either is or ought to be outside of the 
ingroup that contains the satirist and the audience. The reasons for the rejection 
of the target are given in the satiric criticism. This allows for a trick of 
implication. The satirist is only explicitly focusing on the satiric target, and does 
not necessarily say anything about the audience. However, the audience is subtly 
characterized by its rejection of the target; the audience must be characterized in 
some way that the target, for the reasons identified in the satiric criticism, is 
unacceptable to them.  
 
The audience does not necessarily explicitly accept this sort of 
characterization. In fact, they might not accept (or even recognize) any 
characterization at all. Rather, the audience simply goes along with the satire, and 
the satiric humour. They laugh as the “us” against the targeted “them.” This 
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provides room for the satirist to construct the “us,” the ingroup and what defines 
that ingroup. This is not something that can be done cavalierly and the audience’s 
preferences do not simply disappear. However, if the satirist is careful and clever, 
they may insert beliefs or characteristics that do not contradict the beliefs or 
values of the audience members. The beliefs, in turn, may be unconsciously taken 
up by the audience as beliefs they have always had. The characteristics of the 
target are characteristics that were always reason for the target being rejected. 
Consider Stephen Colbert’s treatment of Fox News personality Bill O’Reilly. 
The Colbert Report: The Colbert Report, while a broad mock news 
show, as also specifically constructed as a satire of the Fox News 
program The O’Reilly Factor with Bill O’Reilly. The O’Reilly Factor 
was notorious during the early 2000s for being the epitome of a 
degenerate kind of right wing infotainment. Bill O’Reilly, the titular 
host, would loudly shout exaggerated theories of how all doubt of 
American President George W Bush was part of a treasonous 
conspiracy, he would loudly shout at hapless guests before cutting 
their microphone (denying them a chance to respond), and use 
didactic graphics to inform his audience that they should be in a state 
of constant terror.  
 
Colbert presented a very specific satire of O’Reilly, affecting 
his bullying style and referring to O’Reilly as “Papa Bear.” He would 
refer to himself as pursuing not truth but “truthiness,” something 
that felt true enough even if it contradicted reality. Every episode 
would have a monologue titled “The Word,” where he would give the 
same sort of didactic monologue that O’Reilly did, and he would 
conclude episodes with the “Threatdown,” a list of threats to 
America. To pointedly mock the absurdity of O’Reilly’s fear-
mongering, Colbert would always include “bears” as a top threat to 
the United States. His interviews also mocked O’Reilly’s self-
aggrandizing not just in the questions he asked — an early Colbert 
interview features the famous question “George Bush: great President 
or greatest President?” — but by beginning not in an introduction of 
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the guest but an extended re-introduction of Colbert where he bows 
and waves to the crowd as he walks over to the interview. 
 
Colbert’s satire of O’Reilly criticizes him for his fear-
mongering, self-aggrandizing, and dishonesty. By so-characterizing 
O’Reilly, he subtly characterizes his audience in opposition to that. 
Colbert’s audience believes in moderation, fidelity to the truth, even-
handedness, and, through the context of The Colbert Report being a 
mock news show, some value of media discourse. There are a few 
ways in which this could lead to the subtle inculcation of beliefs. One 
is that if the audience only accepted some of these beliefs to start, in 
which case the satire nudges them to accept all beliefs. The most 
pointed transition, I believe, would be between the values that are 
specifically negations of the criticisms of O’Reilly (fear-mongering to 
level-headed, dishonest to even-handed) and the broader value of 
media discourse. Another is in a transition between satiric targets. If 
the audience accepts the dynamic created by Colbert’s satire of 
O’Reilly — of reasonable fairness against wild unreasonableness 
— then by changing satiric targets, Colbert subtly characterizes the 
new target as similar to O’Reilly. In 2011, Colbert chose to target 
Occupy Wall Street. By choosing Occupy Wall Street as a target, he is 
just not criticizing Occupy but subtly putting forward that the 
participants of Occupy are opposed to his audience. If the audience is 
defined by their values of moderation and even-handedness, then the 
participants of Occupy, by virtue of being the satiric targets, must in 
some way be the opposite of those values. It is like a subtle argument 
by analogy. There is some ingroup-outgroup relationship between 
Colbert’s audience and O’Reilly, the ingroup-outgroup relationship is 
defined by certain values, there is an ingroup-outgroup relationship 
between Colbert’s audience and Occupy, therefore Occupy possesses 
the same values for which O’Reilly is rejected. 
I believe that the Colbert example gives two reasons to be pessimistic about 
satire’s ability to influence its audience’s beliefs. The first is a practical 
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reason: the effect has to be slight and subtle, since the audience must already 
accept much of what the satirist is proposing they believe. An audience wholly 
enamoured with what Bill O’Reilly presented would not accept Colbert’s criticism, 
and so not allow themselves as an audience to be so-constructed. The second is a 
moral reason: the sort of influencing I suggest is possible is less than fully honest. 
It happens below the level of argument, and tricks the audience into believing that 
they already believed something. Colbert does not directly make the argument 
that Bill O’Reilly are to be held as equivalent, but rather indirectly implies it in 
how both are made satiric targets. 
 
4. Ensconced Satire 
 
Mock news only makes up a small part of satire. There are songs, cartoons, novels, 
shows, and films. In this section I will focus on what I call ensconced satires, which 
are narrative works of satire. I call these satires “ensconced” because the satire 
sits comfortably within a larger work. While the argumentative points of mock 
news satire are often made directly, and the point of the show is to receive the 
argument, the satire of ensconced satire is part of a larger work. Even in wholly 
satirical works where the satire is the foremost point of the work — I think here of 
a satirical allegory like the film Snowpiercer (2013) — it nevertheless exists within 
a greater narrative. The satire is delivered through the narrative. 
 
 This section is dedicated to analyzing ensconced satires in light of the 
analysis of mass media given in the first section. The industrial context of mass 
media dampens a work’s value by making it less clear, since mass media makes it 
harder for the audience to trust the making intentions of a work. I will argue that 
this effect is pronounced in the case of satire, since many putative satiric 
criticisms run counter to the ideas and values that animate both media industry in 
general and particular media companies. If the mass media context limits the 
clarity of a satiric criticism, then the critical capacity of satire must be considered 
to be limited by the mass media context. My argument for this section is that the 
mass media context muddles satiric criticisms. If the criticisms are muddled, then 
they should be expected to be less effective. If a satire’s criticisms are less 
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effective, then its political potential is lessened. To elaborate this point I will 
recur arguments from chapter 1, concerning meaning, intention, and trust, and my 
analysis of mass media. I will use them to show how mass media inhibits audience 
trust, and that this lack of trust in turn reduces a work’s clarity. 
 
 In chapter 1 I provided an analysis of the James Bond movie Skyfall (2012) 
which did well to draw out some of the issues I would like to discuss here. The film 
is the 25th James Bond film411 and so provides a sort of retrospective on the 
character. It examines what the character is, what the character can be, and 
whether the character is a hopeless anachronism. One interaction involves Bond 
and the character Sévérine who he meets in Monaco. Sévérine announces herself 
as an escaped child sex slave, and that she is under the control of the villain Raul 
Silva. Later, Bond approaches Sévérine in the shower, and notes that she does not 
have her gun for protection. One way to read this scene is as a criticism of the 
Bond character as presenting a predatory masculinity, which would be consistent 
with other criticisms of Bond as outdated which occur throughout the film. 
However, the film is also a standard James Bond film. The character navigates a 
glamourized world of violence, sex, and luxury. Importantly, Skyfall is a Bond film 
produced and promoted by a major studio and rich producers who are invested in 
the continuation of the Bond franchise, which means both the protection of the 
Bond brand and the affirmation of Bond fans. These latter two points make it 
difficult for the audience to trust the film. They cannot be sure that the film is 
fully critical of Bond because there is doubt that the intentions behind the 
filmmaking could be fully committed to a criticism of Bond. Using the language 
that I established in chapter 4, the work is unclear. 
 
 My analysis of mass media helps explain the distrust in the Bond example. 
Skyfall is a media product designed and distributed for consumption, and to be 
consumed in such a way that is profitable for the people making and distributing 
it. While the particular people who are concerned with the film’s profitability 
might not be conventional artistic participants — they are not actors or directors 
 
411 As per the official lineage. There are other, less official James Bond films like the 1967 Peter 
Sellers Casino Royale. 
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or editors — they may nevertheless make or otherwise influence decisions that 
determine the content of the film. These unconventional artistic participants are 
likely to have interests orthogonal to those of the conventional artistic participants 
— specifically oriented towards the film being designed and distributed for 
consumption — and so may be suspected of acting with intentions quite different 
from usual art-making intentions. In the particular case of Skyfall, these intentions 
centre on the profitability both of the film and the companies and producers 
behind it. Recurring my analysis from chapter 1, whether or not the actual 
producers and managers have these intentions, and whether or not the producers 
and managers actually intervene in the film, from the perspective of the audience 
these intentions are still candidate intentions and must be considered. As the 
audience engages Skyfall, they are engaging a mass media product that is the 
result of a certain industrial process, and that process promotes interests 
concerning marketability and consumability. These interests militate away from 
seriously challenging what makes the product attractive, so the audience has 
reason to doubt that something that seems seriously critical of the product’s key 
attraction — Bond’s aggressive masculinity in the case of Skyfall — is in fact a 
criticism.  
 
 This analysis of Bond and Skyfall generalizes comfortably to satire, with the 
key difference being that the unclarity in the case of satire is more pronounced. 
The unclarity is more pronounced because satiric criticisms are often moderately 
unclear already, due to working through misrepresentation. Again, satiric criticism 
is conducted through the humorous misrepresentation of the model in the 
intentional object. Misrepresentation is used to add features or characteristics to 
the intentional object that the model does not have. These misrepresentative 
features or characteristics either embody or direct the criticisms against the 
model. For this criticism through misrepresentation to succeed these 
misrepresentative features have to be understood as misrepresentative features 
(as opposed to features of stylistic design or mere incompetence), and they have 
to be understood as either embodying or directing criticisms against the models. 
Both the misrepresentation itself and the criticism through misrepresentation are 
often at least a little unclear just on account of the indirectness of criticism 
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through misrepresentation and how fine grained the distinction may be between 
misrepresentation and representation within a style. Accordingly, mass media 
satire might be thought to be doubly unclear: it is unclear because of the 
ambiguity inherent in criticism-through-misrepresentation and it is unclear 
because of the distrust of the work for being a piece of mass media. 
 
 This double unclarity comes to the fore in case of criticisms that run 
counter to the values that inform the industrial production of mass media. There 
are two particular ways in which satirical criticisms suffer that I want to draw out. 
The first is when the criticism picks out a satiric target that is valuable to some 
participant in the industrial production process, similar to the Skyfall case 
discussed above. The second is when the criticism relies on values that seem to 
contradict the values associated with mass media and industrial production. 
As I noted in the Skyfall case, there is reason to doubt that a company would put 
out a mass media product that makes a serious criticism of that exact mass media 
product, or at least the sort of product that it is. The industrial production context 
means that the people involved in the work’s production are strongly incentivized 
to affirm and retain an audience, which means not undoing what draws the 
audience to the work. This does not mean that such auto-critical works cannot be 
produced, but just that when a putatively auto-critical work is created it is less 
clear because the audience cannot fully trust the intentions behind that work’s 
creation. I want to examine this in two cases. The first, Cabin in the Woods (2012) 
is an example of a film that suffered because it took as its satiric target something 
that was essential to its own success. The second, Sucker Punch (2011) work as a 
sort of correlative case: a film that suffered because it took as its target 
something that the (real) audience considered to be essential to that film’s 
financial success. These two failures are similar, and may be thought of as film-
side and audience-side failures. CitW is a film-side failure because it is the content 
of the film that is muddled and uneven. Sucker Punch is an audience-side failure 
because the unclarity is specifically a result of the film contradicting audience 
expectations. 
Cabin in the Woods: CitW is an attempt at a horror film that is a 
satire of horror films. This is easy to deduce as the film’s framing 
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narrative is of two middle manager types covertly manipulating 
teenagers into a conventional horror film scenario. Once there the 
teenagers are faced with a sort-of-but-sort-of-not randomly-selected 
classical horror villain, and those teenagers being killed is recorded 
for the satisfaction of some ambiguous elder gods. Throughout, the 
film attempts to render satirical criticisms of horror films like that 
those films are sexist, derivative, and contrived. The contrived 
criticism is mainly demonstrated through the framing device, that the 
teenagers are manipulated by a corporate entity to act differently to 
how regular humans would act. An example of the derivative criticism 
is a scene where the corporate manipulators bet on which horror 
villain will be summoned, and comment that some version of zombies 
has been chosen yet again. The most straightforward instance of the 
criticism that horror movies are sexist, by way of being exploitative, 
is where the corporate manipulators use chemicals to manipulate one 
of the female teenagers into taking her top off and showing her 
breasts to the camera.  
 
The problem that all of these criticisms run into is that the film 
nevertheless attempts to hew close to a horror movie formula, and 
appease horror movie fans. This means that the film embodies what it 
is putatively criticizing, thus making it less clear exactly what its 
critical point is. Consider the sexist-criticism instance, where the 
corporate manipulators force the woman to take her top off. This 
scene is preceded by a conversation between the manipulators where 
they discuss that what they are doing is sexist and exploitative. The 
ordering of the scenes undercuts the putative criticism: this feature 
of the film is exploitative but it is happening anyway because the 
diegetic viewers like it. Even if the scenes were oppositely ordered, 
however, there would still be the issue that the exploitative scene 
would still have been presented to the audience on the basis that the 
audience enjoys it. It is difficult to accept that the intentions behind 
the film are truly critical given that the film embodies what it is 
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putatively criticizing. Similar analyses can be given of the putative 
criticisms that horror films are derivative and contrived, as film 
presents a derivative and contrived film for the audience’s 
enjoyment. The scenes of the zombies stalking and killing the 
teenagers are filmed as conventional horror scenes, with the 
standard-for-horror prescribed response of fear. What is worth 
remarking is that in each case, it is still reasonably clear that what 
the film is putting forward is that horror movies are sexist, 
derivative, and contrived. What is getting particularly muddled is to 
what degree the film is taking a critical attitude towards these 
features, and to what degree. The film is not rendered completely 
unintelligible, but it is less clear. And to the extent that it is less 
clear, it is worse. 
 
Sucker Punch: Sucker Punch is a satire that, I argue, was largely not 
received as a satire because it took as its target the attitudes and 
preferences of its target audience. The plot centres on a woman who 
is imprisoned at a reformatory for “wayward” women, and the 
reformatory sells the women as prostitutes. The core conceit of the 
movie is that any time one of the women is forced to perform a 
sexualized dance, the film changes to a fantasy sequence where the 
women enact some portion of their plan to escape. Each fantasy 
sequence draws from a different genre of popular media aimed 
towards males aged 12-25: there is a high fantasy sequence, a war 
sequence, and an action-heist sequence. Each sequence is 
theoretically hyper-violent and features theoretically highly-
sexualized actresses, but is staged and shot as to deny the enjoyment 
of violence and titillation. The criticism that the film offers is of what 
might be considered nerd media contemporaneous to the film (2011). 
The content of the criticism is that nerd media is connected by 
exploitative and misogynist attitudes that stem from a desire to own 
and control women. The targets of the criticism, in other words, are 
the fans of titillating violence who paid to watch Sucker Punch in 
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cinema. That’s the basis of the film’s title: the viewer is drawn in and 
sucker punched. 
 
The film was not well-received. According to Cinemascore, 
which tracks audience responses immediately after seeing films in 
theatre, Sucker Punch received a B-, which is very low for a major 
release.412 Rotten Tomatoes, which aggregates responses to films, 
registers a mere 23% of professional critic reviews of Sucker Punch as 
positive, and 47% of audience reviews as positive.413 I take this as 
evidence that the film did successfully make the audience feel 
attacked, but was not understood as purposefully critical. This is 
evident in the professional reviews, archived on Rotten Tomatoes, 
which rarely make mention of it being satirical. Prominent articles 
that do note it as satirical, such as the one found in Slant Magazine, 
pointedly do so against the critical consensus. I argue that my analysis 
of mass media makes sense as to why Sucker Punch was largely not 
recognized as satire. The practices of industrial production are 
centred around affirming and retaining an audience. Audiences are 
familiar with these practices, and so they expect the works with 
which they interact to affirm and seek to retain them. Familiarity 
with the practices of production inform practices of interpretation. 
Targeting the audience for serious criticism runs counter to standard 
mass media practice, especially criticism that targets the audience’s 
consumption of media similar to the work in question. Accordingly, 
critical intentions are not readily interpreted. This is well-understood 
as a lack of trust, specifically a lack of trust of participants in the 
industrial film-making process to intend criticisms of the consumption 
of industrially-produced films. 
Together, CitW and Sucker Punch provide examples of how the context of 
industrial production in mass media inhibits satiric clarity and, accordingly, 
 
412 Cinemascore ratings are accessed directly through its main website: 
https://www.cinemascore.com/.  
413 Rotten Tomatoes, “Sucker Punch (2011).” Last accessed January 27, 2019. 
https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/sucker_punch_2011/.   
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dampens work value. The process of industrial production is determined, in part, 
by concerns surrounding audience retention and profitability. The process, in turn, 
possibly involves participants who are primarily motivated by those same concerns. 
To the extent that they may be involved in the art-making process, their intentions 
have to be considered as candidate intentions behind a work. To the extent that 
those candidate intentions exist, it is more difficult for the audience to conclude 
that any given feature of a work that appears to contradict or criticize the 
interests of industrial production does in fact contradict or criticize those 
features. This renders the work less clear, and if the work is less clear then it is of 
lower quality. Similarly, if a work is less clear then it should be expected to be less 
critically effective, and if it is less critically effective then it should be expected 
to be less politically effective. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
My goal for this chapter has been to apply my theory of satire from the first five 
chapters and show it has some explanatory value. I chose the are of mass media 
because for most people, that is the location and origin of most satire which they 
encounter. I have given two different arguments as to why satire should not be 
expected to be particularly effective as a means of political influence. The 
political potential of mock news shows is limited because the audience should be 
expected to already agree with the critical thrust of the show which they are 
watching by virtue of being the audience for that show. Narrative satires have the 
political potency of their messages dampened by the fact that the context of their 
creation: the industrial creation process suggests that any work created within 
that process is unlikely to have been created with intentions that substantively 
criticize and advocate action against that system. 
 
 Abstracted to their most basic points, I do not think that my arguments in 
this section are very radical. The culture industry comprises some of the richest 
and most powerful institutions on the planet right now. There is really no reason 
for executives from Fox and Marvel and Disney (who are increasingly the same 
people, as the companies merge) to be the locus of meaningful political change. 
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They sit on top of vast, powerful networks and would presumably like to maintain 
their positions. These networks confer real power that does not meaningfully 
depend on esteem or respectability. That is not the sort of power that is 
challenged by watching television. 
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Conclusion 
 
I have decided to present this section as an epilogue rather than a conclusion, as 
current events prevent me from reasonably saying that this topic is concluded. 
This is not to say that I do not believe I have shown anything — I am confident that 
I have — but just that I do not believe that my dissertation ends at any point of 
finality. And, I suppose, this is to be expected. In the introduction, I wrote that my 
goal was to present an account of satire that would help to make sense of people’s 
expectations of satire, and the role of satire in contemporary politics. That is not 
the sort of project that lends itself to saying “I have shown such-and-such to be 
the case.” I have aimed to provide the tools to start a discussion, not finish one.  
 
The central thing which I have provided is an account of satire, which I gave 
in chapter four: A work of art is satirical, in part or in whole, insofar as it makes a 
criticism by way of a funny misrepresentation. The first three chapters built up the 
components of this account: The first chapter established a way of understanding 
works of art that gave a prominent role to trust, and the relation between the 
audience and the work makers. The second chapter provided an account of 
misrepresentation and showed how it is essential to satire. Lastly, the third 
chapter gave an account of humour and discussed the various ways that satire 
made use of humour. The final two chapters began to apply my account of satire, 
to show what it could do to be useful. In chapter five I engaged the ethical 
evaluation of humour, and used that to discuss how a work could fail to be satirical 
because the humour was unethical. The sixth and final chapter focused on mass 
media satire, the sort that is most frequently engaged, and I show that there is not 
much reason to expect it to be a politically potent force.  
 
Many of the component arguments are interesting in their own right. I 
believe that trust is a particularly valuable way for thinking about work meaning, 
and the importance of the uncertain relationship the audience has to the artwork, 
artist, and art-making process. I believe that approaching humour as a social 
practice allows for a greater understanding of why humour is so important to 
people — it is not just a sensation or release, but a way that we manage our 
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relations to the world around us and the people in it. The social account helps 
explain why people can be so defensive about what they find funny — if humour is 
how we manage our friendships, then having a “good” sense of humour can be 
understood as meaning we have good friends, and are socially valuable, whereas a 
“bad” sense of humour may be taken to indicate inferior friends, and social 
disvalue. I do not believe that this is a logical entailment of the social account, but 
I believe people do think like this, and the social account helps to understand why 
that sort of thinking happens. And then there is the argument about the ethical 
evaluation of humour in chapter five, and this is where current events intervene. 
 
In a passage in chapter five I refer to “for the lulz” as a slogan that is used 
to justify a wide range of internet trolling, associated primarily with the websites 
4chan and Kiwifarms. The term “lulz” is a bastardization of “LOL,” early internet 
slang for “laughing out loud.” To say that trolling is done “for the lulz” is to say 
that trolling is a humour practice, with the laughter of the trolls as the goal. As I 
am first writing this section, about a week ago a member of the websites 
Kiwifarms and 8chan (a 4chan spinoff), Brandon Tarrant, was part of a group that 
murdered 49 Muslims in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. Before the 
attack, he uploaded a manifesto to 8chan, which was itself an act of trolling. It 
was full of catchphrases and memetic jokes, and justified his actions as being “for 
the lulz.” 
 
I believe that the social account of humour and the argument for ethical 
evaluation under the social account can help understand and discuss both the 
manifesto and the violence. Tarrant, and the cadre of racists and aspirant fascists 
like him on Kiwifarms and the Chan websites, are using humour to negotiate their 
place in modern society. They have identified themselves with a form of humour 
centred around the targeting or provocation of an unwilling target, and use that to 
exercise power. Since they understand the social divisions that racism wishes to 
create through humour, and those divisions are the boundaries across which power 
is exercised through humour, the humour and the fascist politics are inseparable. 
As Adam Serwer writes, “Ultimately… every joke, every pithy reference, every 
pretend gesture toward the standards of liberal democracy has the same 
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punchline: we are going to kill you.”414 The joke is violence, but violence is a joke. 
The social account of humour helps to understand this. 
 
The Serwer article represents something else, which is a change in attitudes 
from when I began my project. I wrote in the introduction that as recently as four 
years ago there was a real euphoria around the power of satire. Political humour 
was a great defence of democracy, exposing the hypocrisy and hubris of ruling-
class incompetence. An article like Serwer’s, in a major publication like The 
Atlantic, would be unthinkable then. Now pieces like Serwer’s, or Jeet Heer’s in 
The New Republic, will excerpt Jean-Paul Sartre’s “Anti-Semite and Jew” as if the 
content has always been obvious.415 The roles of humour and irony (and with irony, 
satire) are being reconsidered. 
 
This reconsideration of humour, irony, and satire is why I believe it is best 
to present this final section as an epilogue rather than a conclusion. I have tried to 
provide the conceptual tools to have a discussion that is only just kicking into gear, 
and so my dissertation does not provide the final words on a subject, but rather it 
provides the words that someone else will hopefully use to say something 
worthwhile. 
  
 
414 Adam Serwer, “Nazis Have Always Been Trolls,” The Atlantic, March 21, 2019,  
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/mosque-shooter-troll-like-original-
nazis/585415/ (accessed March 27, 2019).  
415 The particular passage being: 
Never believe that anti-Semites are completely unaware of the absurdity of their 
replies. They know that their remarks are frivolous, open to challenge. But they 
are amusing themselves, for it is their adversary who is obliged to use words 
responsibly, since he believes in words. The anti-Semites have the right to play. 
They even like to play with discourse for, by giving ridiculous reasons, they 
discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, 
since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and 
disconcert. If you press them too closely, they will abruptly fall silent, loftily 
indicating by some phrase that the time for argument is past. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew (1946), quoted in Serwer; and Jeet Heer, “Ironic Nazis are 
Still Nazis,” The New Republic, November 25, 2016,  
https://newrepublic.com/article/139004/ironic-nazis-still-nazis, (accessed March 27, 2019). 
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